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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

METAPHOR AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN POPULISM AND LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY
Populist movements have emerged the world over, appearing even in countries in
which it had long been assumed that liberal democracy was unassailable. Scholars have
been grappling with the concept of populism for decades, but as populists have won
victories close to home, the research has taken on a heightened sense of urgency. Two of
the common theses that have appeared in the recent literature are, (a) populism is opposed
to liberal democracy, and (b) populism is linked to a democratic tradition of thought that
originates with Rousseau. While I am willing to grant (a), I argue in this dissertation that
populism, at least in the United States and some European countries, has a much stronger
connection to the classical liberal tradition than many scholars would like to admit. More
specifically, the populist notion of ‘the people’ is indebted to a notion of self-interest and
an instrumental conception of government.
This dissertation examines the democratic and liberal traditions through their
orienting metaphors. The most important metaphor of is that of mechanism, which guides
both of their notions of government. While liberalism has advocated for a notion of good
government as a well-balanced machine, whose impartial procedures yield either maximal
liberty or equality, the supposedly democratic populism insists on government as a tool for
the people as voiced by a single leader. But this conception of the people as using a tool
has less to do with Rousseau’s notion of the general will and more to do with taking the
economic conception of the individual as a metaphor for the people. Or in other words,
populism treats the entire people as a single, self-interested individual writ large.
Underlying the approach to the problem through guiding metaphor is a concern
with a notion of politics as involving public world-creation. That is, ‘politics’ as a technical
term deals with the ways in which humans are spontaneous world-shapers who are not
merely conditioned by the world but also can condition it in turn. I contend that the
mechanistic metaphor, even in its liberal form, cannot adequately evoke this sense of public
power as something to be preserved. This is because liberal theory often proposes a notion

of good government as procedural, regulated, and divided by competing powers. Any
spontaneity of the individual is relegated to the private sphere, while the public sphere
remains the purview of elected representatives subordinated to ‘independent’ laws.
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CHAPTER 1. POLITICS AND METAPHORS FOR DEMOCRACY
In recent decades, bouts of populism all over the globe have seemed to increase in
both frequency and strength, winning elections in unlikely places. Authoritarian-leaning
leaders have proclaimed victory on behalf of ‘the people,’ and have set about attacking
enemies, competitors, and foreigners. The 2016 presidential election of Trump was one
such event, which has left scholars and commentators grappling with an explanation of
his success and worrying about a possible totalitarian turn. While it cannot be said
unequivocally that any new totalitarian formation has emerged from these populist
victories, racism and nationalism have clearly been at play, especially in (but not limited
to) the United States and Europe. Thus, the populist victories on behalf of the people
have—empirically at least—amounted to little more than a triumph of one group within a
country. To put the point directly, minority populations have generally lost when
populists have won.
With few exceptions, populism has been regarded as a threat to healthy
democracy. While Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau have advocated for a Leftist
version of populism, it seems dubious that any populist leaders have lived up to the
position advanced in their scholarship. 1 Thus, scholarship, if not direct political
commentary, comes to the question: what has made populism so appealing when it is
self-evidently bad? What would drive sixty million people to vote for Trump? Perhaps
the most popular and promising answer is that populism is able to exploit a certain strand

1

While Latin American populism has often been more economic-oriented and ‘Left’ than
populism elsewhere, its most famous exemplar was Hugo Chavez, whose
authoritarianism and partisan-style of politics would serve as a poor exemplar of political
virtue.
1

of democratic thinking about the people even if it is, in some way undemocratic. It seems
that getting clear on explaining both the appeal and the problem with populism, then, will
entail gaining a better understanding of the conceptual terrain set up by the notion of
‘democracy.’
In this introduction, I will first identify some of the assumptions that we tend to
make about democratic politics, so that we might develop a curious unfamiliarity with a
topic in which judgments can seem to come naturally, even automatically. Many of the
democratic concepts that we tend to take for granted, such as ‘representation,’ ‘rights,’
‘self-interest,’ and ‘checks and balances’ stem from the liberal tradition, which, while
dominant, exists alongside concepts from other political traditions, such as the
Rousseauan-democratic and republican traditions. Thus, whether it be a matter of
scholarship or a layman’s evaluation, it seems that we cannot help but draw upon liberaldemocratic concepts to think about democracy and populism. Second, I will briefly
elaborate my approach to understanding populism and liberalism, which involves
examining the metaphors they deploy in order to coordinate and determine their concepts.
They both adopt a metaphor of mechanism for government, and they both adopt a
metaphor—a schema—of an interest-driven individual for the citizen. While examining
metaphors has been an approach in political philosophy—taken by Lefort, Hegel, and
Taylor, for instance—it has not played a prominent role in the literature on populism.
Third, I will outline the three basic concepts that these metaphors help us determine and
deploy: freedom, authority, and unity. There, I will show the way in which populism and
liberalism interpret these concepts in opposed fashion.

2

The benefit of my approach is that we can see not only the opposition of populism
and liberalism, but we can also show how the shared metaphors enable a slippage
between thinking as a populist and as a liberal. Moreover, while liberalism provides a
sophisticated conceptual framework that has remained relatively stable for generations,
the impulsive, shallow eruptions of populism are not rejections of liberalism’s concepts,
they are a perverse realization of them. Thus, populism cannot be solved or fought by
simply insisting even more vehemently on the primacy of liberal concepts or about
deploying them to decry the irrationality of populists. If the insights of liberalism—
pluralism, the importance of freedom, the importance of discussion, and a rejection of
absolute authority—are to be preserved, then we must think through another political
tradition, viz., the Rousseauan democratic tradition, and set aside the primacy of
mechanistic and self-interested individual metaphors.
As I will show, rather than helping us to think of a stable, healthy notion of
democracy, these metaphors motivate a kind of instability in our concepts. This is not to
say they explain the entire psychology of everyone who draws from them, but rather, that
thinking from these metaphors has its own kind of inertia. Such inertia (a) gives a socioeconomic rational kernel to irrational populism, transformed by a fanatical, even
psychotic, belief in one’s group membership, and (b) blinds liberalism to issues of
community membership that cannot be successfully repressed. 2 If we want a stable, more
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We could put the point a little differently and say that for all its sophistication,
liberalism still has an element of the irrational insofar as (a) it renders some intelligible
questions nonsensical or irrelevant, and (b) it dispenses with the arguments and context of
certain concepts and beings to deploy them as fully transparent even as they become
increasingly opaque. Louis Hartz was comfortable referring to a kind of irrationalism
endemic to the hegemonic adoption and expansion of liberal theory, associated with
3

comprehensive theory of democracy, then, we should be ready not only to expand our
political vocabulary, but also to think about democracy differently, namely, by adopting
and working through the organic metaphor for political unity. My overarching thesis,
then, is that populism and liberalism tend to lead into crises that motivate transforming
into each other, as evidenced by their shared metaphors of mechanism and the interestdriven individual, and that we can begin to think through a more stable version of
democracy by working from the organic metaphor. I will outline the steps I take to
support this thesis in the final section of this introduction.

1.1

Framing Political Issues
In common parlance, there seems to be no association more natural than

“democratic politics” and “voting.” For citizens, voting is that practice in which an
opinion is made public; it is the primary way of participating in the public sphere.
Consequently, while every person may have some set of human rights, voting rights are
both reserved for members in a given political community as well as especially
humanizing—assuming humans democracy realizes an essential freedom that is not
found in other forms of government. If we narrow our focus to thinking about the

Locke, in The Liberal Tradition in America, (New York: Harcourt Brace 1983), see esp.
6. While Hartz’s project is more narrowly historical and emphasizes the role of feudal
concepts, to which American liberalism was blinded, my project has an affinity with his
insofar as I am attempting to explain how liberalism’s blind spots are not simply
theoretical shortcomings. They dangerous defects that give rise to the various threats to
liberal democracy that we have seen since its ascendance, fascism and populism not least
among them. These ‘blind spots’ arise at varying levels of analysis, such as the
psychological need to organize aggressive impulses or the ontological-constitutive role of
the community for the individual. For a helpful articulation of different levels of analysis,
namely the ontological, metapsychological, and psychological, see Stefan Bird-Pollan,
Hegel, Freud, and Fanon: The Dialectic of Emancipation, (New York: Rowman and
Littlefield International 2015), esp. 17-20.
4

workings of any given democracy, for instance when we think about the perspective of
politicians, votes are a kind of currency. They seek to accumulate that currency by
building a platform wide enough to get the majority vote. One can interpret this situation
cynically and take it that politicians will do or say anything to win enough votes. It is due
in large part to this latter situation that “politics”—and public life in general—is a kind of
nasty business that most people would prefer to be done with as soon as possible and
return to their fulfilling and free private lives. In fact, one of the major motivations for
voting is that it allows one to choose their representative, which ultimately means:
citizens choose who will pursue and protect their self-interest. It is only with this
assumption that we can make sense of the oft-made criticism of people—specifically of
lower social classes—‘voting against their own interests.’
Beyond this conception of democratic politics as an electoral competition is the
conviction—prevalent but not universal—that political thought is something like a field
of critique for the public, practical world. This is certainly found in the legacy of Marxist
thought and its critique (a) of the state as an instrument of the bourgeoisie and (b) of
organized labor as human alienation. These two threads oftentimes converge: political
thought is a critique that articulates the ways in which public institutions or social groups
hinder, dominate, oppress, etc. the interests of other persons and groups. It is up to the
critical theorist to identify the limits of public power, so that its abuses are mitigated if
not made impossible. These are the core background assumptions of the populist-liberal
debates taking place in both scholarly and lay discourses. If we are to think through a
healthy democracy, we must reject these two assumptions and (a) take a broader view of
what constitutes ‘politics’, and (b) work through the positive constitution of public

5

power. That is, we must ask not “what makes the ‘use’ of public power bad?” but rather,
“what makes public power good?”
Populism and liberalism seem to offer different perspectives within this
framework of voting, self-interests, and critique. Populism suggests that a corrupt elite is
using public resources to pursue their own private interests, and the proper response is for
the people to elect an outsider who will pursue the general interests of the people—and
not the established elite, foreigners, globalists, etc. Politics, for populism, has a messianic
flavor; it consists of the righteous people overcoming the evil, corrupt individuals who
have unfairly risen to power. Liberalism, at least insofar as it is readily recognizable in
our public institutions and public discourse, suggests that everyone has their own
interests, and the public sphere simply is the space of contesting these interests, hopefully
with proper mediation (meaning a referee). Proper politics, on this understanding,
consists of regulating and mediating this competition, such that no group is ever
permanently in power and every individual can find fulfillment in their private life,
protected by a system of rights.
The conflict between populism and liberalism—at least in scholarly discourse—
takes place as a debate about the proper understanding of democracy. Is populism right in
its insistence on a public interest distinguished from private ones? Or is democracy
nothing beyond an aggregation and mediation of differing—even competing—private
interests, as market liberalism suggests? The two options seem different enough, but they
nevertheless hold in common those initial assumptions about the substance of politics:
votes and self-interest. I want to suggest that these concepts are not only not necessary for

6

politics, but they might even be opposed to politics if we take it that politics is about
freedom and community.
If it is at least possible that politics is not primarily about voting and has little or
nothing to do with private self-interest, it remains a question as to why it strikes us as so
familiar and natural to think of politics in just these terms. The answer, I think, has to do
with how we think about politics and the greater community. It is not only that we say
certain terms like “self-interest,” whose meaning is taken to be fully transparent, it is that
our thinking is guided by a vague, often (partly) unconscious picture of how the world
works that insulates our self-evident concepts from inquiry. Thus, if we want to gain a
better understanding of not only populism and liberalism, but alternative conceptions of
politics, we should reflect on the kind of metaphors that we draw on, perhaps even
unconsciously.

1.2

Metaphor, Populism, and Liberalism
Clearly, the notion of metaphor is central to my project, since I am identifying

what metaphors drive certain kinds of thinking and acting. For liberal thinking, the
mechanistic and self-interested individual metaphors do not provide a personal
motivation so much as a logical framework and vocabulary for analysis. For populism,
the metaphors operate less abstractly; they inarticulately fuel a drive to control
government machinery, to expel other parties and groups from the public sphere, and to
narcissistically celebrate the pursuit of one’s interest, set against the interests of others. In
this section, I will offer a clarification of metaphor and how it works in my project as
well a provisional characterization of liberalism and populism, to be fleshed out in
chapters two and three.
7

1.2.1

Metaphor

Approaching liberalism and populism through their guiding metaphors is
necessary if we want to analyze populism and liberalism as people think and live through
them, since the metaphors speak at a general enough level that it is shared by scholars
and laymen. Further, guiding metaphors can offer a clearer glimpse of what drives
ideologies to develop and be applied in the ways that people deploy them. Most
importantly, though, metaphors allow us to think about the suprasensory. The ideas of
community and freedom are not objects of sense experience; nevertheless, these concepts
hold a central place in our language of political thought, even when our political thought
seeks positivistically to reduce these terms to empirical issues. Metaphors are often the
first way that we begin to think about these terms, and they remain one of the most
powerful sources for further thought and action.
While these reasons for thinking in metaphor are necessary, they are also, in a
sense, dangerous, because we can let them do our thinking for us. If we think that an
organism offers a metaphor for community, we still need to work through what is
relevant for thinking about community and what is inessential or misleading. Moreover,
we cannot be too presumptuous in what we think of the term “organism.” It is not just a
metaphor but also a concept, and we have to be ready to inquire into its meaning. This
provides even more reason to interrogate metaphors; we fail to analyze them at our own
risk.
The focus on metaphor has an additional benefit for this project. Scholarship on
populism and liberalism have both faced difficulties in offering definitions for each

8

term. 3 While there are divergent versions of each term—populism has varied empirical
instantiations while liberalism has sophisticated theoretical variations—they become
more transparent in their unity by highlighting their driving metaphor in conjunction with
their familiar, disparate elements.
The most relevant, prominent work on metaphor and politics was done by Claude
Lefort. He famously proposed that democratic power is represented as ‘the empty place
of power,’ where totalitarian power is represented in the organic form of a single,
monolithic person. 4 He provocatively engaged in analyzing the kind of images and
fantasies that accompanied certain kinds of thinking of power and communities, and it
should come as no surprise that it is now being drawn upon in discussions about liberal
democracy and populism. 5 His rejection of the organic metaphor has been widely
adopted, and while I think Lefort has a compelling critique of totalitarianism, I will be
arguing that he mischaracterizes the organic metaphor. Moreover, the metaphor of the
empty place of power is itself narrowly liberal-democratic and redescribes the liberal
interpretation of government mechanism. So, while Lefort’s work has been adopted to
directly inform debates that pit populism against (liberal) democracy, I want to suggest
that populism is not simply a return of totalitarianism (and thus does not neatly fit with

3

For instance, see Andreas Kalyvas and Ira Katznelson, Liberal Beginnings: Making a
Republic for the Moderns (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 3-7, (henceforth, “Kalyvas
and Kratznelson, LB”) as well as María Pía Lara, “A Conceptual Analysis of the Term
‘Populism,’” Thesis Eleven 149, no. 1 (December 2018) 35, although her focus is more
on “neoliberal.” Henceforth, “Lara.”
4
Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy,
Totalitarianism (Polity Press, 1986) 301. Henceforth, “PFMS.”
5
For instance, in Koen Abts and Stefan Rummens, “Populism versus Democracy,”
Political Studies 55, no. 2 (June 1, 2007): 405–24. Henceforth, “‘PvD.’”
9

Lefort’s characterization of the organic metaphor), and liberalism is neither the only
interpretation of democracy nor necessarily democratic. 6
The empty place of power, as a representation of democracy, stands in need of
critique, insofar as it can—in principle—lend itself to conceptualizing both populism and
a certain kind of mechanistic liberalism. Both ideologies, despite their differences,
require thinking of democratic politics in terms of ‘contestation,’ within a common space.
Populism involves thinking of a group will overcoming partial interests that plague the
government. Liberalism, at least its market-based varieties, involves thinking of politics
in terms of a regulated competition for votes, in which people select representatives to
pursue and protect their self-interest. Thus, both populism and liberalism are compatible
with ‘the empty place of power’ insofar as they rely on thinking of politics in terms of
voting and with the assumption that differences within a democracy are in a competitive
relationship.
1.2.2

Populism

The discourse on populism often takes place as a critique, either of all populisms
or of Right-wing populism specifically, where the rhetorical concern is the preservation
of democracy. The major positions in this debate are (a) liberalism is democracy, ergo all
forms of populism are anti-democratic, (b) Right-wing populism may be destructive of
democratic practices, but Left-wing populism is a better realization of democratic politics
than liberalism, and (c) populism is illiberal, but lives somewhat parasitically on a
distinctly democratic tradition, namely, one that is not derived from the liberal-pragmatic

6

Contra Michael Davis, “Liberalism and/or Democracy?,” Social Theory and Practice 9,
no. 1 (1983): 51–72.
10

tradition. In this case, populism is a degeneration of democracy, but presumably so is
pure liberalism. 7 I think he third option is the most compelling. I will show why by first
describing populism and second by discussing liberalism. Third, I will argue that both
liberalism and populism are social modes of thinking and acting and cannot fulfill the
democratic promise.
Ultimately, what I hope to show provisionally here and more thoroughly in the
first two chapters is that liberalism and populism—and the tradition they stem from—
may have positive contributions to political thought, but when they are understood in
isolation and according to their metaphors of mechanism and individualism, they
degenerate into a kind of social automatism. This automatism makes politics superfluous
because populism and liberalism become transfixed on concrete ends. Populism becomes
obsessed with having a representative that gives their supporters a sense of control over
government machinery, which entails ousting other representatives and tearing down
laws that do not seem to conform to their immediate will. Liberalism becomes transfixed
with the supremacy of some set of procedures that transcend and limit public power. It
may allow citizens to act with liberty in the private sphere, but the public work of
articulating rights, creating laws, and maintaining institutions could—with all
consistency—be left to a bureaucratic class or enlightened despot, or ‘technocrats’ as
they are now sometimes called. 8 The liberal and the populist—or rather democratic—

7

See for instance, Yascha Mounk, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in
Danger & How to Save It, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2018) 8-13. He uses the
phrases, “illiberal democracy” and “undemocratic liberalism” to express these two kinds
of degeneration.
8
Liberal thinkers have offered arguments for why this is not the case, but it is not clear
how plausible any of those arguments are in the face of populism. Schmitt’s argument
11

traditions can only positively contribute to democracy if we abandon them as one-sided isms and understand their concepts as rooted in political freedom, which I think can be
done through an organic metaphor of political unity.
The difficulty of defining populism has led to several different approaches. Abts
and Rummens characterize it as a ‘thin’ ideology that can couple with various other
ideological contents, hence it can be both Left-wing and Right-wing without erasing the
differences between the subspecies of populism. 9 Laclau argues that populism is a style
of politics, which sits as the opposite pole of liberal-pragmatic politics. 10 Thus, in day-today political practice, concrete activities play out on a fluxing continuum of styles. Of
course, there are other approaches, such as thinking of them as “combat concepts” used
merely to identify political opponents or allies, thinking of them as a rhetorical strategy,
or simply wishing to abandon the term altogether, but those will not be as illuminating in
recognizing features of populism when they appear.

against parliamentarism in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy serves as an adequate
reason to be suspicious of liberalism’s defense of democracy. Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of
Parliamentary Democracy, Ellen Kennedy (ed. and trans.) (Cambridge: MIT Press 1988)
5-7. Henceforth, “Crisis.” The core justification for democracy in liberalism relies on a
presumed rationalism: a process of open discourse and voting will eventually lead to the
best results (truth, justice, freedom, etc.). But the process of conversation does not
necessarily lead to the best idea winning in the so-called marketplace of ideas. Ignorance
can be disseminated just as easily as truth, domination just as easily as freedom, and
social discrimination just as much as political inclusion. More to the point, I would say
that liberalism seems more compatible with a kind of technocratic administration, in
which an elite educated in political economy, make decisions about rights and how to
protect them.
9
“PvD” 408.
10
He writes, “. . . populism has no referential unity because it is ascribed not to a
delimitable phenomenon but to a social logic whose effects cut across many phenomena.
Populism is, quite simply, a way of constructing the political.” Ernesto Laclau, On
Populist Reason, (New York: Verso 2005) xi. Henceforth, “OPR.” Laclau attempts to
formulate his approach to populism in several ways, including “a way of construction,”
and “a dimension of the political.”
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While scholars may disagree on the exact taxonomy of populism, they
nevertheless agree on the characteristic features of populism. Moreover, there is
relatively large agreement on what cases constitute populism. Each case of populism may
emphasize some features over others, and some features may be largely unimportant for
the success or appeal of the populist movement or regime. If we wish to understand a
‘populist’ event and not attempt to measure it, then these features suffice to get us started.
I will identify four features.
First, populism involves a kind of (pretend) homogeneity of the people (or ‘antipluralism’). Trump’s ‘make America great again,’ slogan, with its imagery of a lost
status, indicates that greatness was a property of the whole and not just a class or a group.
Or in other words, there is some feature by which all Americans are alike, perhaps moral
and perhaps ethnic. Second, populism involves a tendency to promote a single,
authoritarian leader. Trump’s referring to himself as a king is a perfect illustration, but
the fact that he ran on being an outsider even while within the Republican party is a good
indicator that he presents himself as the only suitable representative of the American
nation. Third, populism often deploys a maxim that populism restores sovereignty to the
people. At his rallies, Trump often says that ‘we’ will make America great again. By
voting for him and attending the rallies, people are participating in a kind of national
rejuvenation and taking control of the country back. This leads to the fourth and final
feature, populist movements target an elite that has illegitimately seized control of
government. Trump ran as an outsider; he promised to drain the swamp. He was able to
harness not only resentment against Democrats, but resentment against professional
politicians in general.
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In analyzing populism, I want to understand it in the terms that make it plausible
to voters. How does one have to interpret populism such that it appears as an attractive
movement or ideology? In order to understand populism on these grounds, we need to
understand it as having at least a rational kernel. It aims at a principle, namely autonomy,
but its specification of this principle falls short. The destructive character of populism
stems from its inability to realize its own ideal, not from having the wrong ideal from the
start. Populism understands the principle of autonomy in the sense that the people
manufacture and control the laws. More specifically, populism envisions the fulfillment
of this promise as though the people were a giant individual authorized to create its own
machines capable of doing so. The machines it creates, government institutions and laws,
are designed for the sake of carrying out the people’s will, which in turn should produce
what the people want (prosperity, stability, status, etc.). If the tool is defective or if the
desires of the people change, the people should be free to discard or change the tool.
Populist supporters of Trump take it that the current government—its laws and
institutions—are not doing what they want, and those supporters identify with the people
as a whole. Thus, the laws and institutions should be discarded or changed.
1.2.3

Liberalism

Much like populism, liberalism has some familiar features, but its varieties pose a
problem in offering a generic definition. Liberalism poses a greater difficulty than
populism if only because the various forms of liberalism tend to be quite detailed, and its
advocates have engaged in extensive defenses of their own versions but not others. My
focus is less on liberalism as a modern, prescriptive theory. I am interested first in
understanding the “liberal” institutions that inform our lives and that we discuss in the
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political events of our times. Second, I am interested in it as a tradition that has produced
several concepts that we now take to be self-evident and that shapes the thinking—often
unconsciously—of most of our social-political thought. More specifically, I will be
tracking the notions of “rule of law” (further associated with “checks and balances”),
“negative liberties” (associated with “self-interest”), and “proceduralism” (with at least a
loose association with means-ends thinking).
The concern with both liberal institutions and the liberal tradition are historically
related. Once liberalism displaced competing political theories, such as the divine right of
kings and republicanism, it entrenched itself so thoroughly in Western thought that it is
expressed virtually everywhere. Once those concepts became omnipresent, their
authorship became anonymous, their meaning shed the need for questioning, and their
raison d'être forgotten. And in an approach inspired by Heidegger’s historical
destruktion, I aim to interrupt the ease and familiarity with which we repeat these
concepts so that we can better understand them. 11 I start, then, with how several concepts,
produced by a specific tradition but so thoroughly disseminated that they appear to be
self-evident, are used in the contemporary critiques of populism.
To be clear, modern liberalism as it appears in current debates about normative
theory is distinct from the tradition that I will be examining, although they are not
mutually exclusive. The former is a narrow, relatively well-defined theory best
represented by Rawls with a focus “equality” that seeks to promote individual choice.
Traditional liberalism is much broader and is associated with such figures as Constant,
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I would like to thank Dr. Natalie Nenadic, whose contributions to my own thinking
about history and my approach was invaluable, and who further allowed me to attend a
large portion of her seminar on history in Fall 2019.
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Berlin, Locke, and Smith. It focuses on the negative liberties (i.e., “rights” as noninterference) of private individuals. The tradition, as we will see, is tied to certain socioeconomic conditions, namely that of capitalism, which have entailed a certain conception
of the individual as private in a way that focuses on the exclusion of others. Proper,
liberal government seeks to preserve that exclusion by enforcing rights, which are
epitomized in the right to property.
In large part because of its ties to the material practices of everyday life, viz. life
with a capitalist market, the tradition of liberalism has achieved a kind of common-sense
plausibility that transcends ‘theory.’ The modern theories of liberalism do not make those
same assumptions about the individual. In fact, in contrast to libertarians (much closer to
the tradition in this regard), modern liberalism conceives of the individual as needing
support from others. Hence, it has been somewhat derogatively described as advocating
for a ‘nanny state’ insofar as it appears in the realm of professional ‘politics.’
Nevertheless, especially when conceiving of the proper role of government—or any other
kind of collective—it is certainly possible that modern liberal thought can
(unconsciously) draw from the same kind of market liberal tradition that permeates a
majority of social thought.
None of this is to say that I am committed to the idea of material existence as a
basic principle of explanation. While I think it is right to say that material economic
practices reinforce certain kinds of thinking about the individual and society, taking this
to be guiding principle of explanation for socio-political phenomena implies that politics
and ideology are a kind of automatic super-structure, a spiritless realm distinguished
from the material realm. I am more interested in how people think about existence—
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material or otherwise—and this thinking often orients itself through some kind of
ultimate picture or metaphor. Methodologically, then, I locate my project close to what
Carl Schmitt calls a ‘sociology of concepts.’ I will analyze concepts, e.g., self-interest,
primarily in terms of how conceptual structures and relations are mirrored in social
relations and held together within an overall picture of reality. “The metaphysical image
that an epoch forges of the world has the same structure as what the world immediately
understands to be appropriate as a form of its political organization.” 12
To forecast the later analyses, I take it that the primary features of traditional
liberalism are, first: an emphasis on ‘a rule of law, not men.’ Legitimate government
action is not performed on the basis of an arbitrary personal will, but on the basis of
independent laws, thereby curbing the abuses of public power and protecting the
citizenry. Independence of the law is assured by dividing the government powers that
deal with the law such that the excesses of power can be curbed (“checks and balances”).
Second, liberalism involves a notion of individual rights, especially rights of noninterference. Put briefly, each citizen should be left to their own devices on some matters
and within the same limits, and neither the government nor other citizens should be able
to interfere with those individual projects. 13 Freedom, then, is a freedom from
compulsion, coercion, and force. What the individual gains from this subtraction of

12

Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, George Schwab (trans.), (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press 2005) 46. Henceforth, “PT.”
13
The idea is that it is in each person’s interest to submit to this reciprocal limitation. The
problem is that ‘self-interest’ is conceived narrowly to cover ‘what is good for you’ and
not in terms of realizing the people’s freedom to undertake something new and
unexpected. Liberalism can be understood to promote freedom, but only (a) freedom
understood as individual liberty, i.e., being able to do what one wants on one’s own, or
(b) freedom as personal choice. It does not promote freedom in the sense of creatively
shaping the world that exists between people.
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interference is a kind of control over their own private sphere, a control that lets them
pursue their self-interest. We should note, however, that even when liberalism advocates
for other kinds of positive liberties, or even focuses more on equality, it still usually
adopts the same kind of instrumental thinking where government has an end of serving
the individual, and thus is empowered to deploy the means necessary for accomplishing
its assigned end. Moreover, these means—tied to rewards and punishments—all still rely
on a notion of self-interest. Third, liberalism takes it that when decisions are to be made,
the correct procedure to apply is majority vote, and usually majority vote on a
representative with an assigned set of competencies. A democracy is an aggregate of
individuals, and the ‘collective decision’ is the will of the majority articulated through a
process of counting the opinions of each.
These concepts are common in the literature on populism, even when they are not
presented under the name of liberalism (although they often are). They are also most
forcefully articulated by some of the major liberal thinkers in the tradition, usually in
response to political events in which public power was used to devastating effect.
Benjamin Constant, for instance, offered an early articulation of liberalism in the wake of
the Reign of Terror. Isaiah Berlin articulated a series of concepts directly taken from
Constant as a response to totalitarianism. I take these two figures to be the most relevant
liberal thinkers, given that populism represents a similar kind of real-world threat and not
just a competing ideology. The basic impulse for liberalism is to recognize the danger of
public power. Its solution is, essentially, public heteronomy and private autonomy. One
can be in charge and pursue one’s interest alone, but public government should—
ideally—consist solely of universal laws applied without discrimination or prejudice.
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Moreover, those laws, because they are independent, are the only competent mediators of
conflict, since individuals are competitive and sometimes hostile, and since no one is a
competent judge in cases where their self-interest is at stake, no one is therefore a
reliable, stable mediator.
1.2.4

The Metaphors of Liberal Democracy

Both populism and traditional liberalism draw from the same two metaphors,
government as mechanism and the interest-driven individual, albeit with different
interpretations of each and different emphasis. Where liberalism privileges the state as a
machine to be balanced and independent of human arbitrariness, populism is driven by
the image of the people as a giant individual with its own interest. But from Smith to
Rawls, liberalism too views individuals as self-interested, who are then represented by
government officials, who are checked in turn by other representatives. While populism
emphasizes the image of the people with one set of interests, it still thinks of government
as a machine, albeit with the purpose of accomplishing the ends set by the people. Let us
briefly examine how each -ism is shaped by these metaphors.
The ideal state according to liberalism is a giant, autonomous machine, ensuring
that no individual oversteps their bounds and exercises power over another individual.
This is a state that is immune from abuse, since no person or group of persons wields any
power, at least no power that is not fully delimited by law and whose exercise is subject
to oversight. The liberal dream is to design a constitution that could make even a nation
of devils behave. 14 For Constant and Berlin, this ideal need no further proof than the
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To paraphrase Kant. Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace, from Immanuel Kant,
Practical Philosophy, Mary J. Gregor (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
1999) 335.
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events that drove them to express their theories. The image of a well-balanced machine
encourages thinking of government primarily in terms of representatives pursuing the
interests of their constituents but limited by independent laws. Thus, a certain reading of
the ‘rule of law’ as well as a notion of checks and balances are all central concepts held
together in this metaphor. And liberal thinkers are prone to diagnosing problems in terms
of violations of these concepts.
While populism may hold that the government is a machine, it is not an
independent scale or referee. It is a tool to be used by the people. The people, moreover,
is not simply an aggregation of individuals, it is a collective entity with its own interest
and identity. The people, through their leader, have the right to seize control of
government mechanisms away from corrupt elites, who have been using the government
for their own narrow interests. This can be readily seen in Trump’s claims about draining
the swamp and making America great again. Since populism views the people as a single,
self-interested person who has a right to use government, it is most likely to draw on
concepts of popular sovereignty in the sense of the people being in control of government
decisions. Thus, populists view the election of their representative as a license to use
government however they will; there should be no check or limitation to the people
pursuing its public interest. It tends to diagnose problems, then, within the register of
partial/special interests, which should be banished from the public realm, and the will of
the people as a kind of public interest. The public interest, however, is virtually always
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the apparent interest of a specific, partial group, e.g., a nationality or race, and even this
partial interest is unstable and leaves too much room for deviation within the group. 15
If this characterization is right, then the widespread emergence and re-emergence
of populism, even in the face of its defeats and failures, makes sense. Populism will
continue as a possibility for democracy as long as liberalism remains the predominant
source of our political and governmental concepts; they both emerge from the same
guiding metaphor. Or in other words, by drawing on the same metaphors for their
concepts, they narrow our vision of what politics is and should be, and when one -ism
comes to a crisis, people are most likely to merely react and flee the opposite
interpretation of that same, self-evident metaphor.
By focusing on issues of voting and self-interest as they do, I contend that neither
populism nor liberalism offer a view of political community so much as they are
competing views about a vaguely democratic society—a realm in which individuals
pursue their private interests such as wealth and status. The major symptom of this fact is
that both of them require conceptualizing individuals as (a) essentially alike, and (b) as
instrumental reasoners. While liberalism may hold that individuals have diverse
judgments of ‘the good,’ it holds that everyone can be regulated and domesticated by a
notion of ‘the right.’ This is to say that human doing is dangerous and needs to be tamed.
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Nadia Urbinati makes a similar point when contrasting populism to party democracy.
Nadia Urbinati, “Antiestablishment and the Substitution of the Whole with One of Its
Parts,” in Routledge Handbook of Global Populism (Routledge, 2018) 79. While she is
right to offer the distinction, I think she underappreciates how easily party democracy,
which acknowledges some limitation to pursuing a partial interest, slips into a populist
logic that makes no such acknowledgement. The source of this mistake, I think, is an
over-appreciation of the independence of laws, regulations, etc. We will be examining
how Hobbes gives us good reason for doubting this independence of the laws in the first
chapter.
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We are alike insofar as we all want things, insofar as we are vulnerable to what others can
do, and insofar as we would all agree that we should follow the rules. Populism, perhaps
more crudely, thinks that the members of a democracy are simply similar with regard to
one feature or another, such as ethnicity, race, class, etc. As for social instrumentality, the
liberal person and the populist collective are simply trying to produce the ends they
desire. Private activity in the former and public activity in the latter are merely a means,
and they come to an end when we get what we want. Community, by contrast, is not
about how individuals behave around each other; it is a unity in the mode of beingtogether. To see what this can mean, we would need to abandon the socio-economic
terms, especially that of interest and instrumental reasoning. While populism and
liberalism are not about community, they are nevertheless about democracy insofar as
they offer determinations of some concepts that necessarily accompany democratic
government.

1.3

Three Concepts: Freedom, Authority, Unity
Populism and liberalism both draw upon metaphors of mechanism and the

concept (and metaphor) of the self-interested individual to think about politics. It seems
to me that the less these metaphors are explicit, the more powerful they tend to be. 16
16

Perhaps this is why bouts of populism tend to be so dangerous in the short term, while
market liberalism seems to lead to periods of stagnation, relatively stable (by contrast),
and slow, growing dissatisfaction. The former operates largely at the level of feeling—
often feelings of resentment, while the various kinds of liberalisms tend toward being
hyper-explicit in offering doctrine. The incessant explanation and systemization of liberal
thinking drains the metaphors of much of their power. If we can say that populism is
more immediately dangerous than market liberalism because its thinking draws from its
guiding metaphors unconsciously—or semi-consciously—then we could also say that
liberalism remains susceptible to bouts of populism because it is a weaker realization of
those same metaphors.
22

Moreover, regardless of how implicitly or explicitly developed they are, these metaphors
inevitably orient and develop three concepts necessary for thinking about democracy:
freedom, authority, and unity.
Within the liberal-democratic framework generally (and drawing upon their
metaphors of mechanism and interest-driven individuals), freedom is the freedom of each
citizen that democracy is meant to guarantee as outlined, for instance, in a bill of rights.
Thus, commonsense holds that freedom is a matter of the private, individual citizen.
Authority, meanwhile, is the possession not of subjects, but of the rulers. Still within the
liberal-democratic framework, authority is the rightful possession of those who win an
election; it is through election that authority is given from the people (a collection of
private citizens) to a representative who is supposed to act on behalf of their interest.
Unity, finally, is a matter of the identity of everyone who is a citizen of a given state,
including the ruling representatives.
While populism and liberalism have some similar, general commitments to these
concepts as outlined above, they determine them further in opposing directions.
Regarding freedom, liberalism views it as largely private and reciprocal. Each individual
ought not to interfere with others, and the government is entitled to act in order to
preserve these boundaries. For instance, if a state guarantees its citizens a right to life,
then the state is entitled to protect citizens from those who might take their life, including
fellow citizens as well as foreign enemies. For populism, however, freedom is not just
private; it bleeds into the public sphere. Citizens are often promised by populist
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candidates increased control of the government, either vicariously through the leader or
through direct referendums and plebiscites. 17
Authority is conferred by voting in both populism and market liberalism, but the
similarity stops there. For liberalism, authority is a possession of a representative, but it is
precarious: it is checked by other representatives and only temporarily conferred by
elections. It is more of a “rental” and less like “property.” For populists, authority is
absolute; the people should not be challenged on any issue, therefore their leader should
not be challenged or checked. Attempting to ‘balance’ government powers would be
evidence that partial, corrupt interests have gained traction within the government.
Unity, for liberalism, is just the set of individuals who happen to be government
by a set of institutions. Almost categorically, such thinkers go to great lengths to deny
any kind of ‘pre-political unity,’ which is to say, any source of unity outside of the
operations of government and voting. 18 The unity of the people, then, is not a community, it is a set of individuals operated upon by their representatives; as members of a
set, they are alike in their having their own particular interests, rights, etc. Unity for
populism, by contrast, is a matter of shared, substantive identity. Members of the people
are not just formally similar in that they have an interest; they are substantially similar in
that they have the same interest. Which is to say that unity in populism is a matter of
social identity.
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The latter have, historically, rarely been the result of populists coming to power. Most
populism remains heavily representational and minimally participatory.
18
For instance, see Arash Abizadeh, “On the Demos and Its Kin: Nationalism,
Democracy, and the Boundary Problem,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 4
(November 2012) 872-3, Jan-Werner Mueller, What Is Populism? (University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2016) 77-8, Henceforth, “WIP,” and Bernard Yack, “Popular
Sovereignty and Nationalism,” Political Theory 29, no. 4 (2001) 524.
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One vision of democratic politics that does not draw from mechanism and
interest-driven individuality would re-interpret each concept at a more basic level.
Freedom, for instance, is not a matter of pursuing one’s self-interest or being left alone or
even of voting; rather, democratic freedom can be a matter of acting in concert with
others. Or, in other words, it is public, not private. Authority is not a possession of a
representative to perform concrete actions, but rather is a duty to orient and guide the
actions of the population. And unity is not a matter of identity or a matter of being
subjects to the same institutional machinery, but a cooperative endeavor of performing
community. 19

1.4

Roadmap
My overall goal is to show how liberalism and populism are linked such that they

tend to transform into each other. The instability of liberalism and populism can be traced
to their shared metaphors and how their interpretations of three core concepts—freedom,
authority, and unity—lead into crises that suggest the opposite -ism is a cure. However, I
also want to offer a healthy notion of democracy by taking up the organic metaphor for
thinking of political unity.
In the second chapter, I will establish a clearer vocabulary for discussing politics,
as distinguished from discussing the social realm. Moreover, I will introduce some
distinctions to help discuss democratic government. Together, this terminology will set
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Or as Iris Marion Young put it: ‘togetherness in difference.’ See, Iris Marion Young,
“Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of Group Political Conflict,” in The
Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (Oxford University Press, 1995) 157.
Henceforth, “Young, ‘Together.’”
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up the conceptual terrain in which the metaphors of mechanism, the self-interested
individual, and the organism operate.
In the third chapter, I will examine the mechanistic metaphor for the state as the
main source of understanding market liberalism. There, we will see that the primary
conceptual crisis is about the independence of the law and its implications for authority. I
will start with the idea of authority as divided, checked, and regulated, and demonstrate
how its crisis leads to the institution of an authority who has power over the law, a move
exemplified in Hobbes’s notion of sovereignty. This transformation can be characterized
as a transformation from a liberal ideal of checks and balances to a kind of populist
authoritarianism.
In the fourth chapter, I will examine the metaphor of the interest-driven individual
as the main source of understanding populism. Here, we will see that populism views the
people as an individual writ large, unified by a shared interest. However, I will show that
interest—a concept that originates in liberalism—is itself prone to disintegration and
change, and thus the necessary deviations from the general interest of the people leads to
a suicidal aggression toward everything partial. The best outcome of this movement
would be a renunciation of public power and agreed upon limitations of pursuing one’s
interest for the sake of having a plurality of interests. I characterize this as the
transformation from a populist identity to a kind of liberal aggregation of private
individuals.
In the fifth chapter, I discuss a healthy version of democracy by drawing up on
organic metaphor for political unity. There, we will see unity discussed a shared project
of making people belong. We will see authority in terms of orienting the action of
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citizens and putting faces to the law. And finally, we will see freedom in terms of public
freedom and the possibility of forgiveness for partiality.
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CHAPTER 2. POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY
How do we envision our collective living together, or even better, how do we
envision collectively living together well? Is it cooperatively living with other individuals
with fair rules to regulate our behaviors? Is a system of competition, driving innovation
and thereby promoting the overall happiness of each (at least in the long run)? Or perhaps
our living together shifts between competition and cooperation, with no group ever
becoming strong enough to stifle individual experiments in living. How we answer this
question determines not only what we call our collective living together, e.g., “civil
society,” but also delimits our understanding of what democracy is and what constitutes
its health.
I propose that many of the familiar answers to the questions above operate within
a horizon of thought explicitly developed during the Enlightenment that I will call ‘socioeconomic’ in contradistinction to ‘political,’ which has its origins in Ancient Greek
thought. 20 The distinction, perhaps mostly famously articulated by Hannah Arendt, is a
controversial one. This is in part because it the terms ‘social’ and ‘political’ have
numerous meanings, occasionally acting as synonyms, antonyms, and occasionally just
20

I am following Arendt’s basic framework here. Cohen and Arato offer a slightly
different read by rendering the Greek koinonia as “society,” and thus take Aristotle to be
concerned with “political society,” rather than “political community.” Beyond this
terminological difference, there is extensive overlap in the genealogy of the
social/political distinction according to Arendt, on one hand, and Cohen and Arato, on the
other. Importantly, they all view the Romans as developing a notion of societies—in the
plural—in contrast to the united political community of the Greeks, which strikes me as
an important development in thinking about groups within a political whole—a move I
will be making in my own usage of the social/political distinction. We will look at the
Arendt in a little more depth later. For Cohen and Arato, see Jean L. Cohen and Andrew
Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1992) 84-91.
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unrelated, and it will be helpful to sort out some of the most familiar ones. On its own,
‘social’ might mean something like ‘sociable’ or be invoked when we talk about
‘socializing,’ meaning dealing with friends, acquaintances, etc. ‘Political’ might mean an
“us versus them” struggle or cutthroat competition. When we distinguish between social
and political, we might mean informal organizing for the former, and formal, government
organizing on the latter. On this distinction, the civil rights movement was social because
it was performed by actors who were not elected representatives. Organized sports,
country clubs, and ‘social gatherings’ are all social because they separated from the
government. This leads to a secondary sense of ‘the social’ as the sphere of voluntary
association, whereas ‘the political’ is in some sense ‘compulsory,’ e.g., the government,
as the sphere of politics, has the right to compel people to pay taxes, whereas social clubs
can charge membership fees where people can opt out. While these uses have a nebulous
relationship to the following discussion, they do not map cleanly onto the historical
distinction. The tendency in these distinctions is to map out different spheres of life: the
sphere of government, the sphere of non-institutional relationships, the sphere of
command and compulsion, the sphere of business and profit, etc. But the demarcations of
these spheres are shifting and disputable, if the social/political distinction is to be of
theoretical use, it will need to be drawn in such a way that it illuminates the different
spheres but is not simply a reflection of our assumptions about these spheres. I will be
arguing for a modal conception of the social/political distinction. Some ways of
organizing and thinking draw from a framework with instrumental rationality and a
primacy of the concept of self-interest, which I will call “social.” Meanwhile, the
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“political,” is a way of organizing and thinking about relationships that are creative and
cooperative.
This reading of the political still resonates with the ancient Greek conception of
the political, which is the sphere of freedom wherein political actors creatively determine
their shared world and thereby themselves. For the Greeks, the political consisted of
living together in a polis, which had multiple possible forms whose concerns explicitly
excluded the necessities of life—which were taken care of by slaves. Political freedom is
realized in living in a monarchy or an aristocracy or a democracy. Ants, by contrast, have
no possibilities; they must necessarily live under a queen. While there are familiar
debates about which form best realizes the freedom of its citizens (and which corruptions
of political forms are the biggest threats to freedom), the main denial of freedom was
isolation. Freedom cannot be realized in conditions of privacy, of being deprived of the
public sphere.
Neither Arendt nor I are interested in returning to a Greek notion of the political
that excludes issues concerning the necessities of life. To explicate the relationship
between the necessities of life and the political, I aim to show how issues of necessity are
conditioned by freedom rather than vice versa. This means, however, that if we are
interested in a notion of politics that is not simply economics, we have to be careful about
(a) the categories that we use to orient our thought, (b) the kind of reasoning we draw
upon to interpret public activity and draw conclusions, and (c) uncritically assuming that
some issues should intrinsically be kept out of political discourse or that some issues are
the primary substance of politics.
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One provisional reason for developing an open conception of the political is in
response to emerging bouts of populism throughout the globe. Upon reflection, the
actions of populists are often driven by animosity and insular group aggression rather
than profit. And yet, perhaps ironically, populists like Trump make a claim to power
based on his business acumen. Whether Trump ends up being ‘good for the economy’—
he certainly brags about stock market at though (a) that were the measure of economic
well-being, and (b) there is a direct link between his actions and the health of the
market—clearly there is a rhetoric about business and an appearance of economic
thriving that entices some of Trump’s supporters. How is this surface rhetoric of
economic self-interest to be squared with a hostility toward educated elites, the
established stewards of the economy, and low-labor cost immigrants?
Trump offers an illuminating, though challenging, example of populism. The
primary challenge is to see how a notion of economic self-interest is connected with an
aggression against a ruling elite as well as outsiders. They seem to be in contradiction.
On the one hand, one of the biggest issues Trump emphasizes in his rhetoric is ‘the
economy,’ or ‘the market.’ At least a portion of his supporters celebrate the fact that he is
putting American interests first. On the other hand, some of the people supporting Trump
are voting ‘against their self-interest.’ One could take this view insofar as one sees poor
Trump supporters in favor of policies that advantage the rich. However, it may be the
case that one of the driving forces in supporting Trump lies in how his supporters see
themselves—as independent, as hard workers, as religious/social conservatives, as
white—and these concerns frame their concerns more than ‘class.’
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If we unreflectively adopt a familiar economic framework for analyzing the
support for Trump—or for any political phenomenon—we will invariably end up
condemning some of the people we are examining to a kind of ‘irrationality,’ be it moral
or instrumental. But the point at which we brand people ‘irrational’ is the point at which
we cease to have an explanation for their actions. This is not to say that we need to view
the support for Trump as rationally necessary, but our analysis must offer a rational
foundation and then go on to show whatever contradictions or degenerations plague that
foundation. The usual route to explaining the foundation for populism is to analyze the
democratic tradition, which is more about the political form of a people rather than about
economic issues. One of the problems with populism, as I will show, is that it attempts to
navigate political questions about ‘the people’ with economic concepts. Before I can
make that case, we will have to clarify economic (which I will be calling ‘socioeconomic’) and political frameworks and how they relate to liberalism and populism.
Whether we draw from a social or a political framework will determine both our
conception of ‘the people’ of democracy as well as their relationship to their government.
Set against much of the modern tradition of political philosophy, my point of departure is
thinking about collective living together as something that creatively (but perhaps often
unconsciously) do as a collective. This collective creation of institutions and movements
is prior to private behaviors and decisions. A dominant trend in modern philosophy is to
assert the opposite: the terms of collective living together are established by individual
acts, namely, entering the social contract. 21 Let us call this prioritization of the individual,
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This is at least true for Hobbes and Locke. Rousseau’s notion of the social contract is
not as devoted to the primacy of the individual.
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qua independent, ‘social,’ or even better, ‘socio-economic.’ Provisionally, a social
conception of democracy focuses on the self-interest of each private person and perhaps
the interest of the whole collective (modeled on the interest of the individual). 22 What
usually follows from starting with an independent, self-interested individual is thinking of
rationality as instrumental rationality. Self-interested individuals have given ends, and
their activity is focused on providing the means to accomplish those ends. The means are
usually familiar and habitual, such as the routine tasks one performs on the job, or the
routine chores in keeping up one’s house.
A political conception of democracy holds that a people is primarily engaged in
free self-organization, i.e., a kind of positive freedom in which people spontaneously
institute and maintain features of a common world through persuasion rather than
command, violence, or coercion. A political conception of democracy, then, is primarily
concerned with the creative power that gives shape to the state; it is thoroughly public.
The core assumption here is that a political form is open to question in a way that private
ends are not. A people must commit not only to a general type of government—
democracy, aristocracy, etc.—but it must also flesh out the genus with specific
institutions, procedures, and rights that express their freedom (both public and private). In
other words, political freedom not only determines the sphere of government but also
delimits the private sphere as well. In sum, a ‘political’ framework emphasizes
spontaneous, collective freedom, expressed most clearly in a people giving itself a form
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of government, although expressed in other ways as well. A ‘socio-economic’ framework
emphasizes the habits and behaviors of individuals, even individuals living together.
My aim in this chapter is to offer an account of a healthy democracy, which must
be oriented by a political framework while still being able to address social issues. My
main premise is that socio-economic thought is oriented too narrowly by a notion of
‘self’—either individual or collective—that is defined by ‘self-interest.’ The first section
distinguishes the social from the political; the former is directed toward instrumentality,
efficiency, stability, while the latter is directed toward freedom and creativity. By
detailing the social/political distinction, we will be able to see the way in which politics is
distinct from economics and cannot be ‘solved;’ it is essentially open-ended.
In a healthy democracy, in which creative freedom is explicitly recognized, there
is an inescapable question of how government is organized and who is responsible for
making, interpreting, and enforcing the laws. This question, emphasizing the ‘who’
formulation, occupies the second section, which I will frame as the question of
sovereignty. Any time a decision is made, or a law is passed that can be enforced on a set
of subjects, sovereignty is at play. On the one hand, ‘democracy’ invites us to think of the
whole people as sovereign. On the other hand, the right to enforce laws sets up
democracy—just like any form of government—to seem antithetical to creative freedom
since enforcing some set of laws would seem to reduce the plurality of possible actions to
a narrower set of behaviors. It would follow that a successful account of healthy
democracy must offer an interpretation of sovereignty that both recognizes political
creativity as well as explains the ability to enforce laws. The difficulty here is that

34

sovereignty is necessarily ambiguous; in any concrete manifestation of sovereignty, it can
be interpreted as an expression of political freedom or mere socio-economic functioning.
This discussion of sovereignty and the kinds of power that such a sovereign might
express will shed light not only on liberalism and populism, as deficient modes of
politics, but also on a healthy notion of democracy. Reflected in our liberal institutions
and informed by a variety of thinkers in the liberal tradition, we have inherited a belief in
the desirability and efficacy of a pluralistic representative system in which openness and
competition are necessary conditions for democracy. Populism advocates for a
personalistic sovereign, most often in the form of a single leader who presents the will of
the people directly. Thus, populism and liberalism differ in the kind of constituted
government, i.e., the political form, for which they advocate. In spite of their difference,
they share (a) a commitment to the basic concepts of unity, authority, and freedom,
construing them differently in order to establish their distinct visions of the community,
and (b) an aversion to thinking of the people as a source of creativity and world-shaping.
I will argue that they share more than these basic concepts but to a larger degree than
others see, they share interpretations of these concepts, making them susceptible to
transformation into each other.
In the final section of this chapter, I will briefly sketch a conception of a healthy
democracy, oriented by a notion of political freedom. Here, I will argue that political
freedom is more fundamental than social liberty and interest. Moreover, a notion of
democracy oriented by political freedom must be accompanied by a notion of
‘belonging,’ which is more fundamental than socio-economic equality.
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2.1

The Political and the Social
As we consider the term, ‘social,’ it is helpful to keep in mind some of the various

ways of specifying what kind of society we live in (or that people have lived in). We may
find some of the following terms familiar: ‘market society,’ ‘civil society,’ ‘class
society,’ ‘mass society.’ These are concepts meant to express how people are organized,
and they evoke not only different kinds of relationships individuals may have, but also
different behaviors that that groups generally engage in. That is, the kind of society we
have tells us what individuals tend to be like; there is a reflective relationship between the
universal (society) and the individual. 23 But these social characterizations not simply
additional bits of information to be added to information about what kind of governments
people have; ‘society’ is not simply non-governmental groupings, since different kinds of
relations may produce power relations reflected in government. So, different accounts of
‘society’ will have different relationships to concepts of government and ‘politics.’
Given the manifold accounts of ‘society,’ there can be no definitive account of
‘politics’ that can be absolutely distinguished from the social. Nevertheless, if we take up
the question of freedom, we can make sense of the history of the social/political
distinction especially as it pertains to democracy. Thus, we will review a brief history of
the two concepts of freedom that guide accounts of democracy. In this history, we will
see social freedoms distinguished from political freedom by Benjamin Constant, in which
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Charles Taylor rightly makes this point explicitly in Modern Social Imaginaries. His
main point that is that for all of the claims about ‘individualism’ that arose in modernity,
such ‘individuals’ were always considered in conjunction with a notion of society as well.
See Charles Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, (Durham: Duke University Press 2004)
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the former comes to displace the latter as the proper aim of government. Then we see the
social and political distinguished as complementary spheres by Hegel, wherein the
political is primary. Third, we will briefly visit Marx’s critical analysis of the social being
the basis of the political. Finally, we will see Arendt’s continued analysis of the growth
of the social as obscuring the possibility of politics. Once we are familiar with this
historical sketch, I will offer my own interpretation of the social-political distinction as
interpretive frameworks that orient us toward different questions, different issues, and
allow us to interpret public power in different ways. That is, the social/political
distinction marks different modes of organization, rather than separate spheres, and the
political mode of organization emphasizes spontaneous creativity while the social mode
of organization emphasizes self-interested behaviors.
2.1.1

A Brief History of Social and Political Freedoms

In the wake of the Reign of Terror, Constant articulated a notion of modern
freedom that had supplanted the ancient notion of freedom. 24 Modern liberty is
characterized as a ‘freedom from’ force and coercion, not only by the government but
also other individuals as well. Such ‘negative liberties’ are often spelled out in a doctrine
of rights—a right to life, to property, etc.—that explicitly delimit the ways in which
individuals should be free to pursue their interests. Thus, this notion of modern liberty is
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Benjamin Constant, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the
Moderns,” from Political Writings, (New York: Cambridge University Press 1988) esp.
316. Henceforth, “Constant.” Constant is somewhat inconsistent on this point.
Sometimes, presumably for rhetorical purposes, he seems to view the modern notion of
liberty as completely replacing the ancient. Other times, he simply advocates it as more
important or more predominant. While the latter view is probably the better account, he
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theory, and he never works out an account of how ancient and modern freedom are to be
successfully related.
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immediately associated with interests and its locus was the independent individual.
Moreover, this notion of liberty was explained and defended as something meant to
overcome and replace the ancient notion of freedom, which was tied to direct civic
engagement and participation in the public sphere. Constant’s argumentation is
interesting partly because we can see echoes of it repeated now, 25 and partly because the
argument oscillates between whether modern liberty is desirable or simply the only form
of liberty available. On the one hand, modern liberty is supposed to be its own kind of
‘good,’ worth choosing on its own, superior merits. It is a great gift of modernity. But on
the other hand, it is the only form of freedom possible, and disaster is sure to result if
people attempt to realize ancient—i.e., political—freedom. So modern liberty is both the
best choice, but we have no choice.
Constant is not the inventor of a novel concept of freedom; he takes himself to
have been articulating a notion of freedom that was already available, if not fully
developed. Hobbes had espoused a similar concept of liberty much earlier, although it
was not the driving concern of his political philosophy. Constant remains our important,
historical source because he grasps a distinction between political freedom and social
liberty, albeit in slightly different terms. Modern, social liberty belongs to individuals
even when they do not participate in government. In fact, as long as individuals are
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represented in government, their interests are best served by minimizing the intrusion of
government into their private lives. Ancient, political freedom, however, seems fated to
trample on individuality and demand religious and moral conformity, violently
enforced. 26
Constant’s account of negative liberty and representation, while influential and
embedded in a larger tradition, was not universally accepted as fully satisfactory. For
Hegel, the modern notion of liberal freedoms, while a great achievement, needed to be
situated in a more comprehensive theory, one that recognized humans also as
participating in the universal, rather than passively represented in it. This is to say,
humans are embedded in “ethical life,” which had its purest expression in Ancient Greek
democracy. This does not mean that each person should exercise sovereignty or
otherwise be directly involved in government, however. This is because for Hegel,
‘freedom,’ which we may associate with the political, is not limited to direct
government. 27 Smaller associations, guilds for instance, are all a part of the state and
participate in the freedom of the whole, even if they are not a part of the government—
which is the purview of the third estate.
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At least according to the liberal thinkers who sought to limit the use of public power
with inalienable, inviolable rights of the individual.
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This point about how ethical life is not merely reflected in ‘governing’ again stems
from the nature of the concept, Sittlichkeit. Wood rightly emphasizes that it has both an
objective side—the present, intersubjective world as embodied in institutions and
determinate customs—and a subjective side—a self-understanding and attitude on the
part of individuals that orients their thought and actions. Allen W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical
Thought, (New York: Cambridge University Press 1990) 196. “Ethical life,” then,
expresses how people shape, create, and preserve their world by way of what they take to
be shared norms, which extends beyond government to the entirety of intersubjective
existence.
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For Hegel, the life of the state was the realization its freedom, and its highest
expression of freedom, its most reflected and explicit representation, was the monarch.
This is not because the monarch was ‘free’ to act as arbitrarily as he pleased, but because
his individual actions took responsibility for the actions of the whole. The monarch’s own
‘subjectivity’ could be as minimal as putting a signature on decrees, which would be
drafted and debated by ministers who interact with liaisons from other institutions. But
the individual actions of the monarch (qua monarch) reflected and focused the will of the
whole people into a concrete event. To be clear, the universality of freedom would be
expressed in various contexts; the actions of the sovereign are only the clearest—and
most powerful—expression. 28
Civil society, on the other hand, is akin to the nation’s household for Hegel. 29 It is
not a market per se, but it is the realm in which individuals sell their labor for the sake of
satisfying their needs. More than that, it is the realm in which needs are articulated and
multiplied, which can result in a bad infinity (an unending sequence) if it is not delimited
by the state. 30 Hegel recognizes the situation of the laborer as being engaged with the
necessity of the body, akin the Ancient Greek slave. However, there are a few crucial
differences. First, the laborer has the rights of the citizen; and although such rights are
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G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, H.B. Nisbet (trans.) (Cambridge:
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only a feature of abstract right, they still help formalize and aid in the recognition of the
dignity of the human individual. Second, the modern European laborer contributes to the
well-being of the state rather than a single household. Thus, the laborer belongs more
universally in civil society rather than belonging to a particular person or family. Finally,
civil society is more comprehensive than mere contract relations. This is because civil
society is not simply limited by the state (qua government); it is integrated into the state
(qua the people as a whole).
I take it that Hegel’s account of civil society and the state is the right normative
account of the social and the political. In this relationship, the freedom of the people is
primary, and serves to orient and even redeem the social groups within the state (on the
levels of the estates, the guilds, and the individual). Freedom, which has its highest
expression in politics, also permeates social interactions as well, albeit less explicitly.
However, actual states fall shorter of this ideal than perhaps Hegel was willing to admit,
and for this reason Karl Marx is an indispensable contributor to the history of the
social/political distinction. One of Marx’s most enduring contributions to social-political
thought is the recognition of the extent to which government is a reflection of class
interests, and the ruling, bourgeois class is willing to wield a variety of tools—both
physical and ideological—to maintain its control of the state. Descriptively, Marx’s
analysis of the operation of the government on behalf of class interests marks an
engagement with the rationality of actual events that demonstrates the irrationality of the
world.
For Marx, the state is a means deployed by social classes for their own ends, to
serve their own interests. Because it serves the interests of particular classes, it must
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ultimately be overcome, perhaps first by being appropriated by the proletariat in a
dictatorship. 31 Hence, Marx’s thought is associated with the ‘withering away’ of the state
as well as the uniting of the workers of the world. The proletariat—the working class—is
the universal subject and not ‘the people,’ the nation, or the state.
In the final point of our history of the social/political distinction, Arendt criticizes
Marx’s position insofar as it makes the public sphere the realm of administration and
economic coordination. The culmination of communism would make it such that
creativity and fulfillment would take place privately, between autonomous individuals no
longer pitted against each other by artificial ideology or class difference. What is lost is
the sense in which in which the public is the appropriate space for action, for the
performance of great deeds and disclosing one’s uniqueness in speech. 32
Arendt, like Marx, is criticizing the dominant mode of conceptualizing the public
world, but where Marx focuses on capitalism, Arendt targets socio-economic thinking.
Both of their targets—capitalism and socio-economics—tend to displace and replace
other modes of thinking, organizing, and acting. The major drawback of Arendt’s
approach to the distinction is that she tends to view the movements in favor of social
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For instance, in his notion of human emancipation overcoming the state in Karl Marx,
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Of course, Marx is familiar with the alienation that accompanies modern economics: a
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human function (labor). See the Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts
of 1844 (New York: Prometheus Books 1988) 74. Arendt’s continued criticism is that
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materialist framework that Marx takes from Feuerbach (and other Moderns).
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justice as instances of social climbing, i.e., governed by the logic of economic selfinterest (for instance, in “Reflections on Little Rock”).
Arendt takes it that political action, unlike labor, is not (or need not be) driven by
self-interest. This is not to say that politics is altruistic or requires self-sacrifice, but
rather, the logic of self-interest and instrumentality are inappropriate for action. While it
may be true that there is a tendency or a temptation to view ‘justice’ in terms of economic
or distributive justice, which orients itself by economic categories, it is deeply reductive
to view the civil rights movements and the struggles for social justice as merely economic
(or ‘social’ in Arendt’s sense). While civil rights activists may not be government
officials, their attempts to change the American communal fabric fits with Arendt’s own
characterization of politics, with the caveat that civil rights activism is political action
about ‘society.’ Part of Arendt’s issues in misrecognizing civil rights activism and social
justice lies in how she draws the distinction between the social and political. Arendt often
slips into discussing the social and political as separate spheres, which she takes from the
Ancient Greek distinction between the private and the public spheres, demarcated by
separate spaces, but her analysis of the social/political distinction works better—and is
less objectionable—if it is understood as distinguishing two kinds of logic. Drawing from
this brief history, and especially from Arendt, we can see the difference in social logic
and political logic by analyzing the concepts they bring to bear on public activity.
2.1.2

Analysis of Political Action and Social Behavior

Having reviewed a brief history of the social/political distinction, we have arrived
at the conception of terms as primarily referring to two kinds of logic. Political logic, on
my reading, is guided by a notion of creative freedom that is realized in acting in concert
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with others. Social logic, by contrast, involves a notion of private liberty, but its driving
concept is that of self-interest. Political freedom can orient social groups (in the sense of
non-governmental identities) and movements and make those groups a source of
creativity and an initiation into the wider public sphere. Social logic and its notion of selfinterest can guide some kinds of relationships and do so appropriately, but when it is
taken to be the ultimate guidepost for thinking about all intersubjective interaction, it is
destructive. In order to clarify these two kinds of logic further, I will analyze how they
conceive of public activity, which can be analyzed into two sets of structural features: its
activity, its aim, its mode of speech, and its performer; we will review both political
action and social behavior in this framework.
Following Arendt, ‘action’ is the term appropriate to properly political activity,
which she distinguishes from labor and work in The Human Condition. An action has its
source in an actor and not in an external cause. 33 Moreover, action is necessarily
performed by a plurality of distinct individuals in concert; it is not the product of a single
will. Action, then, is the cooperative initiating of something new, and that novelty is
introduced into a common world as something unique and unprecedented. It lacks the
concreteness and durability of making (be it construction, manufacturing, etc.) but action
can be preserved in institutions, memorials, and the like.
The aim of political action is a goal, which is both provisional and at least partly
open-ended. When political actors cooperate, they enter the public sphere with flexible
goals and a readiness to change course. The open-endedness of goals makes action
explicitly unpredictable. Political actions are not arbitrary, and coordination remains
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possible because the actors share a principle, which itself is an open, normative guideline
that actors must further determine in the course of their action. 34 While principles are
generally agreed upon by those acting together, they may disagree about what goals best
realize or express their principles, and this disagreement is the substance of political
discourse.
The mode of speech appropriate to politics is persuasion. Persuasion is the
appropriate language of freedom because it attempts to ‘woo’ the reason of others rather
than derive a necessary conclusion. The key point here is that is that reasoning in public
is neither deduction, which involves only necessary conclusions, nor education, which
requires hierarchy between student and teacher; to engage in persuasion, political actors
have to set aside the possibility that one can ‘make’ others believe something. This is in
part because thinking and speaking in and about the public sphere involves appearances,
for better or worse. While the best examples of political discourse would show a shared
spirit of inquiry and curiosity among political actors, this is not always the case and
public discourse can degenerate into mere rhetoric and propaganda. 35 Political actors
speak to each other with the aim of persuading others about how their goal should be
determined but also a willingness to be persuaded. Because of this openness to the speech
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of others, politics is a realm of forming an opinion. 36 Moreover, persuasion is appropriate
for politics because action consists of equals acting together; no commands are possible.
Finally, political action is performed by distinct individuals, expressing their whoness, an opacity that allows an individual to be surprising and spontaneous, and
undertaking something that is not simply a part of their typical, day-to-day existence.
Like action itself, political actors demand that they be the source of their own
intelligibility; they both must be taken on their own terms if they are to be meaningful in
their freedom. 37
Offering examples of politics on Arendt’s conception risks two possible pitfalls. If
one treats it as something momentous and rare, then politics starts to appear as
existentially superfluous and elitist. If it is commonplace, it loses its specificity. I propose
thinking of momentous politics as the most shining exemplars of political freedom while
being open to the idea that freedom may be at play more ambiguously in more common
public affairs. An example of momentous political activity would be something like the
American Revolution, in which distinct actors, with great uncertainty and equally great
inventiveness, set about creating institutions that would act as organs of freedom. I would
add, contra Arendt’s own interpretation, that the civil rights movement was largely a
prolonged action of unprecedented institutional and spiritual change for the country—
although Arendt is far more willing to see civil rights actors as social climbers.

36

When public discourse shifts from forming an opinion to simply reporting an
opinion—or enforcing one—then it has lost a sense of shared inquiry and transformed
into what I am calling a social mode of acting and speaking.
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Thus, politics involves Kantian ‘reflective’ judgment, in which a universal must be
found for the particular.
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I now turn to the social. Where the political is spontaneous and unpredictable, the
social invites instrumental reasoning and predictability. 38 Its mode of activity, then, is
behavior. Instead of goals, it has ends, and social behaviors takes place only as a means
of producing that end. Ends stem not from a principle that people discuss and further
determine, but from an interest that is usually assumed to be fully determined. When
social actors enter the public, their minds are essentially made up. There are things that
social actors want, and they report—rather than form—their opinion when coordinating
with others. Social organization, then, is instrumental. 39 While the goals of political
action require a plurality of perspectives to be realized; the ends of social activity are
more efficiently realized when everyone has the same perspective and engages in the
same behaviors. Moreover, while persuasion is possible in social behavior, command is
much more efficient at accomplishing the given end. Political actors are irreducibly
distinct, while social actors are tokens of a given type. That is to say, social behaviors are
intelligible as the typical actions of a given ‘what’ rather than a ‘who.’
Perhaps the best examples of social behaviors are instances of buying and selling.
Clearly, this activity involves multiple people and transpires ‘in public,’ but it involves
people acting according to their private interests and ends. Moreover, the people and their
private ends remain unchanged after their exchange—what has changed is that property
has changed hands. ‘Social behaviors’ applies not only to material goods and economic

38
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exchanges; it applies to modes of association in which people pursue or preserve their
social status, e.g., golfing at a country club.
There are three important points of clarification. First, while ‘the political’ is
about the expression of freedom in action and not about following pre-given rules, it
nevertheless has a prescriptive importance. If a genuinely public realm were lost, for
instance, because all forms of interaction became technical-administrative and subsumed
under regulations, then we will have lost the ability to express and recognize novel
meaning (at least with regard to the ultimate issues of public life). While it carries an
inherent instability and moral riskiness, 40 the political realm should be preserved. The
most radical threat to politics is totalitarianism, which is not just a tyrannical form of
government or a kind of immoral rulership. Totalitarianism is a threat to the general
human condition that seeks to make an important mode of being human impossible in
order to accelerate a transcendent process, e.g., racial struggle for Nazis and class
struggle for Stalinists. In the total state, everyone is under surveillance by (potentially)
everyone else, and everyone is fully subjected to the will of a single leader. This social
arrangement not only assumes that people are malleable, interchangeable cogs, it seeks to
make this belief a reality through obliterating the public and private.
Second, politics is both fragile and somehow almost inescapable (except for under
totalitarian conditions). Politics is fragile insofar as it can be colonized by other modes of
organization, especially the social. The language of judgment here helps to reflect this
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change, insofar as judgments, once made, tend to become prejudices used to inform other
judgments. Moreover, initiating a new, unpredictable project with others demands
vulnerability from its actors. Thus, an action tends to exhaust itself and become but one
event in a causal link. Politics is also (largely) inescapable insofar as spontaneity and
freedom continuously erupt into public affairs. Whenever people are together, they
may—by virtue of a common problem and an urge to distinguish themselves—begin an
action with the hope of reorganizing their common world.
Third, what we call ‘government’ can be political or social, and the political is not
limited to government activity. Insofar as the government acts as a kind of administrator,
issuing laws and making determinative judgments according to a procedure, it is social.
Insofar as institutions and representatives initiate an action that changes how we live
together and relate to one another, government is political. Presumably—and
provisionally—democratic governments should tend toward the political mode of action
because the people, as a collective, is engaging in self-government. “Self-government”
here means the people is not automatically organized by some transcendent law. Rather,
the people, again as a collective and not simply a collection of individuals, is organized
by its own laws, i.e., is autonomous. 41
2.1.3 Political Community
For the second task, I take it that politics, etymologically, invites us to think in
terms of the polis, which is a kind of doing, namely, the doing of self-organization. For
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the sake of familiarity, I will often use the term ‘political community’ in place of ‘polis.’
While this subsection will introduce a whole-parts relationship, I am still drawing on the
modal distinction from earlier. Thus, I take it that it is appropriate for thinking of a whole
political community in a way that is oriented by public freedom and creativity. ‘Social
parts,’ by contrast can be guided either political thinking or by socio-economic thinking
without issue.
The primary challenge in thinking of the unity of the political community in
whole-parts terms is to think of it as a whole with parts, wherein (a) the plurality of parts
is essential for the whole, and (b) the whole can be distinguished from other wholes and
thus cannot incorporate everyone. I make the point about distinguishing wholes from
each other not because each political community should remain absolutely pure or
isolated from others, but because political communities need to be distinguished from
each other in order to relate to each other at all (for instance, in relationships of respect
and not annexing parts of other communities).
There are two explicit arguments that I take to be compelling on this point about
distinction. The first is Hegel’s argument that self-knowledge requires recognition from
another self. 42 This is because a self-conscious being desires to see itself in the external
world, but insofar as it interacts with objects of its desire, e.g., food, it destroys its
objects. And a conscious being can only see itself reflected in the world by way of what it
creates, not what it destroys. Acts of durable creation, ‘work,’ require a relationship to
some other self that interrupts and mediates the relationship of a conscious being to the
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Charles Taylor discusses this point about the necessity of other selves, for instance, in
Taylor, HMS 18-9. Hegel offers the material for Taylor’s analysis in the lordship and
bondage section of The Phenomenology of Spirit.
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objects of its immediate desire. While all self-conscious selves may share a kind of
creative freedom and reason, that freedom must determine itself in specific forms that
distinguish them from each other.
The second argument in favor of distinction is offered by Carl Schmitt, and it is
tied less to self-knowledge and more to a notion of commitment. For Schmitt, the primary
distinction in politics is the friend-enemy distinction, which marks the possibility for a
conflict in which death can occur. As long as people are willing to fight and die alongside
some people and against others, then there is politics. 43 For Schmitt, when people are no
longer willing to fight for their friends—their community—then there is no political
community, and this kind of commitment must always include and exclude others. As a
subsidiary point, the notion of a political community with a specific identity becomes all
the more important for democracies, which can institute their own government only if
they exclude others. When Schmitt makes this claim about democratic exclusion, he is in
part drawing from examples of democracies, in part deploying the friend-enemy
distinction, and in part recognizing that there is disagreement about how to organize the
government machinery and that people will fight and die for that disagreement.
The principles of inclusion and exclusion for a political community often go
unaddressed or their articulation goes awry. The difficulty stems from, on the one hand,
the tendency to associate into groups based on some perceived similarity, especially if
that similarity is presumed to be ‘natural,’ e.g., race or nation, and, on the other, the need
to cooperate with people who are importantly dissimilar. The former is necessary because
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For Schmitt, the friend-enemy distinction is only what makes organized conflict
possible. It does not imply that all politics is war. See Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the
Political, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2007) 27-33. Henceforth, “Concept.”
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living together and cooperating with people who are similar is a necessary part of
growing into a community. Sustained, daily interactions and cooperative efforts require
substantive similarities, e.g., shared interests or hobbies, or an imagined identity of
background experiences or perspectives. In other words, regardless of universal
similarities, individuals are not born politically formed and ready to be integrated
seamlessly into a political community; they are born into a family and then integrated
into simple identities (religion, sexuality, socio-economic class, etc.) before
distinguishing themselves from their peers. 44 The latter is necessary in part because
without the ability to change roles and social descriptors, to renegotiate and reinvent
them, each person would be sentenced to be what everyone else says they are.
The whole-part relationship provides a helpful path to understanding the political
and social. On the level of the whole, the political community consists of the common
project of preserving that intersubjective world. On the level of parts, social groups
provide the grounds for association based on similarity of appearance, offering a simple
but necessary basis of intelligibility for people. ‘Social groups’ are descriptive
designations of what people say they are and which people they associate with. Social
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We can call these identities ‘social,’ but if we do not adopt a purely social interpretive
framework, then these groupings can enhance and enrich the political sphere. While such
groupings may have a positive relationship to the political, they are not as demanding as
the public sphere and do not have the openness of possibility that political action has.
Thus, they are like steppingstones to the political in the way that Hegel takes it that the
estates, especially the second estate, is a kind of steppingstone to participating in the state
as a whole. Social association is easier than working with people who appear different,
and thus people, especially the young, need to have some ability to discriminate with
whom they spend their time. Of course, the young also need to be introduced to a wider,
intersubjective world just as immigrants need to be introduced to a new public sphere.
Arendt establishes this as the political significance of education in Hannah Arendt, “The
Crisis in Education,” from Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, (New York:
Penguin Books 2006) esp. 173-7. Henceforth, “‘The Crisis in Education.’”
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groups, unlike the political community can appropriately associate based on similar
appearance. 45 In other words, a social identity says a little bit about what a person is like
and a little bit about what is in that person’s interest; it makes them readily intelligible but
not necessarily in terms of their spontaneity. Those are the two levels of grouping; the
political community is something to be strived for, while social groupings are a necessary
part of the development of political actors. These two aspects are co-constitutive of our
collective living together. 46
The relationship between the two levels complicates the whole-part relationship.
While the political community should not have a substantive identity in terms of similar
appearance or what-ness, it must have a kind of identity insofar as all the parts are
devoted to the same project, the political community must have a kind of homogeneity of
freedom—shared goals, shared principles, and a commitment to mutual respect and
forgiveness, etc. This homogeneity of freedom is a pre-condition of sharing ‘objects’ in
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Keep in mind that the individual’s right to association—probably the greatest
contribution to political thought by liberalism—is simultaneously the right to
discrimination. That is, it is the right to choose whom to be around and not be around.
While the ‘association,’ formulation is rightly praised, the discrimination formulation
tends to be maligned, for instance, as a response to Arendt’s usage of it in her
“Reflections on Little Rock.” This wariness about discrimination is also well-founded. I
propose, in keeping with Arendt’s thought, that the resolution to this ambivalence is the
distinction between the social and the political. The social is the realm in which
discrimination and association are appropriate. It is inappropriate to discriminate and
associate on an individual basis in the political realm.
46
For Schmitt and Rousseau, the partial social identities tend to threaten political
groupings. Private interests, on their account, have a stronger motivational component,
which not only fragments a community into smaller parts, it encourages various parties to
seize control over the whole. While this scenario is certainly possible, it is not logically
necessary. In times of political health—as ephemeral as they may be—partial social
identities can express and further political belonging rather than detracting from it.
Arguably the civil rights movement expressed such a democratic health, even if its legacy
was incomplete.
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the common world, e.g., laws, institutions, elected officials, etc. The key to keeping
political identity distinct from a social identity, I contend, is that political identity must
have different perspectives, members of that project have different appearances, and the
difference of perspective and appearance must be recognized by all as constituting the
shared project. With an outline now given, let us review each part of this account in more
detail.
To recapitulate the point, political identity does not require a similarity of
appearance; it requires shared, substantive principles and a commitment to some of the
same institutions and modes of organization. Political identities still exclude other
identities because not everyone will see their freedom reflected in the same institutions
and laws, e.g., I take myself, as a United States citizen, to be perfectly reasonable in
stating that I could not owe allegiance to a monarch. This does not imply that I have to
fight against the United Kingdom, but certainly a conflict is possible along those lines
were the Queen of England to declare a rehabilitation of her sovereignty over her old
colonies. 47 Part of my understanding of my fellow Americans will be at least a vague and
incomplete sense of the apparent characteristics and appearances of several groups of
Americans. I can recognize several accents, for instance, that I can say are American
even if they are not my own. Thus, while political identity does not intrinsically have a
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Political communities require people to be willing to fight for the state. To be sure, the
important point is not that we fight and die for different, particular individuals who
inhabit office, but that we see our freedom in our own government offices even when we
despise the person/people in office. As an American, I see my freedom in the various
government offices because I can vote for my representative, and this is my default, often
deeply unreflective understanding of freedom. It would be unthinkable for me to see my
freedom in a hereditary monarchy, but presumably citizens of the United Kingdom have
their reasons for committing to their royal family.
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shared appearance, there is often a sense among members of the political community of a
kind of family resemblance for some of the social groupings within the whole. More
problematically, one political pathology is taking a political grouping to be akin to a
social grouping and thinking that one is committed only to those who are similar in
appearance or have a strict identity of interest (often signaled by a common appearance).
The political community derives its unity from an active commitment to itself, to
maintaining and supporting its parts and allowing collective action. Each member has to
participate in this project, because it cannot be handled only or even primarily through
representatives. This commitment is not simply an apparent characteristic shared by each
member, like nationality, nor is it a common governing mechanism that transcends and
mediates social identities. We might say that it is a common spirit, rather than a common
nature or a common mechanism. The nebulous, collective commitment must consist of, at
a basic level, respecting the self-articulation of social groups, meaning that each person
attempts to allow others to identify themselves according to their own categories rather
than imputing to them categories of partiality and hostility to the whole. 48 Maintaining
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It seems that a healthy democracy could not consist of “Left” and “Right” social
groups, at least in America, because each group is committed to presenting the other
group as essentially demonic and in need of being defeated. Identifying social groups as
hostile to the whole because of their partiality is part of the logic of populism, and one of
the reasons why populism so readily erupts in times of liberal-representative crisis is
because demonizing other parties is an effective electoral strategy. It is possible that the
American federal system provides a good model of political community, with the caveat
that the individual states would be partly social (similar appearance), partly political
(engaging in political sovereignty), and so they would have to have their own, more
narrow social identities below them, as it were. My suspicion is that the public spirit of
the United States is not committed to articulating our ‘whatness’ in terms of states,
however, and there may be complex reasons for why we are not attached to a spirit of
federalism even if we maintain federal ‘machinery.’ It is not clear to me that any
articulations of social identity are currently well suited to being the basis for political
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political unity is a task that can always fail or degenerate; no rule or constitutional
arrangement can guarantee success, and no one can be forced to perform it. Even if, for
instance, hate speech is outlawed, one has at best made an outward habit punishable if
caught in public. A spirit of hate and bigotry still persists, and those habits can be
perpetuated in private. 49 Even more problematically, the spirit of racism and bigotry can
transform and show up in ways that are not expressly outlawed. Bigots are also capable
of politics in the sense of spontaneous, creative world-shaping, and this capacity can be
neither theorized nor legislated away. Here is an example. The racist response to school
desegregation in the South wasn’t to simply accept Brown v. Board of Education, it was
to subvert the spirit of integration and create ‘segregation academies’ to maintain de facto
segregation. In summary, maintaining political unity can only ever be a matter of shared
principles and renewed attempts at persuasion, and if that unity erodes, then citizens
simply have a shared administrative apparatus that they will attempt to possess and use
against other social groups-turned-political (in a pathological way). I will return to the
topic of a healthy political community in the last section. For now, I will briefly say a
little more about the kind of social groups that I have in mind.

unity in the country, which is more a product of a polemical spirit rather than a lack of
social concepts.
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Carl Schmitt seems to lament that Hobbes allowed for just this point in his discussion
of the public/private distinction. Hobbes claimed that publicly, subjects must recognize
the king as possessing healing powers. However, in private, people need not believe in
such miracles, and it would be a mistake to think that the sovereign could command
private belief. We can perhaps recognize in Schmitt’s regret over Hobbes’s insight that
private belief can always come back into the public, more powerful and coordinated with
other private citizens into a new group taking on a political role, i.e., a role willing to
conflict with the rest of the community.
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2.1.4

Social Groupings within the Political Community

When I discuss social groups within a political community, I take social identities
to be identities that foster typical behaviors for members of that group and offer
interpretations of appropriate ends of action for group members. They involve a
similarity of appearance, and they might be guided by a notion of common self-interest
that does not thereby threaten the political. They can be identities that one takes on via
free association, or they can be an identity imputed to persons from infancy. Either way,
the existence of social groups is not in itself problematic. Social groups play a necessary
role in the development of individuals and their sense of self and for gaining a
perspective on the world. Social identities are problematic when they are taken to be
absolute and unchanging and when they are taken to be the basis of a political
community, i.e., when we take them to be the groups within which we act and create new
realities and that demand our deepest loyalties and possibly our most final sacrifice. 50 For
instance, people who take citizenship in the United States of America to be a matter of
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Space does not permit me to go into detail, but it seems to me decisive that Marxist
thought played a pivotal role in thinking about social classes as something that transcends
a political community (embodied in the state). It is only once we start thinking of a global
bourgeoisie and proletariat that these classes can come to appear as constitutive of the
intersubjective world. Progressive thought that draws from Marxism tends to treat social
categories in the same way, although certainly not to equal extents or without innovations
and emendations. To be sure, the treatment of social categories in this way—as
transcending political boundaries—was not a fanciful invention on the part of Marx; it
reflects a part of reality that remains true now. However, a class that transcends political
boundaries, however much members of those classes resemble each other and no matter
much their material interests may align, will never be a suitable political grouping. That
is, it will never be a grouping of expressing its freedom in principled institutions.
Communism was only able to appear in world history when it became alloyed to a
nation—Russia, China, etc.—and never simply as a movement of the proletariat as such.
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race or ethnicity, say white nationalists, have reduced a political community to a social
identity.
Social identities, especially if they are imagined (rightly or wrongly) to be a
matter of nature, encourage certain kinds of behaviors to further specific interests.
Citizenship within a democratic community, however, provides the basis for interacting
with others unlike oneself by way of more general commitments to institutions and
general principles; such commitments and principles make fellow citizens intelligible as
fellows to you without making them identical to you. Thereby, you can become
unfamiliar to yourself and realize your own distinction without the threats and risks of
meeting in a violent ‘state of nature.’ Nevertheless, appearing within the political sphere
is demanding, so one cannot act politically all the time, and moreover, the political would
not make sense if social categories had not established a shared language to
communicate.
There are a few ways to conceive of groups within a political community. One
can think in terms of race, class, sex, religion, party, gender, Left and Right, etc. What is
important about any of these groupings, whether they seem to be natural/biological or
artificial/historical, is that they inform the identity of the individuals who belong to each
group. These descriptors make a person intelligible to others as well as themselves, and
this intelligibility sets the expectations of their interactions. These groups tell you and
everyone else within the wider community what you are. This is not to say that each
individual within an identity group is exactly alike, or that a group identity works the
same for everyone within the group. Social identities intersect with each other, change
over time, and leave room for individual interpretation. Moreover, individuals must
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inventively navigate their social contexts in ways that can be hard to predict.
Nevertheless, social identities precede individuals, who are born into and grow from
them. 51
We could interpret the public sphere entirely as social groups interacting with
each other. Such groupings would defy state boundaries. To be sure, the realities of the
global economy offer good reason to think that there is one boundless—or near
boundless—civil society in which we all participate and fall into groups. However, the
instability of cooperative and competitive relations, the fluidity of social identity, and the
lack of power outside of ‘purchasing power,’ are all good, provisional reasons to think
that civil society is not a good locus of autonomy. Lasting rules that we can call our own
seems to require a bounded unity, in which there is a relatively clear and stable sense of
collective responsibility for one’s fellow citizens. Such lasting rules give us a sense of
determining the norms and institutions that shape our lives in the community, and
communal living requires rules that are not merely formal or purely universal, e.g., the
exact framework of government or a shared vision of what community should be like.
There are two difficulties I want to address to close this discussion of political
unity. The first is a question about whether the political community must have its own
kind of substantial identity, whether it merely holds together several social identities, or
something else together. If the former route is taken, then political identity starts to
become just a social identity that has been elevated in prestige or power, which entails
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Heidegger’s notion of inauthenticity is apropos here. Everyone is at first and for the
most part, inauthentic. Similarly, individuals begin life within, and most often persist in,
social groups according to social modes of organization. Nevertheless, human freedom
interrupts and breaks up the social realm.
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that politics is about domination and ‘the Left’ aims at making the dominating class as
inclusive as possible. 52 This approach has the advantage of giving a non-monetary
motivation for public service that incurs the risk of death for some individuals: police,
military, health care, firefighters, etc. If a political community has no identity of its own,
the difficulty becomes identifying what principle could hold together a finite set of social
identities. 53 Equality before the law may encourage many citizens to be law-abiding, but
it hardly seems sufficient to motivate any significant personal risk or a life of public
service. 54 Why and how would it bind some social identities together and not others?
Why would members of one social group risk their lives in defense or service to members
of other social groups? It seems possible, and perhaps even likely, that members of a
social group would assume positions of risk and responsibility for the sake of dominating
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Mouffe and Laclau seem to think that political identity exists and that it is simply an
elevated social identity, which ties into their notion of hegemony (a particular that stands
in for a floating or open-ended universal). Laclau in particular discusses a notion of the
populist identity being created on the basis of a particular demand that stands in for a
group of irreducibly diverse social demands on, for instance, OPR ix.
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The classic liberal answer—and possibly the republican answer as well—is that laws
are the basis of binding people into a political unity. Arendt takes this tack in On
Revolution, but it seems to me that the portion of her argument does a disservice to the
rest of her thought, particularly her work on forgiveness which I will introduce shortly.
54
Benedict Anderson, reflecting on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, notes that it
seems nearly inconceivable to think of such a monument without a background concept
of ‘the nation.’ While people might be willing to sacrifice themselves for the nation, he
contends that people are not willing to make such sacrifices for liberalism, for instance, in
large part because liberalism does not deal with grander themes about life, death,
immortality, etc. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (New York: Verso 2016) 6-10. Henceforth,
“Anderson, IC.”
60

or harming members of other groups—a phenomenon that clearly happens with I.C.E.
and the police. 55
The second difficulty is about the relationship of the social and the political. I do
not take it that each of them corresponds to some content or sets of issues of their own.
Rather, the difference is in how they organize, what kind of reasoning they draw upon,
and how their activities are carried out. Thus, no social issue can be immunized from
political engagement, and no political action or institution is immune from falling into a
kind of social routine. Moreover, while it seems that the political community requires the
existence of social groups, social groups rely on their existence from some political act or
grouping.
I think the relationship here is one of judgment and prejudice. One cannot judge
without already having acquired a language and set of prejudgments (i.e., prejudices). But
prejudices themselves are sedimented judgments that can be re-opened for reflective
judgment. The great priority of politics and judgment over society and prejudice is not
that they are antecedent, but that they are direct enactments of our freedom. In a similar
vein, a social identity—a ‘what’ one is—can be expressive of freedom and not habit in
situations where usual habits and norms break down. Thereby, a social identity becomes
politically significant and expressive of one’s who-ness rather than simply ‘what’ one is.
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As an institution, the police are rational and an indispensable part of the political
community. However, corruption and aggression—especially when it is prevalent and
embedded within ‘the culture’ of the police force—needs to be explained. My account
has the upside of accounting for how aggression is one of the ‘benefits’ of what is
ultimately a dangerous job. We should expect that it is a more prevalent motivator for
officers when, (a) it is assumed that one becomes a police officer with the expectation of
a benefit or serving one’s interest, and (b) police officers become disillusioned with their
monetary rewards.
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Arendt seems to offer an example of this when she discusses the situation of being
attacked for one’s identity, e.g., being Jewish, and it is only in terms of one’s identity that
one can stand up for oneself. In this case, one takes on an active relationship to one’s
social identity that makes it an expression of one’s capacity to initiate action and
distinguish oneself from all others. In sum, there is no static barrier between the social
and political; the political must occur against the backdrop of the social, and social issues
and identities can be politicized.
In my contribution to the discourse on populism, liberalism, and democracy, I
want to preserve the sense in which action is political, and not just a mechanistic
behavior. I will show that both market liberalism and populism, even when either is taken
as the solution for the other, fall into conceiving public actors in behavioral terms, ergo
democracy must adopt a different framework if it is leave room for political freedom. I
take it that the notion of behavior I wish to avoid can either be descriptive—in which case
materialist or economic explanations are given to interpret actions—or prescriptive—in
which ideal, ‘legitimate’ behaviors are suggested for people to follow.
Critiques of populism tend insist that populism violates the set of laws (or at least
principles that should condition the laws) which are designed precisely for limiting the
use of public power. The usual first reaction against populism is that populist movements
and their leaders do not recognize the rules intended to check them as legitimate
limitations. Within this framework, the question then arises: what do we do if our actions
are constrained by rules and norms and theirs are not? Liberal critics often follow up on
this basic question with more technical ones: how do we get populists to behave? How do
we legitimately stop Right-wing populists? On the one hand, these critics have a moral
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picture of the world that they want actualized; on the other hand, they want to fix the
problem of populism while still operating within the limits set by currently existing
government and social mechanisms. This project, I take it, effaces the political because it
takes the ends of political action for granted and because it seeks to instrumentally shape
the behaviors of others. For example, we might view the election of the president of the
United States as important because that office can nominate supreme court justices. By
voting on the president, then, one can help secure control of the supreme court, which has
far reaching implications over contentious issues, or at the very least, that is how political
parties are likely to present the situation. However, by exercising control of government
and wielding the law to encourage behaviors, one has foregone persuasion. 56 When
persuasion fails, then so too public freedom has failed, and only forgiveness can repair
political relations. When persuasion fails and the disagreement is over something that is
unforgivable, then an original political unity has disintegrated into groups jockeying for
control of government machinery, and these new groups are only quasi-political, i.e.,
social in the sense of being driven by self-interest and governed by instrumental
reasoning. Political action can be about justice, but it can never make anyone just. It can
only attempt to persuade. While the end of liberal commentators is often something like
equal rights, the notion of action at play here is deeply hierarchical, since the liberal
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One of the great political contributions of liberalism has been its insistence on the
importance of discourse and persuasion, which Rousseau and the democratic tradition
have been wary of. Problematically, liberalism has considered discourse as a rationalistic
process in which truth and justice are assumed to emerge simply by virtue of engaging in
a regulated process.
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critics are taking on the role of social engineers, and the problematic populists are being
treated as unruly cattle, impetuous children, or incorrigible brutes. 57
2.1.5

Democracy and Its Liberal-Populist Interpretations

At the outset, I offered the example of BLM protests as an occasion to clarify
social disruption and political action. Having seen a delineation of these terms, we are
now in a better position to understand such protests as not only political but also
democratic. Only one term remains to clarify. Once done, we will be in a position to see
liberalism as a theory of civil society and populism as a kind of social movement.
The classical conception of democracy is a form of government in which all—or
the many—rule. This is to say that every citizen participates in rulership, even if only by
turns. Democracy is distinguished from rule by the one—monarchy—and rule by the
few—aristocracy. It is commonly accepted that such a conception of democracy is no
longer tenable given the scale of modern states. The modern conception of democracy—
deeply influenced by the major contract theorists arguing against the divine right of
kings—holds that democracy is a principle of authority: the authority of the government
ultimately rests with the people. This modern iteration of ‘democracy’ served to make the
term compatible with representative government. While the many may never occupy
government office, they may still be the ultimate source of authority for those who do.
With a change in how democracy is conceived, from a form of government to a principle
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Abts and Rummens are willing to call populists enemies of the state, thereby adopting
a weapon of the populists themselves. Hillary Clinton referring to Trump supporters as
‘deplorables’ is exemplary here. It marks an attitude of having already categorized a
portion of the population who are now a problem to be dealt with. Persuasion is not a live
action. Admittedly, the polemical spirit of the contemporary U.S. is such that persuasion,
in fact, is very difficult if not impossible.
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of authority, so too there has been a change in how the political community is
understood. The classical understanding of democracy, by directly involving each citizen
in government, made it such that each citizen had a voice, and all had to listen. Modern,
representational democracies have emphasized a right to vote for a representative; this
does not imply that one has a ‘voice,’ however. Instead, it means that one has a
representative to serve citizens’ interests whether this is conceived as “self-interest” or
simply as having set identical ends; this is the core meaning behind the maxim “no
taxation without representation.” But does representing the interests of some constituents
mean that citizens have a voice or that they (indirectly) participate in public power?
Liberalism and populism offer further specifications of democratic representation and
how the people participate in government.
The liberal tradition offers a vision of democracy in which individuals cast votes
for representatives who must maintain their approval for reelection. Thereby,
representatives are ‘subject’ to their constituencies. The assumption is that if voters are
dissatisfied with their representative—because they did not ‘perform well’ (did not serve
voters’ interests)—they will lose the next election. Thus, their continued time in office
relies on being effective administrators, which importantly means implementing effective
economic policies and offering their constituents the sense that their rights are secure. 58
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One of the slogans of Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign was ‘the economy, stupid,’
which is just one reminder of the importance of economic interest for liberal politics.
Both in the history of liberal theories as well as in contemporary practice, property and
wages are assumed to be of the highest order of importance. By contrast, while I have no
problem with property and economics to be a concern of politics, I am skeptical of its
primacy. Moreover, I think such relations tend to be thought of within a socio-economic
framework, in which interest, instrumental rationality, and behavior take precedence over
the concepts of spontaneous freedom in a political framework.
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Such elections pit politicians in competition with each other, and—like the market’s
invisible hand—tend toward promoting the most effective administrators, assuming
everyone follows the constitutional rules (including respecting individual rights as they
have already been articulated). This entire vision of the democratic process assumes that
voters behave according to their interests in set, transparent ways, and when constituents
fail to behave in these ways, they are subject to the familiar criticism of voting against
their own interests, i.e., they are voting irrationally. This is a social picture of democracy.
Populism may in some ways be a reaction against this picture, but it preserves the
general social framework. Populists—and Trump exemplifies the point here—reject two
features of liberalism. First, populists reject the old representatives who occupy office
and the limitations of the power of the ultimate representative (usually the president,
prime minister, etc.) both in terms of the particular people in office as well as the
plurality of people who can act as appropriate representatives of the people. Moreover,
while voting remains vital for populist leaders, the rallies, parades, and gatherings are
arguably just as important. While liberalism promotes a kind of distant business
relationship between voter and representative where the latter pursues the interest of the
former, 59 populism promotes a stronger socio-psychological connection in which the
populist supporters have direct access to their leader. The second rejection populism
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This is Hannah Pitkin’s characterization of the liberal notion of representation in
Hannah, Pitkin The Concept of Representation (Berkley: University of California Press
1967) 190. Henceforth, “Representation.” This point is echoed in Arendt’s analysis of the
idea in OR 24, wherein the slogan “no taxation without representation” flags the extent to
which economic self-interest and representation run together.
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makes of liberalism is liberalism’s allowance of any social grouping or interest. 60
Liberalism has no category of the foreigner, which is a category that is absolutely
essential for populism, although it applies that category to other social groups within the
wider community. Within any populist movement, there will be degrees of the rejection
of social difference, with the simplest members being, e.g., protestant white supremacists
who view women as belonging within the country as little more than dutiful servants. But
the attack on these foreigners within the body politic is just a way of advancing the
interest of the true people, the great silent majority, the real Americans, etc.
We can see in schematic fashion that liberalism and populism operate within a
social framework. They are primarily ways of interpreting a representative’s relationship
to their constituents, and such representation remains focused on a concept of selfinterest. We will see this account fleshed out in the following chapters. For now, I want
to suggest that the BLM protests are not primarily about advancing anyone’s interests—
as individuals, as a social group, or even as a political collective. The protests act—even
if only ambiguously or imperfectly—as declarations of belonging within the community,
and their effectiveness has been due, in part, to the recognition from other social groups
of both the validity of the claim of belonging and the evidence that this has been
repeatedly and systematically violated. At this point, it is unclear if the BLM protests will
be successful. As a political act, it will never have achieved a final end, but might
nevertheless successfully reshape our intersubjective world. Such a success would require
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This is perhaps an overstatement, but not much of one. In the United States, the
permissiveness of liberalism can be seen in the continued legality of far-right paramilitary
groups, e.g., the Proud Boys. While members of that group may get arrested for particular
crimes (and not often enough), liberalism allows them to exist as a group that defines
their interests in direct, aggressive opposition to other members of the state.
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not just a change in rhetoric or a shallow tokenism by politicians and advertisers, but in a)
a reflective shift in the attitude of the general public, and b) a change in organization of
government officials. Clearly, this model of political action is not contained by (voting)
procedures, although such practices may play a part in political change. In fact, no
political action is contained by any determinate practice. To understand how this can be
true and how political action such as the BLM protests are still intelligible as democratic,
we have to widen our view of what political action can be beyond the actions of elected
representatives. Thus, I turn my attention to different notions of political power.

2.2

Sovereignty and Orders of Power
The previous section addressed the social and the political as modes of

organization—both institutional and not. Of principle importance was the question of
how liberalism and populism view the relationship of a representative to their
constituents, given that the familiar notion of democracy thinks of ‘politics’ in terms of
voting for a representative for the sake of pursuing one’s self-interest. This everyday
view of ‘politics’ holds that each citizen can pursue their self-interest in private.
Representatives work for collective self-interests in public, and thus seem to be the
bearers of democratic power, having been invested with authority from their constituents.
That is, only representatives—and their appointed officials—actually act on behalf of the
people.
This view of things, which emphasizes the work done by representatives
distinguished from that done by private citizens, has two consequences in the popular
imagination. First, it makes elected offices hyper-important insofar as only government
officials—usually elected representatives—can exercise public power. Second, as a
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further consequence, it makes the stakes of the elections high. If a group of citizens can
gather enough support to get their representative in office then they have achieved control
over some portion of the government, and this is felt no more acutely than in presidential
races in the United States. 61 This view offers two prima facie problems: the first is that it
makes ‘politics’ formulaic and non-creative for a vast majority of citizens. Public affairs,
on this view, are not fulfilling, and they are only engaged with to the extent that citizens
can reasonably think it secures their private endeavors. For those committed to the
democratic promise that the people can collectively engage in world-shaping, this view of
politics is untenable.
Second, this view of politics that only highlights the efforts of representatives
must solve the puzzle of how to regulate the regulators. Assume, briefly, that our
lawmakers are obliged to follow some laws or procedures. If we posit that such laws are
natural or of divine origin, we would have to account (a) for how those extra-political
laws can substantively guide political law-making, or (b) we would have to show which
laws have such a status and give an account for what laws we need beyond them. If we
take representatives to be guided by laws of reason, perhaps transcendental ones, we must
now have to explain how such transcendental laws are manifested in some particular laws
and not others. The difficulty is that if such laws of reason are genuinely built into reason
itself, it would seem to be manifested in many alternative—but mutually exclusive—
positive laws. In summary, there is no self-evidently plausible conception of extra-
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Note that in the Democratic primaries, Elizabeth Warren made a comment about how it
was appropriate to have big plans and an ambitious platform when running for president.
She certainly did not invent such an attitude, which inarguably played a role in Barack
Obama’s ‘Hope’ and ‘Change’ campaign slogan in ’08.
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political laws that can guide political laws. Either politics is superfluous, and we should
follow the laws of God or nature or reason directly, or laws/procedures of reason are
superfluous because they cannot, in themselves, decide on what positive laws to
establish.
As a consequence, we should recognize that even in the safe, regulated picture of
representatives exercising public power, such officials are genuinely powerful, and this is
the condition not only for the use of office but also its abuse. If there is an anesthetic for
this risky arrangement of public power, it is the belief in the ‘constituent power of the
people,’ that is, a belief that it is the will of the people that creates and sustains their
government officials. This concept, used by Rousseau and influential for theory of
modern democracy, consists of the belief that the people wills itself, and in willing itself
as a political community, it can appoint its magistrates and officials. And while particular
officers like magistrates and princes may be corrupt, the will of the people is always
upstanding—if in need of guidance.
The everyday, representational view of politics, at least in our imaginations,
draws upon a larger, more expansive history of liberal-democratic ideas. If we want to
better situation and evaluate our ideas of what a representative is and should do, we
should gain greater clarity on the constituent/constituted power distinction. In doing so,
we will be able to see more possible relationships between a people and its government.
Moreover, we will be able to sort out what kind of power government representatives
should have: is it power in the sense of control? Is it creative? Whether it be power
wielded by an individual or a group of individuals (e.g., a parliament or a council), the
historical term for the power of the highest office has been “the sovereign,” (famously
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expressed by Hobbes and Boudin and later taken up by Carl Schmitt). Used in
conjunction with state government, sovereignty has more often been used in the sense of
‘control’ and is further tied to the right to give punishments and rewards. Certainly, the
populist attitude toward the president—at least when the populist leader is elected—
draws upon this historical notion of sovereignty, albeit in a confused fashion. My account
of a healthy democracy, then, needs to offer an interpretation of sovereignty.
Sovereignty, in brief, has been taken to mean the ultimate decision-making power.
One of its early and influential definitions is given by Jean Bodin, “Sovereignty is that
absolute and perpetual power vested in a commonwealth which in Latin is termed
majestas.” 62 In other words, the sovereign is the one who commands and is not
commanded, who subjects others to the law, but is only subject to the laws of God and
nature. 63 The concept takes on an especially modern character insofar as it focuses on
command; Bodin views even statutory laws as a command. Command, unlike persuasion
so characteristic of life in the Greek polis, requires hierarchy. Consequently, the issue of
sovereignty can be found wherever the ruler and ruled are not strictly identical, which
poses some conceptual difficulties for democracy given its insistence on both popular
sovereignty as well as representation.
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Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Six Books of the Commonwealth, M.J. Tooley (trans.)
(Oxford: Seven Treasures Publishing 2009) 65.
63
Andreas Kalyvas offers an interesting dual interpretation, of sovereignty as the power
of command on the one hand, and sovereignty as a creative, constituent power on the
other. The latter, he thinks, provides an understanding of government power that does not
run afoul of some of the critiques of sovereignty, such as those given by Arendt. See
Andreas Kalyvas, “Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power,”
Constellations, Volume 12, No. 2, (2005) 226-7. While Kalyvas has a promising start, he
does not address the problem we will initiate here about popular sovereignty and the
necessity of particular persons to act.
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The issue in its simplest form is that in a democracy, the people is the ideal
sovereign. 64 However, since it is never wholly present for a decision, the will of the
people must be represented by some concrete person or persons. The representative is
then the practical sovereign, since it is the representative who concretely acts. But this, of
course, is a violation of popular sovereignty since only a few are making decisions. 65
When we ask about the constitution of democratic government, we ask who is
entrusted with the authority to make final decisions on behalf of the people. By ‘final,’ I
mean to designate not only the rank of the highest office, but also the authority to
command even if obedience entails risking one’s life. 66 Assuming that modern
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I am deliberately overlapping a notion of sovereignty, which we are discussing now,
and the notion of the constituent power of the people, which I mentioned earlier. This is
not simply an entanglement of concepts that I am repeating because these terms tend to
be found in such a fashion, e.g., in Rousseau. Rather, I am overlapping them because, on
my interpretation at least, they have an expressive relationship. The sovereign office—be
it prince or legislature or parliament, etc.—expresses the authority of the bearer of
constituent power. My position regarding sovereignty does not deny the right to punish
and reward, but rather to re-emphasize some of the ways in which representatives must
express and determine, in words and deeds, the principled commitments of their
constituents. One of the most alarming things about Trump is not that he is deaf to his
supporters and that he only commands them through Twitter, but rather, the fact that he
engages with his followers, sometimes retweeting their conspiracies or fake news.
Trump, as a populist, is not just a manipulator using vulgar rhetoric; he is an expression
of a genuinely narcissistic and paranoid attitude that has embedded itself in a significant
portion of the population.
65
Bodin took himself to have solved the problem by identifying an aristocratic
government (the few) with democratic sovereignty, which implied offices were open to
all without special favor. See Bodin 112-3. Such a resolution seems to elide the basic
situation of a government official issuing binding commands on the general population.
In short, if the government issues commands, then it is sovereign. The fact that
sovereignty may have originated in the people is immaterial if they alienated in the
person of their representative(s).
66
Benedict Anderson notes that liberalism and the notion of interest were insufficient to
motivate people to risk their lives. It is only with the emergence of ‘the nation’ as a mode
of political belonging that governments were able to shift away from monarchy. See
Anderson, IC 10 and 65.
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democracy must be representative, we have to ask who the people are who vote for their
representatives and who those representatives are such that they can command their
constituents.
2.2.1

Constituted and Constituent Power

Constituted power is created with an eye for an assigned function; it is regulated
by publicly known laws. Every state has such institutions, and moreover, they are
organized into a political form. Such forms define the exact configurations,
subordinations, and dependencies, etc., that determine how decisions are made and laws
enacted. For example, the United States federal government has three branches whose
highest offices are the supreme court, congress, and the president. Each has their own
‘sphere’ in which they make decisions according to given principles and subject to
limitation by other powers; each has offices subordinated underneath it which it can
command. While the United States government can be said to be ‘democratic,’ our
political form is certainly not the only form that can make such a claim. Other
governments that call themselves democratic can include various parliamentary
configurations, presidential configurations, and even include a monarch in their
constitution. Unlike the ancient Greek conception of democracy, which corresponded to a
political form and designated who was in office, our conception of democracy is a
principle of constituent power that is compatible with many governmental configurations.
Constituent power is responsible for the creation of constituted powers and, by
definition, is not always already regulated by a pre-given law. Constituent power features
prominently in Rousseau’s thought, in which the general will has the right to legislate for
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itself without itself being regulated from some outside rule. 67 In Rousseau—and
democratic thinking more generally—constituent power is a collective endeavor and not
the actions of a few. Thus, ‘constituent power’ does not pick out any particular founders
of a country, but the spirit and character of a people. Constituent power, to be sure, does
not exist apart from constituted power. It creates and conditions the very institutions that
express—even if only partially or unstably—constituent power itself.
Constituent power is often viewed in the contemporary literature with distrust or
even outright rejection. It is distrusted for at least two reasons. The first reason is that
demagogues are liable to abuse terms like “the will of the people” for their own purposes,
‘justifying’ violent and oppressive actions. The very vagueness of such a phrase it
malleable and insulated from critique. The second reason is that constituent power never
appears directly; it occupies a conceptual space similar to that of a noumenon of which
there can be no theoretical knowledge. However, if we discard any notion of constituent
power, specifically in the form of the general will, then democracy can only be realized
in a form of constituted power in which everyone participates in government.
2.2.2

Representation and Identification

This brings us to another distinction with which Carl Schmitt engages, which he
calls the representation/identification distinction. For Schmitt, representation and
identification are necessary aspects of all sovereign power, although all stable
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Constituent power has an earlier origin in Christian theology. The fact that, as a
concept, it has been derived from the absolute authority and power of God is the reason
why so many Left thinkers view it with distrust. Thinking about constituent power qua
constituent power commits one to thinking in terms of political theology, which is
antithetical to the contemporary project of thinking through democracy as following the
death of God or the proverbial decapitation of the king.
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sovereignties will tend toward one or the other. 68 The polar distinction is meant to
explicate the fundamental problem and definition of sovereignty: who decides. In a
representational system, an authority—a single person or group of persons taken from the
whole—have the final say. A monarchy is an example of a representative system insofar
as the monarch represents not a group of voters, but rather a legitimate will (bestowed by
God, for instance) that binds the members of the collective together. Identification, by
contrast, is an expression of sovereignty in which a collective, as a whole, has final say.
A system in which decisions are made by referendum exemplify an identificatory system.
Representation is still necessary in an identificatory system, though, since a particular
someone needs to present the question or issue on which the collective will vote yay or
nay. Conversely, a representative system still requires some identification insofar as a
group accepts the authority of the representative and recognize it as legitimate. Liberal
democracy is meant to be a kind of hybrid system that nevertheless prioritizes
identification, insofar as representatives making decisions are themselves subject to the
will of the people through vote.
Schmitt’s work on democratic representation challenges the assumption that a
people must be represented by a pluralistic legislative body, e.g., parliament. He was
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See Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, (Durham: Duke University Press 2008) 23941. Henceforth, “CT.” Schmitt makes the argument in a few places, but perhaps most
clearly in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. Schmitt’s work is important not only
for thinking of the political, but also for the specific debates about populism. He is often
interpreted and criticized as an advocate of populism. Schmitt’s most prominent,
contemporary representative is probably Chantal Mouffe. Like Mouffe, my reception to
Schmitt is often critical, and while I agree with her that Schmitt’s thinking provides a
challenge that must worked through in order to address politics, she and I differ in our
responses as we will see in chapters 2 and 4. To put it briefly, by advocating for a Leftpopulism, Mouffe still operates within the horizon of self-interest; it only seeks to widen
that category beyond economic-material bounds.
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infamously distrustful of parliamentary democracy on the grounds that the political
parties and bureaucrats end up making decisions behind closed doors, violating the
principle of openness that undergirds a parliamentary-legislative state. While there may
be conditions in which a parliamentary state can function well, he thinks under modern
conditions and the need for economic administration, parliament degenerated into an
aggregate of special interests parasitically carrying out their own projects through public
means. 69 The competition of private interests, carried out semi-secretly, directly led to
inaction in the midst of crises, an erosion of faith in parliament, and a breakdown in the
basic principles meant to ground parliament, e.g., a substantive relationship to truth.
Schmitt preferred either a singular representative, e.g., the president, 70 or a mode of
democracy in which crowds would publicly acclaim or decry a proposed course of action
by a chosen leader. While he acknowledges this configuration of power which
emphasizes political identification, he did not advocate for it, perhaps in part because it
did not bypass the need for some kind of representative. If we think of democratic
practice in terms of plebiscite and referendums, Schmitt has already shown that someone
still needs to frame the issue to the whole community.
2.2.3

The Problem of Sovereignty in Democracy

One way to understand the shift of the classic definition of democracy as a form
of government to the modern notion, wherein the people are the source of authority for
representatives but do not themselves make concrete decisions is a shift from democracy
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Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, (Durham: Duke University Press 2004) 92-3.
Henceforth, “L&L”
70
He advocates for this position after analyzing the inconsistent parts of the Weimar
Constitution. See “L&L” esp. 77.
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as a constituted power to a constituent power. This shift is not only evident in Rousseau’s
notion of the general will, it also plays a role in Locke and Hobbes, who take the social
contract to consist of the individuals ceding the authority to a representative. That
representative—who is constituted by the social contract—exercises sovereign power to
make decisions on behalf of the entire public; the ideal of autonomy is still maintained,
though, because the sovereign representative acts with authority that ultimately lies with
the people who constituted the representative, and—at least post-Hobbes—the people can
revoke the sovereign status of the representative. 71
However we understand a representative constitution—whether it be a parliament,
a president, or the person who puts a question to a vote—it is clear that government
always involves hierarchy and command. A pure identity of rulers and ruled cannot be
achieved. The fact that some amount of representation is necessary entails a problem for
democracy. On the one hand, the people should be sovereign since they are the
constituent power. They should have the final say by voting directly on an issue. On the
other hand, the options that a people can take are laid out by some representative power.
So, while the people may have the final say, either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in a referendum, what
they can say is determined by a representative. Thus, there is always a question of ‘who’
acts as the representative of a democracy that cannot be simply answered in universal
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My characterization here is perhaps too general. Hobbes, for instance, has offered a
theory of a sovereign representative, but once individuals have alienated their authority
through the social contract, they retain no active relationship to that authority. The
sovereign is, in a sense, absolute unless a new sovereign emerges or a commonwealth
degenerates back into a state of nature. Moreover, for Rousseau, the people cannot be
‘represented’ at all. Nevertheless, they can appoint magistrates and revoke their
appointments. My discussion of sovereignty here pertains only to representational
thinkers, and while Rousseau has concepts for sovereignty, constituent, and constituted
power, we will not see them in detail until my third chapter.
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terms; without someone to act as president or formulate questions for the people, the
government would not be able to act. This is the problem of sovereignty, of establishing
who is entrusted with the power and authority to direct ‘the will of the people’ into a
concrete state of affairs. Schmitt rightly points out that whoever has the highest office not
only acts but acts with the discretion to interpret and apply vague concepts, e.g., state of
emergency, public health, etc., and this power of discretion cannot be fully or finally
delimited by a pre-given law or procedure.
To be clear, we could remain committed to a view in which sovereignty and
authority (or any other positive term) in some way lie with ‘the universal’ (i.e., the
collective or the people). But some particular someone or group have to act on behalf of
the community. Moreover, this ‘acting on behalf’ must, itself, be something positive, a
power in excess of what an ordinary citizen can do. Oversight, checks and balances, etc.
may be prudent to institute, but such limitations on power are secondary to the institution
of power itself. Ergo, if government is to act at all, government officials must have the
ability to act on behalf of the collective, and this investiture of power is ‘sovereignty.’
My strategy for thinking through representative power—sovereignty—is to think of such
power as necessary, but not creative on the part of the sovereign.
I want to make the provisional suggestion that liberalism and populism and their
shared presumption about elections focus solely on this question of sovereignty, i.e., the
power of a representative in relationship to the whole people. Characteristically, the
tradition of liberalism has addressed sovereignty by delimiting the powers of every office
and pitting offices in balanced opposition with each other, just as parties oppose each
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other in order to assume office. 72 Or in other words, sovereignty is limited by way of
division, which is the basis of ‘the division of powers.’ But the focus on limiting the
power of office belie liberalism’s assumption that sovereignty lies in government offices,
and that government offices must be able to determine concrete situations. Populism is
even more straightforward: by definition, it claims government should be an expression
of the sovereign will of the people. This expression can then only come to pass when the
populist leader wins the election and eliminates the partial interests of the corrupt elites.
The logic here is not that the populist leader has intrinsic authority, but rather that they
have been invested with authority by voters and is therefore the bearer of the constituent
power of the people. Thus, populism is the immediate fusion of political representation
and constituent power, and their claim to sovereignty is absolute. A healthier notion of
sovereignty would be ‘limited,’ not necessarily by other constituted offices (although
maybe those too), but by a more expansive freedom of the people. And by ‘limited’ here,
I do not mean simply checked and balanced by citizens instead of representatives, but
rather, offices are not invested with absolute control; a healthy democracy has a
somewhat more deflated attitude toward representatives without eliminating them. 73
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And while some of the more traditionally liberal thinkers like Constant, Berlin, etc.
have espoused and developed this idea about dividing and checking public power,
“checks and balances” has become a part of our familiar vernacular. In this way, we can
see my point about metaphor and the political imagination, in which the history of
liberal-democratic theory has permeated our conceptual landscape, and we draw from
these traditions even without fully thinking them through. “Checks and balances” can be
deployed as a normative requirement without argument, as though such divisions and
‘balance’ automatically yield good results. Kenneth Roberts’s work on populism
certainly does so in his insistence on ‘competitive equilibrium’—claims we will see in
greater detail in the next chapter.
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I hope it is clear from my discussion that I am not advocating for minimal government
for minimal government’s sake, or that I think all taxation is theft, or that all big
79

Another way to put my suggestion is that democratic freedom is not solely or even best
expressed by the sovereign, although the highest representative office must at least
partially express the will of the people.
2.2.4

Mediating Powers: Freedom, Authority, Unity

As constituent power, the people of a democracy is responsible for its laws. The
government representatives, as constituted power, are responsible for the concrete details.
The two are not strictly identical. That being said, they are related. At least since Hobbes,
constituent and constituted power have been mediated by three seemingly familiar
concepts meant to resolve the problem of sovereignty: freedom, authority, and unity.
Freedom has been predominantly interpreted in the mode of negative liberties:
guaranteed rights of non-interference on some delineated issues, e.g., freedom of speech,
right to bear arms, etc. Whatever representatives are empowered to do, they are not
permitted to violate these individual rights. Thus, constituted power is barred from
eliminating or violating individuals who are constituents even if they wield no direct,
public power.
Authority, within this tradition, has been a transference of a right to act from a
group of people to a single body, either an individual person or a representative group.
Thus, a constituted power is legitimate only if it has been authorized by the people. We
might say that sovereignty is the power of an official to act concretely while authority is
the legitimation of those acts by way of the people.

government is inefficient, etc. Ironically, libertarians who take this view tend to endorse
the power of representatives, which they want used to dismantle independent institutions.
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Unity, meanwhile, is what makes the citizens of a state one people. For Hobbes, a
people only exists when individuals divest themselves of their individual authority and it
condenses in a single representative. For Hobbes, there is no people without a
representative; the representative makes them one collective. To be more precise, there is
no people at all, merely a commonwealth. While bouts of nationalism and similar such
movements (fascism, Right-wing populism, etc.) have attempted to derive their unity
from some natural characteristic, Hobbes’s claim that a collective only comes into being
with institution of a sovereign representative set the stage for a narrow focus on
constituted power while simultaneously endorsing an individualist social ontology.
2.2.5

Hermeneutics of Constituted Power

On a final note, I want to point out the tendency of social thought to interpret
constituted power in a top-down fashion, and not just top-down but also in terms of
‘control,’ in which a representative exercises power over their constituents. I mean here
not simply the ability to determine or enforce laws, but to influence opinion and
encourage certain behaviors. While representatives certainly have some impact on their
constituents, interpreting constituted power in a top-down fashion can lead to a
hermeneutic position I will call ‘conspiratorial hermeneutics.’ In conspiratorial
hermeneutics, it is assumed that someone is in control of public phenomena, and this can
be as hopeful as thinking that the president can bring hope and change all on their own, or
as cynical as to believe that there is someone ‘pulling the strings,’ e.g., Obama, Soros,
‘the deep state.’ Far Right-wing extremists famously engage in this kind of interpretation
of public affairs, in which ‘the deep state’ calls all the proverbial shots and the righteous,
deserving American citizens are victimized and denied the ability to exercise political
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power. 74 But the Left is no stranger to this kind of interpretational framework. Critical
accounts of Trumpism sometimes attribute a seemingly mystical power to Trump to be
responsible for every evil in government. Trump’s followers are referred to as ‘cult-like,’
who imitate or blindly obey him. More importantly, any account that focuses on how
members of the Right are manipulated or run amok by propaganda endorses
conspiratorial hermeneutics.
Clearly, Trump directs and accelerates the belief in conspiracy theories, but his
strategy of calling out ‘fake news’ can only take hold because people already believe—or
deeply want to believe—that the news is fake, i.e., made up, or manipulated, or has some
‘spin’ to it, etc. In order for Trump’s strategy to work, there needs to be (a) a general
distrust in cognitive authorities, scientists, and reporters, (b) a sense of being betrayed or
attacked by powerful people, politicians and semi-anonymous groups like ‘the radical
Left’ or ‘cancel culture,’ and (c) an anxiety about the stability of the world—political
crises, wars, global warming, precarious employment and the threat of downward
mobility, opiate addiction epidemic, etc. While new developments and findings have
made (a) a relative constant with some portions of the population, (b) seems to have only
reached a sufficient level of intensity recently, although it has clearly been on the rise for
years. I doubt Trump—or anyone—could have run with such a strategy even a couple of
decades ago. Similarly, (c) has been on the rise as people ‘consume’ more news and
develop a love-hate relationship to it.
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Donald Trump has recently stated that the people who control Joe Biden operate in
‘dark shadows.’ He’s appealing to people who operate from this position.
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While Trump and the Right cynically channel distrust in cognitive authority and
use propaganda (they are not alone in this regard), 75 it must be explainable, in rational
terms, why people buy in. For one thing, Trump neither magically created an infantilized
population ready to be duped, nor is he a mastermind who knows exactly how to
manipulate each Republican voter. For another, there are diverse sub-groups of Trump
supporters, many of whom do not like him. A more philosophically nuanced
interpretation of populism—in America or elsewhere—needs to abandon a model that
assumes that a leader has full control over their supporters just as an appropriate
normative model of authority does not recommend giving absolute control to a
representative office. Such a bottom-up model understands representatives less like
engineers operating upon the people, but instead as a completion of political action. That
is, the representative acts in such a way to add a final determination of shared, public
principles to make them concrete. Populists, then, are not simply hucksters and
charlatans—there is an element of that—they are an expression of the dissatisfaction with
the established government officials. That dissatisfaction can be rational even while the
populist solution, e.g., electing Trump, is worse than the initial problem.

2.3

A Political Conception of Democracy
Drawing from the preceding material, a successful account of a healthy

democracy should offer a notion of political belonging that does not require a single
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For instance, the Right has a tendency to treat George Soros as a master manipulator,
while the Left treats the Koch brothers in the same way. While these figures might be
influential, conspiratorial hermeneutics holds that those who are influenced do not
genuinely support these ideas. They have been duped or bought, and they certainly have
not engaged in reflective judgment.
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social identity or interest. In other words, members of a democracy must be willing to let
others belong. Moreover, a political democracy, while it has laws and shared principles,
cannot become overly fascinated with an idea of purity, whether it be natural (national,
racial, etc.) or moral. That is, there must be some spirit of forgiveness, although certainly
not everything should be considered forgivable. 76 Finally, representatives should not be
engineers exercising control of the government and the police, but rather should be a
completion of an initiative taken by the people.
2.3.1

Community Is the Performance of Unity with Difference

I take it that a healthy version of democracy is echoed in Tocqueville’s claim that
a democracy must not only have common laws but common manners as well. That is, a
people must have a kind of community in which laws are actively shared and in which
the people are responsible for living with the law. I contend that a community’s health is
not a matter of formally well-built set of laws or balanced power or qualified
representatives, but rather the people being oriented by the project of making its members
belong and taking up a forgiving attitude about the law. My conception focuses on the
nebulous, non-homogeneous activity on the part of the people as non-constituted.
According to this conception, the people is a collective that is committed to listening and
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As an example, it seems to me that while we have the same laws for different racial
identities in the US, both police officers as well as some nebulous group of conservative
liberals are deeply unforgiving of any transgressions made by black people. The penalties
for violations of laws involving marijuana are a case in point. Racists in this context are
damaging democracy not because they violate procedures (they may do that also), but
because their attitude is so unforgiving toward fellow citizens. Taking that aggressive
attitude damages the community, erodes trust, and makes people not belong. On the flip
side, there is a blanket institutional forgiveness for the murder of (largely but not always)
black civilians by police officers. I contend there should be far less forgiveness for such
murders, although I think the spirit of “all cops are bastards” that some people have taken
up goes too far.
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speaking to the other members, even if the whole people is never fully present in one
conversation. 77 Let us briefly introduce the concepts of belonging and forgiveness.
The project of belonging means welcoming people into a community, listening to
their opinions, and respecting individuals as the source of their own intelligibility—rather
than applying categories to them based on their appearance. However, a person might be
situated by their social status, however they might interpret their interests in relation to
others, their opinions and their actions are not dictated by some external source or ‘whatness.’ Individuals are ‘who’s,’ and that means they are unique and cannot be exhausted
by their social identities. Belonging in a free community, then, means that one can
negotiate their social identity and be welcomed by the general community even if they do
not fit in with a particular group.
Forgiveness, at least in its political formulation, is one possible response to a
violation of the law (positive, cultural, moral); it is the alternative to punishment. Where
punishment reciprocates violence, albeit within a communal measure, forgiveness
responds by acting anew, leaving behind the predictable chain of events in which harm
begets harm. This allows the community to focus its attention elsewhere and begin a new
initiative while still recognizing the crime qua crime. Forgiveness is not only an
important option, but a necessity insofar as everyone is bound to act partially with
insufficient regard for the community at some point.
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This conception is distinct from the rationalist assumptions of liberal-parliamentarism,
in which discourse is supposed to yield a distinct good, namely, truth. While liberalism
rightly emphasizes discourse, its presentation of discourse is both too consequentialist
and too epistemological.
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A healthy democracy, on my view, orients itself about these activities. This is not
to say that everyone is made to belong and all crimes are forgivable. Such a demand for
universal love would be, as Freud notes, an unreasonable demand. My view is that a
community must determine the limits of who belongs and what is forgivable, and the
setting of those limits is the measure of the community’s strength. Moreover, these
activities cannot be assigned to government officials while common citizens are free to
pursue their private interests. These activities, while they may not constitute great,
historic deeds, are nevertheless the expression of freedom of the people, and no
community can persist in which these activities are abandoned.
2.3.2

Society Performs Disunity with Difference

Populism and the liberal tradition, by contrast, orient themselves by ideas of
competition and control. Populism holds that a healthy democracy is one in which the
government machinery is not in the hands of foreigners or a narrow elite, but in the hands
of the people’s sovereign representative. According to this conception, the people is the
group whose interest defines the public interest, (aggressively) excluding others, and as
such, they take it that the representative of that group should be in full control over
constituted powers. Any other interest is, on this view, partial, corrupt, foreign—in short,
opposed to the public interest. Liberalism holds that democracy is healthy when the laws
are arranged in such a way that individual citizens are equalized and constituted power is
divided and checked. When constituted powers are arranged in the right way, individuals
are free to exercise control over their private lives and pursue their own vision of the
good. According to this conception, the people is just an aggregate who happen to be
subjected to a particular set of institutions that are built on absolutely universal laws.
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These two conceptions are mutually intertwined and develop from the same spiritual soil:
a metaphor of mechanism, a notion of the individual as interested driven, and a view of
humanity as homo faber. Further, they take it that actions of public import are performed
by representatives; ‘the community’ is only expressed by constituted powers while
private citizens are never more than individuals whose sole political act is that of voting
for a representative. As such, neither can express the freedom appropriate to politics since
their modes of rationality are instrumental, competitive, and calculative rather than
spontaneous, cooperative, and creative.
A qualified notion of cooperation is possible in civil society; individuals can
cooperate as long as it serves their self-interest to do so. Such cooperation often solidifies
into a social grouping wherein people take themselves to be alike on the basis of a
seemingly stable, identical interest. For liberalism, this kind of association is a problem,
and if the power of the group is not to be abused, it must immediately be balanced by
competing with another, similarly sized group or become dissolved again into the
independent individual. 78 For populism, such an association seems to be a boon, allowing
individuals—especially if they are alienated from a community or economicallymaterially powerless—to gain a sense of power and ‘community,’ and any checks should
be removed and any competitions should be won. However, one only belongs within such
a social group on the basis of identity, and deviation can be the basis of expulsion from
the group. That is, the ideal of identity (in the sense of similarity) tends toward a selfdestructive tendency to expel or eliminate its members.
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The former option is more classically liberal, while the latter is closer to libertarianism.
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One of the distinguishing features of racism, which have appeared in conjunction
with Right-wing populism, is a kind of self-destructive insistence on purity. Seemingly
even worse than nationalism, racism insists on an ideal of purity and views history as a
series of contaminations. 79 While there might be different intensities of racism, it
generally tends toward extreme separation between social identities. Commerce,
discourse, and affection are an existential risk for the racist, since they might blur the
boundaries that mark a hierarchy. But this is not an exception to or a break from social
thinking, it is merely an extreme case. This is because self-interest constitutes the social
self: you are a social person defined by what is in your interest, and this interest situates
you in a cooperative relationship with some people and competitive relationships with
others. Social classes generally do not exist indifferently side by side; they jockey for
position within a kind of caste-system. 80 In sum, in a point that echoes Max Weber’s
work on Protestantism and capitalism, victory in competition helps to assure the
competitor of their own purity.
It seems to me one of the boons of liberalism is that it does not propose a kind of
social identity that requires purity and condemns any interest that appears different or
partial. This is presumably because liberalism tends to view self-interest in ultimately
individualistic terms, where group interests are voluntary and alienable (and are assumed
to have less motivational force than private interests). 81 Moreover (and as less of a boon),

79

See Anderson, IC 149.
Anderson offers a brief but illuminating account of how different dialects became the
exemplar of larger language groups, thereby creating a hierarchical ordering of
vernaculars within a nation. See Anderson, IC 44-5. We might call such a relationship
“hegemonic.”
81
This is certainly how Hannah Pitkin frames liberalism self-interest in contrast to what
she called “Burkean” self-interest. See Representation, esp. 198-200.
80
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to preserve one’s self-interest in the long term, a rational person must limit their selfinterest in the short term by way of submitting to impartial procedures or government
mechanisms. The downside is that thinking of oneself as being constituted entirely by
one’s private interest is alienating and—importantly—false. 82 One may participate in
civil society and succeed in pursuing one’s interest, gaining profits or status but not
belong there. 83 Populism—which infamously has been appearing in nationalist and racist
forms—offers a sense of belonging that is in part imagined in a nostalgic vision of the
past (evidenced by “make America great again) and in part concrete (rallies, parades,
etc.). 84 But this mode of belonging requires a similar identity and assumes an identical
interest. If left without enemies—foreigners, ruling elites, liberals, etc.—its identity
becomes an obsession with purity that creates new outside groups from those who had
previously been considered members. A healthy democracy should avoid the kind of
alienation that arises from market individualism as well as the unforgiving fascination
with purity that justifies segregation and aggression.
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The realities of human reproduction entail that everyone is dependent on others—at the
very least one’s parents—for one’s existence. Civil society also requires common
infrastructure, common language, and a host of features o of an intersubjective world that
living individuals did not create ex nihilo. Moreover, one can only ever attain a kind of
relative, not absolute, independence. Thus, a particular self-interest cannot be fully
constitutive of what one is qua a self.
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At best, one may belong at home, i.e., in private.
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It is not impossible for me to imagine that Left populisms may have similar risks.
Perhaps there is a well-founded worry about ‘cancel culture’ and its requirement of moral
purity, even if the current ‘cancelations’ of celebrities and businesses are not particularly
worrying.
89

2.4

Conclusion
My goal for this chapter was to set out the features of a healthy democracy, which

is appropriately political. To summarize the previous discussion, I will offer a brief
reflection on the distinction between the polis—a way of organizing guided by public
freedom—and society—a mode of organizing based on self-interest. Then, I will reemphasize that a healthy democracy must take its orientation from a political imaginary
framework rather than a socio-economic one.
A political community is a grouping that incorporates distinct people who
nevertheless share principles and see their freedom reflected in some set of institutions.
This allows a political community to have differentiated, partial groups within it, but it
also means that a political community will exclude those who cannot see themselves
within those set of institutions or who do not feel the pull of a given set of principles. The
inclusion of diverse groups in a political community is not accomplished simply through
an administrative apparatus, but through labors of belonging and a measure of
forgiveness. The reasoning for this position comes down to an interpretation of the
relationship between what collective living is like and what people are like. A political
community acknowledges that people can initiate novel action, that they are not
mechanically pursuing self-interest, and that interaction and cooperation can be a source
of strength and meaning. This expressive notion of freedom and creativity can be
expressed in various relationships, and it is the hope of democracy that it can be
expressed in government to some extent.
Social groupings, by contrast, are based on similarity, and this similarity may be
explicit and polemical, or it can function unconsciously. When our thinking draws from a
social imaginary framework, we may behave in ways that we think are generally
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appropriate, perhaps under-appreciating the extent to which we are taking for granted
how norms are creative expressions that do not apply to everyone. But we are still acting
socially when we attempt to claim a set identity through semi-scripted behaviors in order
to distinguish ourselves from another group. The anti-mask protesters in the midst of the
COVID-19 pandemic and their rejection of masks are—in part—taking their orientation
from a social framework in which rejecting a mask sets them apart from liberal
weaklings. While such protestors may not be driven by a concept of private, economic
self-interest (although sometimes they are), they are taking their actions to be for the
interest of the whole country (or at least its authentic members).
If we think that humans realize their spontaneity and freedom in acting with
others, and if we think that a community involves a positive relationship among its
members—rather than just limitations on behavior—we should endorse some notion of
political democracy. This is a conception I will detail later, drawing from an organic
metaphor for political unity to guide our thinking. In the next two chapters, though, we
will be reviewing populism and liberalism in terms of a mechanistic metaphor and a
metaphor of an interest-driven individual. What I want to suggest provisionally here is
that liberalism and populism really offer visions of democratic society. Populism treats
democracy as a single society, governed by a singular interest, often pitted against other
societies, and regulated by administrators. Liberalism is a reflection of civil society, in
which individuals can pursue their own interests provided that they are sufficiently
respectful (non-violent, relatively well-mannered) toward others. While this vision of
democracy advocates for avoiding certain societal ills, e.g., violence, theft, it has no
positive communal project. There is no robust sense of communal belonging, in large part
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because, as evidenced in Locke and Hobbes, individuals are conceived as largely
atomistic. Moreover, the neutrality and focus on ‘right’ instead of the ‘good’ in market
liberalism entails that there is no public flourishing or happiness; the good is reserved for
private life while the public life is regulated simply to prevent and punish illicit
behaviors—violence and theft.
It might be said that my account of political democracy has focused only on
freedom at the expense of equality, and a love of equality is the principle that best suits
and inspires democracy. 85 True, I have not emphasized the term and will not thematize it
further. However, equality of a certain kind plays a crucial role in politics and thus in
political democracy. Politics, insofar as it involves persuasion and creativity, requires that
people meet each other as equals, which means that they do not command each other.
Hence, my suggestion that a successful account to democracy must focus on the primacy
of constituent power; constituted power—or at least the executive—tends toward
relations of command and obedience. This situation of having to persuade each other is
political equality. My account explicitly and purposefully neither focuses on any kind of
distributive or material equality nor on the equality of condition that makes for good
competition. This notion of equality is rooted in a notion of self-interest, and while it is
perfectly permissible to pursue an equality of interests, such a project is social, not
political.
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At least according to Montesquieu.
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CHAPTER 3. THE MECHANISTIC METAPHOR OF POLITICAL UNITY IN
LIBERALISM AND POPULIST AUTHORITARIANISM
As I outlined in chapter one, a working notion of democracy must be oriented by
a notion of creative freedom; it ought not theorize individuals and the government solely
or even primarily in terms of regulated behaviors or negative rights. In this chapter, I will
examine the mechanistic metaphor for government, from which both liberalism and
populism draw and keeps them operating within a socio-economic framework of
thought. 86 Moreover, I will demonstrate the inherent instability of the liberal
interpretation of mechanism and its tendency to transform into populism. This
transformation is premised on (a) the shared metaphor of mechanism for political unity
(understood as government), and (b) the characteristic tendency of liberalism to avoid
answering the question of who decides on the uses of public power, preferring instead to
focus on how decisions are made and ensuring that all exercises of power are checked
and balanced. Populism can appear as a solution to the problem of liberalism because it
focuses solely on who decides—an authoritarian leader. But populism, too remains
within a socio-economic framework, and it, too, has its own inherent instability that tends
86

The notion of mechanism can be explicit or implicit. When explicit, it is often
deployed without much note or fanfare. For instance, William Galston writes that “Not
only do democratic institutions protect citizens against tyrannical concentrations of
power, they also provide mechanisms for transforming the public’s grievances and unmet
needs into effective reforms.” William Galston, Anti-Pluralism: The Populist Threat to
Liberal Democracy (Yale University Press 2018) 1. Henceforth “Anti-Pluralism.”
Galston’s words here offer a notion of what I am discussing with ‘liberalism,’—a kind of
belief in organized government as a machine and for certain ends, with a hope that the
right kind of formal organization will lead to the best consequences relative to other
political forms. There are differences among liberal thinkers, but most liberal theorists all
embrace this same vision of effective mechanisms, yielding desirable results without
giving much credence to what people desire.
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to transform (back) into liberalism. More specifically, the possibility of the abuse of a
single authority leads to a general vulnerability of each member of the populist group,
and insofar as populists are oriented by their self-interest, they are willing to limit the
scope of the use of government to protect individuals from such abuses.
I will begin this chapter by reviewing contemporary critiques of populism and
showing how they are informed by liberalism’s core commitments—checks and balances,
majority rule, and end-oriented government design (more specifically, for the sake of
individual freedom). These concepts function critically, seeking to prevent and mitigate
issues of authoritarianism—one of the primary threats that populism presents. Next, I will
offer exegesis of several key texts in the liberal tradition, viz. works by Isaiah Berlin,
Benjamin Constant, and John Locke, that inform the concepts detailed in the prior
section. This will demonstrate how contemporary critics of populism are drawing from
the wider liberal tradition, and it will establish how their concepts are guided by the
mechanistic metaphor for government. In my third section, I will show ‘authoritarianism’
is not just an external threat to democracy posed by populism; it is inscribed in the origins
of liberal theory—and in any system of representation. The reason for the priority of
authoritarianism lies in the nature of human action as authored, i.e., political action is
always performed by ‘whos’ that can and must respond to novel phenomena. Political
action cannot be proscribed or mediated by some finalized law or procedure—mere
‘whats’—ahead of time. When individuals give up their authority to a representative, they
do it because it will enable the public interpretation and enforcement of laws; the creation
of an authority allows the actualization of the laws in a community. Finally, I will discuss
the mechanistic metaphor more broadly and make my ultimate argument that the liberal
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interpretation of the mechanistic metaphor will tend to degenerate into the populist
interpretation.

3.1

Populism, Party Politics, and State Power
One of the main features of liberal critiques of populism is the presentation of

roughly two alternatives that exhaust the options available: either populism—associated
with authoritarianism 87—or liberalism. Jan Werner Mueller makes this choice the most
explicit, but he is simply at the forefront of a general presentation of the problem. 88 He
presents these options directly:
The major differences between democracy and populism should have
become clear by now: one enables majorities to authorize representatives
whose actions may or may not turn out to conform to what a majority of
citizens expected or would have wished for; the other pretends that no
action of a populist government can be questioned, because ‘the people’
have willed it so. The one assumes fallible, contestable judgments by
changing majorities; the other imagines a homogeneous entity outside all
institutions whose identity and ideas can be fully represented. The one
assumes, if anything, a people of individuals, so that in the end only
numbers (in elections) count; the other takes for granted a more or less
mysterious ‘substance’ and the fact that even large numbers of individuals
(even majorities) can fail to express that substance properly. The one
presumes that decisions made after democratic procedures have been
followed are not ‘moral’ in such a way that all opposition must be
considered immoral; the other postulates one properly moral decision even
in circumstances of deep disagreement about morality (and policy).
Finally—and most importantly—the one takes it that ‘the people’ can
never appear in a noninstitutionalized manner and, in particular, accepts
that a majority (and even an ‘overwhelming majority,’ a beloved term of
87

This association of populism and authoritarianism is widely noted, as we shall see
repeatedly in this section. Galston also notes it in Anti-Pluralism 10-1, although he
situates populism as inheriting and transforming an older surge of authoritarian
movements.
88
In what will be ‘the usual,’ Mouffe and Laclau do not quite fit this pattern, since they
present the options as liberalism, Right populism, and Left populism and they endorse the
latter.
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Vladimir Putin) in parliament is not ‘the people’ and cannot speak in the
name of the people; the other presumes precisely the opposite. 89
Mueller takes it that the choice is clear: the former option is (liberal) democracy and
good; the latter option is populism and bad. The former involves numerical clarity; the
latter involves mysticism. The former is critical and mature; the latter is dogmatic and
moralizing. ‘Democracy’ is the rational choice; populism is irrational, a manifestation of
ignorance or blind emotion rather than a deliberate choice. Evident in Mueller’s passage
is the liberal heritage of some of the ideas being expressed: majority rule, proceduralism,
value (meta-)neutrality, individualism, and a retained capacity to check or critique
government officials (‘oversight’ as well as ‘checks and balances’).
Mueller is largely right in his characterization of populism, but I think he
underappreciates how populism is a ‘logical’ outcome of liberalism. Coincidentally, he
misses how populism retains a kernel of liberalism’s own rationality, that is, socioeconomic rationality. As I will show by the end of the chapter, the populist-authoritarian
and the liberal models of democracy have more in common than they would like to
admit; most importantly, they share a fundamental metaphor that (a) understands the
exercise of collective power solely in terms of constituted government, and (b) thinks of
constituted government as a machine deployed for some given end. However, populist
rhetoric contains a democratic element often effaced in liberalism: namely, that a specific
people rule, even if only vicariously through their elected representative, and who that
representative is must express the principled commitments of the people. This may seem
like an obvious claim at first glance, but historically, liberalism has dodged the question
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WIP 77-8.
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of who rules by making claims to ‘a rule of law,’ by focusing on independent laws or
procedures for how to rule rather than who rules. Populism appears to give an answer to
the question by advocating for a single, nearly all-powerful representative, elected by a
constituency with a shared identity. In this section, we will examine liberalism’s critique
of this authoritarian conception of democratic power and how it narrowly focuses on the
mechanical limitations of power. Moreover, we will see how the machinery of elections
and representation foster political parties, which play a significant role in both populism
and liberalism. The role of political parties seems to differ in populism and liberalism,
given the different interpretations of government mechanism, but this difference is
merely one of relative intensity.
3.1.1

Populism and Authoritarianism

Populism has been rightly characterized as authoritarian. 90 But populist leaders do
not present or advertise themselves as ‘authoritarian,’ instead presenting themselves as a
vehicle for the will of the people. This requires some explanation. While there have been
significant differences between populist movements throughout the world, scholars have
identified several prevalent features that are general enough to work in most cases. 91 For
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One could make the case that the yellow vest protestors, protesting against gas prices
among other socio-economic problems in France, were populists but not authoritarian.
After all, they never fielded a candidate or entered into representative politics, but they
were nevertheless against government elites. While such protestors may have been a part
of a ‘popular’ movement, they are clearly different from Marine Le Pen, the French
populist candidate, as well as other ‘populist movements.’ The full use of the term
‘populism’ seems best reserved for those movements and candidates who have entered
into representational ‘politics,’ and whether Left or Right, have been at least somewhat
authoritarian.
91
We saw the following analysis played out in the Mueller quote earlier. We would see
the same features with some additions in Galston, Anti-Pluralism 27-30. The following
features also feature in Margaret Canovan’s work on populism. As per usual, Mouffe and
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instance, Koen Abts and Stefan Rummens offer a definition of populism as “a thincentered ideology which advocates the sovereign rule of the people as a homogeneous
body.” 92 They further characterize populism’s four major characteristics—antagonism
toward an elite, a drive to restore direct popular sovereignty, a transparent, homogeneous
unity of the will of the people, and a single leader. 93 These characteristics, in some form,
appear in most analyses of populism, and they can all be applied readily to Trump in the
United States. Let us examine each characteristic briefly.
First, populism is a movement of ‘the people’ against an elite whose positions in
power have allowed them to pursue their own narrow interests at the expense of common
folk. 94 Populist leaders attempt to foster and tap into that antagonism so that they can
‘drain the swamp’ and end corruption in government. 95 Let us call this element ‘antielitism.’ Interestingly, Right-leaning populists seem more prone to seeing independent
institutions as beholden to a self-interested elite, as though the notion of an interest
independent of private interests is a sign of corruption. This seems to be one component
of a Trump supporter’s anti-elitism and a reason why they may rejoice in Trump’s
business acumen when he dismantles institutions and puts them at the mercy of

Laclau analyze populism somewhat differently, but their main disagreement with other
theorists is a matter of (a) how to classify populism, and (b) what ‘politics’ even is. They
do not necessarily contest the elements of populism we will discuss here.
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“PvD” 409.
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“PvD” 408.
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The reactionary character against established elites should show prima facie that
populism can only arise within some form of representative democracy. See Mueller.
WIP 101.
95
Kenneth Roberts notes that, descriptively, populist movements generally emerge as a
response to a crisis, often involving a crisis in representation.
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businesses on friendly terms with Trump. 96 The second characteristic of populism is an
attempt to restore popular sovereignty, which on Abts and Rummens’s reading, means
that populists think that legitimate politics is “based on the immediate expression of the
general will of the people. . . . Populist democracies can be understood as an attempt to
achieve an immediate identity of governed and governing. Populists claim to present and
proclaim, not to represent, the essentialist will of the people.” 97 We see here a notion of
mass-mobilization of the people who have felt left out, debased, or forgotten; this is the
call to restore popular sovereignty. Margaret Canovan frames popular sovereignty as a
promise integral to democracy, which helps explain how populist movements get off the
ground. As she puts it, populism exploits the redemptive promise of democracy, which is
the promise that we—and not others—should be in charge of our political existence. 98
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On a further note, current populism in America is tinged with rhetoric of a ‘culture’
war. From what I can anecdotally at least, people at varying level of economic well-being
can support Trump and identify with each other because they tend to lack cultural capital
and they resent those who have it—the educated. They don’t have a liberal arts education,
and because of their rural living, they do not consume cultural products—food, movies,
television, to some extent music—in the same way and with the same standards as the
stereotype of the coastal elite. And with some justification, they resent the cultural elite
who have been openly mocking them for decades, and they are more than willing to ally
themselves with an economic elite to hurt the economic elite even if does not serve their
own finances.
97
“PvD” 408. I would like to voice my disagreement with Abts and Rummens on this
point. Since populist leaders aim to get elected within a democracy, I think it is fair to say
that they take themselves to represent the popular will. It is more plausible to say that
fascist leaders aim to originally present the will of the people without electoral methods
(note that both Hitler and Mussolini attained government power through constitutional
means, but not through election). Abts and Rummens do attempt to show some
differences between populism and totalitarianism (“PvD” 414), but the differentiation is
under-developed and given only a response to an anticipated objection to their use of
Lefort’s work. For the sake of clarity, we should further note that Abts and Rummens
take populism, because of its belief in an unmediated identity of the people and hostility
toward otherness, to be proto-fascist.
98
Canovan TtP 10.
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One of the complexities of this democratic promise is the nature of representation and
sovereignty. While populists may or may not promise increase referendums or political
participation, they almost always reserve decision-making for themselves. That is, despite
the claim of ‘popular’ sovereignty, they always reserve sovereign power for themselves,
and offer ‘sovereignty’ to their constituency only vicariously.
This vicarious experience of sovereignty—a control over government
mechanisms—is premised on an assumed homogeneity of the population, such that a
group can identify with a populist leader based on some shared, substantial similarity. 99
Abts and Rummens write, “The people are united and indivisible, fully formed, selfaware and identifiable by the majority of numbers.” 100 This transparency makes the
feeling of control over the government all the more vivacious, and it motivates hostility
toward non-group members all the more strongly. In sum, these two characteristics of a
call for popular sovereignty and the supposed homogeneity of the people help to establish
a readiness of populist constituents to become populist supporters.
This brings us to the third element of populism, the singularity of leadership—one
leader speaks and fights for the people. 101 Whether populists actually implement more
direct referendums or reserve all political participation for themselves is contingent; it is
clear, however that there is a rhetoric of restoring government to the people as embodied
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Mueller calls it “anti-pluralism” in WIP 3. Galston refers to it as both a kind of
homogeneity and anti-pluralist in Anti-Pluralism 3.
100
“PvD” 408.
101
Note, insofar as populists are elected officials, I think Abts and Rummens are wrong
to say that populists do not ‘represent’ the people. Thus, I find myself in agreement with
Jan-Werner Mueller. WIP 101. My understanding is that Abts and Rummens are
conflating the dynamics of populism with that of fascism on this point.
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in a single figure. 102 It should be clear from this discussion that populism, whatever its
(de)merits, can only occur as a reaction against and a continuation of representative
democracies. 103 Trump can only promise to drain the swamp once people have come to
believe that government offices are filled with swamp ogres, but somehow Trump—their
political candidate—remains pure. On this view of a ruling, elite class, a plurality of
representatives is a liability. Once some representatives go bad, they tend to spoil the
bunch as everyone starts pursuing their own private self-interest.
While the constituent elements of populism are largely uncontroversial, the
diagnosis for whether populism is problematic—and if so, why—has not achieved any
consensus. The most common critiques focus on the last two features of populism: a call
for homogeneity and singular leadership and involve a dichotomous choice. On the one
hand, we can choose an autocratic, authoritarian government; on the other, we can choose
a government whose officials wield limited power temporarily and where a multiplicity
of parties ensures a multiplicity of voting options and prevent an abuse of power. Now
that we have reviewed a conception of populism, we will operate from Mueller’s passage
to gain an understanding of the liberal alternative.
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See, for instance WIP 102. I do think, even if Mueller is right, that populism does not
have the hostility toward all positive law that totalitarian fascism has.
103
WIP 101. It is a further question whether populism—insisting on singularity of
leadership, is simply a modification of the representational system or whether its antipluralist stance is corrosive of the representational system. For Kenneth Roberts, the
latter provides the answer, as we will see later in this section.
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3.1.2

Liberalism as the Anti-Authoritarian Alternative to Populism

Jan Werner Mueller, whose extended passage we saw earlier, offers an explicit
conception of liberal democracy, which he contrasts with populism. 104 Let us look at
what is implicit in his conception. He writes that liberal democracy only assumes the
existence of individuals, and in elections, only numbers count. He takes this to be a
refusal of mysticism, but it also implies that communities are only aggregates—sets of
particulars—rather than collectives (taking the group to be a ‘whole’ with its own
character). If a community is just an aggregate, and number is all that counts, then
government is being conceptualized in terms of quantitatively greater and lesser forces,
represented by some individual(s), competing with each other. On this model, quantity of
votes is the end of political rhetoric and actions by representatives—qualitative concerns
are set aside as subjective. Liberalism takes domestic politics to be a form of war that has
replaced weapons with votes, 105 and has enshrined the economy as one of the core ends
of government. 106
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Mueller puts the alternatives in its starkest contrast; other alternatives may more finegrained distinctions, but they are still essentially reducible to this singular choice. I have
in mind Galston who thinks there are three democratic options (and other, even more
problematic alternative political forms outside of that): populism, liberal democracy, and
elitism. See, for instance Anti-Pluralism 4. The problem here is that elitism is not a
political form that can take the same kind of stance about its own desirability that
populism and liberal democracy can take. Candidates cannot really run as ‘elitists’ and
gain traction. Elitism is clearly an empirical falling-short of liberalism; it is not separate
in its idea.
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This is the explicit position of Benjamin Constant, and it is at least compatible with
Galston’s comments about liberalism involving a suppression of aggressive drives.
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See Galston’s comment in Anti-Pluralism 25. “Economic growth has become more
than a material goal; it is a moral enterprise as well.” He thinks (liberal) democracy is
impossible without a strong, and growing, middle class. Moreover, he thinks that
“Prosperity is both the oil that lubricates the machinery of government and the glue that
binds society together.”
102

Mueller writes that liberal democrats do not take the results of democratic
procedure to be moral in a way that implies the immorality of other alternatives. He is
making a point about populists demonizing the opposition, which often encourages
aggressive or even violent behaviors directed at the immoral. While we should be
concerned about the claims of immorality of others—and how this claim can be
weaponized--? Certainly, such moralism can be coupled with proceduralism or a majority
vote; that moral status of winning a majority vote is one of the reasons that populist
leaders enter into (and sometimes win) elections. Espousing a populist ideology,
however—rather than a proceduralist one—is not a logical requirement for such
moralism. Even if proceduralists did not fall prey to that kind of behavior, we now have a
question about how the result of democratic procedure is ‘good’ or decisive.
Mueller states that the people never appear in a non-institutionalized fashion, and
even the apparent parliament or government is not ‘the people.’ This claim is tantamount
to the denial of constituent power (at least in Rousseau’s sense). If institutional
representatives are not the people, does Mueller take it that the people never appear at
all? If the people cannot appear, does it exist? On the one hand, if the people exist but do
not appear, that starts to sound like a mysterious substance—at the very least such a
stance would be an impetus to taking a notion of the general will (and the constituting
power) seriously. On the other hand, if the people do not exist, then the implication is that
democracy—rule by the people—is impossible. In that case, we would not have liberal
democracies but rather liberal states; ‘democracy,’ at most, would merely be an emphasis
that individuals have a right to vote for representatives in the same way they have a
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formal right to own property, but to ask the question of who the people are would not
make sense.
The characterization of liberalism, especially when contrasted with what it is
critiquing, is that it leaves little to the discretion of representatives. It is not mythical, it
does not deploy a ‘mysterious’ notion of substance, and everything the representative
does is contestable. To the fullest extent possible, decisions should (a) be contested and
(b) be informed by ‘quantity’ (which, implicitly in Mueller and perhaps the social
imagination more generally, is transparent, neutral, and therefore, desirable), whether that
be in the form of votes or statistical data. For liberal democracy, both (a) and (b) are
carried out by political parties. They compete for votes, and when in power, they seek to
limit and ‘check’ other political parties. Further, they have been the object of analysis in
the literature on populism.
3.1.3

Political Parties and the Use of Public Power

It is hard to imagine a democracy without political parties. Parties shape and
articulate the programs espoused by candidates whom citizens vote into office; they offer
an identity for those who support them. How would we know who shares our political
principles if there were not a publicly accessible platform? They help to disseminate the
name and face of their candidates, and they set a recognizable agenda for their candidates
to pursue—at least rhetorically. How could a person seriously run for office without these
functions? This means they also determine what the options are for voting citizens, which
is to say, they determine the possibilities that democracy’s constituted powers can take.
How could we decide on an issue without this delimitation of options? This is not entirely
unidirectional; parties can run primaries, poll, etc., but they nevertheless retain a huge
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influence over who is a viable candidate. In the U.S., for example, it is unimaginable that
someone could win a major elected office without the publicity and cooperation given
from one of our two major parties.
One of the foremost thinkers of populism and democracy is Kenneth Roberts, and
his overarching concern is the way that populism can erode a multi-party electoral
system. Roberts begins his article, “Populism and Political Parties” with an observation
on the paradox of populist parties; that they exist as a party while at the same time
criticizing the established party system. 107 Roberts takes his two main tasks to be (a)
illustrating the way that populism arises as a response to a crisis in representative parties
and (b) analyzing the influence that populist parties exert on the pre-existing system once
they arise. In terms of (a) Roberts identifies three kinds of failures for representative
systems 108: The first is cartelization of political parties, in which large groups of voters
feel deliberately excluded by an entrenched elite who have prevented new interests and
movements from entering the political scene. The second is performance failures;
meaning that populist parties can emerge when ruling parties are viewed to be ineffective
such as in the wake of an economic crisis. Finally, Roberts identifies programmatic
convergence to be a failure of a representative system, wherein voters feel that they lack
real or meaningful options.
All three conditions provide the fertile ground for a populist movement to spring
up or to overtake an existing political party. In terms of (b) Roberts frames populism as a
kind of corrective to some representational problem, writing: “At its most basic level,
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Kenneth Roberts, “Populism and Political Parties,” from The Oxford Handbook of
Populism, (Oxford University Press 2017) 287-8. Henceforth, “PPP.”
108
“PPP” 291-5.
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therefore, populism offers a corrective to deficient representation, and is best located
within the representational sphere of democratic politics, even when it trumpets its
hostility to established representative institutions.” 109 Beyond that general description,
which he takes to hold for both Left- and Right- leaning populisms, he notes that
populism can have a variety of impacts in terms of party systems. It may transform an
existing party or lead to the creation of a new party, and there may be a variety of
reactions to either of these cases. Roberts also makes a few descriptive observations
about various instances of populism and suggests further questions for the reader’s own
research; the most interesting consideration being whether/how the populism in question
resists the “hegemonic temptation of popular sovereignty,” implying that popular
sovereignty is problematic. 110
In accord with the liberal tradition, Roberts is interested in the maintenance of
independent government mechanisms, insulated from being controlled by any one
group—what Lefort would call “the empty place of power.” In “Parties, Populism, and
Democratic Decay,” Roberts examines how some populist movements, through political
parties, have eroded democratic norms. ‘Democratic norms’ here refers to
impartial/fair/balanced procedures in which opposition is not stifled or effaced by
dominant parties. 111 Ends with the observation that, if the Republican party doesn’t
distance itself from Trumpism/populism, it is up to the Democratic party to use what is
left of our governmental checks and balances to stem the proverbial democratic
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bleeding. 112 Weyland argues that populism has a tendency to turn authoritarian, wherein
populist leaders seek to overcome checks and balances, dismantle independent
institutions, and control civil society on the basis of the leader being the embodiment of
the will of the people. 113 The embodiment of a pure, homogeneous will of the people is
set against Weyland’s construal of a people as an essentially “heterogeneous, amorphous
aggregate.” 114 On this account, populism is less of an ideology or governmental/social
movement form and instead is more of a strategy in which leaders seek unmediated
connection with their supporters and promote weak institutionalization (in which
competencies assigned to government functionaries are limited and be other institutional
offices). 115
However, insofar as populism is a ‘strategy,’ one which is capable of
outcompeting other parties for votes, populism is merely an intensification of party
politics. Recall that the basic functions of political parties in the liberal vision are to make
evident quantitative support and to check or limit other parties. The populism vision of
parties is identical, but with the idea that the winning party of an election should then be
unchecked and unlimited; every other party should be limited absolutely. Think of it this
way: liberalism thinks that parties should be in competition; populism thinks that a party
should win the competition. The difference here is slight, and it is not irrational. This is
because the populist interpretation of the party does two things that the liberal
interpretation does not. First, it answers the question of who rules, viz. ‘the people’
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through their single leader. By contrast, liberalism dissolves the people into a set of
platforms which are not anchored in a sense of communal identity, and those platforms
must constantly compete with others to be expressed. Second, populism highlights the
need for power, to have someone make decisions, whereas liberalism is focused primarily
on the limitation of power. But this authoritarian moment is not simply a populist
reaction to the frustrations of a pluralist party system; it is inscribed in the origins of
liberal theory itself. Soon, we will see this authoritarian moment in Hobbes. But first, we
will see that the focus on a limitation of powers and on competition is not simply
categories applied to parties; these terms permeate the whole liberal tradition.

3.2

The Liberal Tradition and the End of Liberal Government
In the previous section, we saw a stark choice presented between a liberal

democratic government and a populist one. The former involved majority rule, checks
and balances, independent laws and offices, and representation by parties that organize
individuals rather than the representation of a singular ‘people.’ The latter involved a
notion of a homogeneous people, unchecked power—often in the form of a single
representative—and a moral standing on the judgments by the ruling person or group that
deems opposition immoral. In this section, we are going to deepen our understanding of
liberalism and its relationship to the mechanistic metaphor. While it is relatively obvious
how populism takes government machinery to be a tool, it is not clear how liberalism can
view government as a machine if it is not a means to be used by any of its competing
parties. Nevertheless, it is a machine, and while it may balance or mediate competing
parties, it has its own ends. These ends are not achieved through wise or judicious use of
a tool, but rather, they are accomplished automatically as a result of competition, in the
108

same way that the invisible hand harmonizes competing interests. The most celebrated
end of liberal government is individual, negative rights.
As a note of clarification, I am not interrogating the tradition of liberalism to
reject it outright. Rather, I think liberalism’s genuine insights into the limitation of
constituted power and the importance of plurality in the people cannot be preserved with
a mechanistic conception of power. Moreover, some of the features that are vaunted as
self-evident—like those used by Mueller in his contrast of liberalism with populism—are
not as compelling. And lastly, some of the features that liberal commentators find
suspicious in populism, like constituent power, the identity of the people, and popular
sovereignty, cannot be renounced or ejected from a working conception of democracy.
In following discussion of the liberal tradition, it should be noted that we will
looking at writers working within a similar political situation; Berlin, Constant, and
Locke are reacting against the violent exercise of public power. Berlin is reacting to
totalitarian terror; Constant is reacting to the Reign of Terror; and Locke is reacting to the
ideas of absolutism in the work of Robert Filmer (and Thomas Hobbes). My hope is that
notions of individual freedom can best be understood as a further articulation of what
public freedom requires rather than an escape from politics; checks and balances can best
be understood as an articulation and augmentation of authority rather than a portrait of
politicians acting like crabs in a bucket; majority rule is best understood as the concerted
action of various partial identities and groups rather than a greater quantity wielded by
one group or political party over another; and that laws and procedures are coordinated
achievements of acting in concert rather than an alien law from another time, regulating
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the behavior of individuals as though they were cattle. To best preserve these concepts in
their best interpretation, we should reject the mechanistic metaphor.
3.2.1

Populist Authoritarianism and Liberal, Negative Freedom

A significant portion of the critiques of populism all share a similar narrative:
populism, like fascism or totalitarianism before it, is an expression of monolithic power
wielded by an authoritarian leader. Any public power that is wielded without abiding by
liberal norms and procedures is illegitimate, anti-democratic, and destructive. Liberal
norms and procedures ensure protection of human rights and de-fangs public officers.
Moreover, some notion of individual rights sets limits to government power, which
citizens cannot participate in directly anyway. 116 In this narrative, Rousseau (and more
often—Carl Schmitt) plays the part of the antagonist against liberal democracy because
of his notion of the general will. In this section, I will trace the main elements of this
narrative from Isaiah Berlin’s comments in the wake of totalitarian terror to the
forerunner of liberalism, John Locke. We will see that the history of liberalism has tended
to insist on limited government for the sake of maintaining individual freedom.
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This is Galston’s definition of liberalism, which is explicitly inspired by Benjamin
Constant. He writes, “This brings us to the core idea of liberalism—creating a sphere
beyond the rightful reach of government in which individuals can enjoy independence
and privacy.” Anti-Pluralism 21-2. Galston seems to not recognize the issue of
‘creation,’—who creates this sphere and establishes its content? His anti-elitist bent
should suggest that elected officials are not in charge of deciding in what regards people
can be free. But his insistence on representational democracy over direct participation
seems to leave the collective citizenry unable to engage in this creation. As I suggested in
the last chapter, we can gain a sense of the political power of the people and its capacity
to shape our communal living together, but this is premised on the kind of communal
solidarity that Galston thinks liberal democracy must give up. See Anti-Pluralism 4-5,
where he suggests that liberal democracy must give up excellence, nobility, communal
solidarity, and the expression of any kind of aggression. And yet, he thinks, liberal
democracy, which mysteriously upholds the private life of each individual, is still clearly
the best.
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Isaiah Berlin offers a distinction between negative and positive freedom that I will
use for the basic organization of several accounts of freedom. 117 Negative freedom, stated
in its simplest terms, is merely absence of restraint or interference. 118 Positive freedom
means a substantive kind of self-determination. 119 Berlin takes these two kinds of
freedom to be distinct, and negative freedom is a better ideal toward which a community
should strive. He forecasts the argument here, for instance: “The liberals of the first half
of the nineteenth century correctly foresaw that liberty in this ‘positive’ sense could
easily destroy too many of the ‘negative’ liberties that they held sacred. They pointed out
that the sovereignty of the people could easily destroy that of individuals.” 120 Let us
examine the terms in more detail.
Berlin distinguishes between different conceptions of freedom—a term he does
not distinguish from “liberty”—that I will use to start my historical investigation.
Negative freedom—or ‘negative liberty’ or simply ‘liberty,’ in Arendt’s terms—is the
absence of constraint or interference. Berlin writes, “Political liberty in this sense is
simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by
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Hannah Arendt makes a similar distinction between liberty and freedom, which maps
onto negative and positive liberty respectively. For Arendt, (positive) freedom, means
“participation in public affairs, or admission to the public realm,” and liberty and
negative freedom are virtually identical in the two thinkers. See OR 22-3. Similarly, as
Berlin admits, the negative/positive liberty is meant to map on to Benjamin Constant’s
liberty of the moderns and ancients respectively. I adopt Berlin’s terms and text as
primary here for two reasons. First, Berlin’s distinction seems to be more well-known,
and secondly, I intend to contend with some of his argumentation.
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See Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concept of Liberty,” from Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on
Liberty, (New York: Oxford University Press 1969) 122-131. Henceforth, “Berlin.”
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Berlin 131-141.
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Berlin 163. I take Berlin’s point to be generally right-headed, and a similar concern
will motivate my criticism of Hobbes shortly, but Berlin and the liberal tradition more
generally do not always identify whose view is susceptible to this criticism accurately. In
short: right concern; wrong targets.
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others from doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree . . .” 121 Isaiah
Berlin defines positive freedom in the following passage:
The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part
of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to
depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to the be
the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be
subject, not an object. . . 122
The idea here is self-determination; this can be expressed in terms of a rational self being
expressed in contradistinction to merely natural instincts or it can indicate the ability to
participate in government/public affairs. 123 As indicated earlier, Berlin is suspicious of
this ideal because, when it is taken to be the ultimate value, is compatible with despotism
over individuals. 124 From this, he takes it to follow that the end of government is best
suited to individual, negative liberties. The main issue with this conception is that unless
one thinks that negative rights are god-given and god-enforced, then rights are created by
the community. Thus, undergirding the network of negative liberties is a notion of the
positive freedom that created them. However, because liberalism regards negative
liberties as the ends of government—the means to enact those ends—the creative aspect
of negative liberty is effaced.
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Berlin 132-4. On Berlin’s analysis, this notion of self-determination requires ‘two
selves,’ one that is rational and truly my own, and then another self that is a part of me,
and yet comes from some other source.
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According to Berlin, thinkers of positive freedom include Plato, Rousseau, Kant,
Hegel and Marx; all of which lend themselves to the most severe kinds of despotism. But
Berlin’s argument must be at least somewhat disingenuous here. Despots and totalitarians
can adopt the language of freedom and quote philosophers from the tradition, but that is
hardly a faithful expression of the philosophical view. The very traditions and thinkers
that totalitarians reference can be used to fundamentally critique totalitarianism. If we are
to critique the practices of totalitarian thinking, we must track totalitarian concepts and
modes of reasoning (i.e., ideology) and not just their word choice or names referenced.
122
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For Benjamin Constant, the only liberty that should be the end of political
institutions is what he calls the liberty of the moderns, which is to say, individual
independence and non-interference from others. He writes, “For each of them [citizens of
the United States of America, France and England] it [the term ‘liberty’] is the right to be
subjected only to the laws, and to be neither arrested, detained, put to death or maltreated
in any way by the arbitrary will of one or more individuals.” 125 It is clear that he takes
something like ‘the rule of law’ to be the means through which the arbitrary and
tyrannical use of power is averted. For power to be wielded legitimately, it must be
directed through law and not other humans, not even a majority. This resonates with
Constant’s individualism, in which power is to be examined in terms of the concrete
actions of and impacts on individuals. He writes, “Among the moderns, on the contrary,
the individual, independent in his private life, is, even in the freest of states, sovereign
only in appearance.” 126 Here, he denies participation in sovereignty (in this context
meaning public practices of power) to individuals even through their representatives. The
reason for this denial is, again, that power is a matter of individuals, and in a liberal state,
power is only to be enacted by laws upon individuals rather than by individuals (even
large groups) upon other individuals.
There is an ambiguity in Constant’s thought (and liberalism more generally);
either the law is perfectly independent of human doing, or some general lawfulness must
be recognizable in human action. The former, I take it, is a prevalent feature of the
mechanistic metaphor for political unity, which I shall address in the last section. The
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latter is compatible with both the uniformity metaphor of political unity (in a problematic
way, discussed in chapter 2) and with the organic metaphor of political unity (in an
insightful way, discussed in chapter 3). For this chapter, I will maintain a discussion
about the law as independent of human doing because, within the various threads of the
liberal tradition, the sole concern is elaborating the proper design of constituted power,
i.e., with offices and institutions with assigned functions and competencies and that
appear in the day-to-day practices of public power. Constituting power, which cannot
appear directly in regular practices of power, will be the subject of the next chapter and
cannot be brought under a concrete law or procedure.
On Constant’s understanding, ancient liberty consists in this:
. . . exercising collectively, but directly, several parts of the complete
sovereignty; in deliberating, in the public square, over war and peace; in
forming alliances with foreign governments; in voting laws, in
pronouncing judgments; in examining accounts, the acts, the stewardship
of the magistrates; in calling them to appear in front of the assembled
people, in accusing, condemning or absolving them. But if this was what
the ancients called liberty, they admitted as compatible with this collective
freedom of the complete subjection of the individual to the authority of the
community. 127
While he thinks it is not the proper end of government, it nevertheless retains a place in
his version of liberalism as a means. He writes, “Individual liberty, I repeat, is the true
modern liberty. Political liberty is its guarantee, consequently political liberty is
indispensable.” 128 Again, he wants both kinds of liberty, but the liberty of the ancients is
a means to individual independence and for self-development, i.e., it is subordinate to
individual liberty. 129 Moreover, this priority is absolute. Constant writes, “Individual
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independence is the first need of the moderns: consequently one must never require from
them any sacrifices to establish political liberty.” 130
For Constant, ancient liberty could act as an ideal for roughly two reasons; first,
the view the ancients had of individuality, and second, the conditions of modernity. As to
the first, he writes, “The ancients, as Condorcet says, had no notion of individual rights.
Men were, so to speak, merely machines, whose gears and cog-wheels were regulated by
the law. The same subjection characterized the golden centuries of the Roman republic;
the individual was in some way lost in the nation, the citizen in the city.” 131 Keep in mind
that Constant takes ancient liberty to apply the meaninglessness of the individual in the
face of the whole. However, only modern ‘political’ theories—usually socio-economic in
nature—emphasized the mechanistic nature of both government and individual behaviors.
Where the ancients had a theory of passions and deliberation (e.g., in Aristotle), modern
theories are characterized by a notion of interests and instrumental rationality (e.g., in
Adam Smith).
3.2.2

The Conditions of Modernity and the Economic Turn

Briefly, let us review his claims about the relevant social changes in modernity.
The new era has brought four changes that make it impossible to realize ancient liberty as
an ideal: first, larger states imply that each individual is less politically important.
Second, the abolition of slavery deprived citizens of leisure. Third, commercial activity
does not leave time for public engagement. Finally, commerce leads to love of one’s
independence. 132 For our purposes, I want to treat the theme of the last three changes
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together and then the first change separately. With the rise of modern commerce,
individuals are concerned with their economic interest. This is not merely a hobby or a
necessity, but an end that they come to love with their individual independence.
Moreover, it essentially informs their political relations. “The representative system is a
proxy given to a certain number of men by the mass of the people who wish their
interests to be defended and who nevertheless do not have the time to defend them
themselves.” 133 Thus, the practices of public power are again subordinated to the function
of pursuing one’s interests; the representative system is merely an expedient form that fits
this concern. However, this liberal vision of rights and interests may also be compatible
with a kind of enlightened despotism, in which case, political freedoms could potentially
be eschewed. Regardless of the compatibility of liberalism with despotism, we should
note what Constant takes individuals to be like—namely, interest-pursuers—as it will
contrast with the ancient vision of individuals.
The first change about the diminishing importance of the individual in relation to
larger, modern states is important, as it directly violates what he takes to be the ancient
view of the individual. For the ancients, it must be the case that the individual as a public
being is absolutely essential and in need of respect and recognition. If human individuals
are politically important, they cannot be interchangeable, or else their public
performances would be superfluous. It is only in private affairs, that is, in dealing with
economics or the necessities of the body, that people are interchangeable. 134 From an
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From the perspective of economics, everyone is basically the same. The plurality that
Hobbes finds in individuals is owed to the fact that we desire the same objects and have
to compete for them. I thus take it that, at its foundations the economics-based facets of
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ancient/republican view, modern liberalism—when it views humans in terms of their
economic functions—transforms people into interchangeable cogs, recognized only for
their fitness for a task. We will see versions of this vision in both Locke and Hobbes.
Locke is often taken to be the explicit originator of liberalism (more or less); at
the very least, he articulated several of its key concepts in a way that many thinkers and
political actors found plausible. He thought of government as designed for some end(s),
he believed in majority rule, and he took his point of departure individual rights and
liberties. For him, a unified commonwealth is required to stabilize property rights, and his
view of liberty is clearly a ‘negative’ one. Locke wrote of the state of nature as “a state of
perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as
they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending
upon the will of any other man.” 135 While people may be free in the state of nature, and
will use their labor to acquire property, it is possible that others can disregard the natural
rights of others and attempt to steal, murder, etc. 136 For the sake of maintaining some
freedom and stabilizing property relations, people enter into a social contract to create a
commonwealth. But Locke’s social contract adds an important twist to the perfect
negative liberty of the state of nature. Locke writes later,

liberalism are deeply anti-pluralist. Where liberalism is better able to articulate pluralism
is where it diverges from market models. Instead of competing over our interests, the
plurality of value judgments that accompany religious freedom is a much better basis for
considering pluralism. John Stuart Mill’s notion of experiments in living is a kind of
halfway point between the two concerns—market and religious—insofar as he
appreciates spontaneity and creativity, but it is subordinated to the principle of
maximizing utility (when he is consistent).
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the end of law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge
freedom: for in all states of created beings capable of laws, where there is
no law, there is no freedom: for liberty is, to be free from restraint and
violence from others; which cannot be, where there is no law: but freedom
is not, as we are told, a liberty for every man to do what he lists: (for who
could be free, when every other man’s humour might domineer him?) but
a liberty to dispose, and order as he lists, his person, actions, and
possessions, and his whole property, within the allowance of those laws
which he is, and therein not to be subject to the arbitrary will of another,
but freely follow his own. 137
Locke clearly expresses that government should be established for the stabilizing of a set
end, namely, freedom. The genus of freedoms, for Locke, is the right to property; even
the right to life is but a form of property. 138 But freedom for Locke is negative; it entails
non-interference from others so that one can pursue one’s own interests. 139 However, in
his notion of property ownership, Locke makes liberty not just one among other goods
somewhat preserved from the state of nature, but the good essentially secured and
maintained through state power.
For Locke, your participation in government is just this: consent to majority rule.
Sometimes you will be a member of the majority, sometimes you will not. 140 In either
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emphasizes religious freedom as the quintessential liberal freedom, as discussed by
George Sabine and his take on the Glorious Revolution. Both paradigmatic rights,
property and religious freedom, all nevertheless share a commitment to private life, set up
as the end of public administration.
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One could debate whether Locke is deploying the liberal notion of freedom as noninterference or what Skinner and Pettit have called the republican notion of liberty as
non-domination, i.e., freedom from the dependence on the arbitrary will of another. I am
not convinced there is much of a difference between the two interpretations, largely
because both notions of freedom disavow the mutual dependence entailed by public
freedom; they are both defined as the negation of what is essential: others.
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Mueller thinks you won’t lose all the time. See WIP 78-9. It seems entirely possible to
me that you could lose frequently and perhaps all the time, especially if the dominant
parties are not trying to appeal to your demographic. With this observation in mind, I
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case, someone will be making a decision, and you will necessarily accept that decision
through your consent. But why does the majority speak for me even when they endorse
the opposite decision of what I wanted? Why would I not simply withdraw my consent
the moment there was some discord between myself and the government? For Locke, the
answer is that you have given your consent to abide by the majority decision, either
implicitly or explicitly through owning real property or voting. Your own act has—
potentially—set you against yourself or your apparent interest. Like an absolute ruler,
majority rule has an unstable relationship to one’s private interest. What is stable is a
notion of individual rights. However, these rights are—for Locke—god-given and
discoverable by reason. The main reason why one would consent to live in a
commonwealth, to give up some amount of personal authority, is in order to have the
benefits of public power in enforcing laws. 141 Of course, Locke believes that the
legislative branch is the primary branch of government; but its ends in legislating are
already given, and from this, Locke further concludes that the rulers of a commonwealth
cannot make laws to impoverish or enslave their subjects. 142 All of this is to say that for
Locke, living in a commonwealth, in society, is just a matter of taking advantage of the
mechanical power of government.
3.2.3

Rights as an End and Economics as a Model

Let us briefly assume that government has an end: the preservation and
augmentation of individual rights. Once you have an end, the question that naturally

think we ought to take the threat of a tyranny of the majority more seriously than George
Sabine—not that he was a particularly staunch defender of liberalism—in “Two
Democratic Traditions” 468
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follows is one of means. And the question of means is ultimately rooted in economics.
On the one hand, public power should be limited by way of division and competition, lest
it be tempted to arbitrarily infringe on the rights of the commonwealth’s subjects. The
competition of powers, because of their balance, will yield the best overall results;
competition is simply the right procedure for making decisions. Thus, politics is modelled
on (Adam Smith’s notion of) economics. But on the other hand, living in a
commonwealth is beneficial only because it offers power, the power to guarantee pregiven laws by suppressing differing interpretations of that which is universal and already
given. Thus, politics intersects with economics and sometimes conflicts with it. Living in
a commonwealth guarantees the public good—which is to say the general preservation of
property—even when it works against an individual’s self-interest (i.e., a person cannot
accumulate to defend their property to the fullest extent of their private, unstable power).
Nevertheless, simply consenting to the decision of the governing is the right procedure, at
least in the long run.
How should we understand this seeming opposition? What is important is not
their seeming contradiction but rather what they both presume. They both presume a
universality about humans. All humans have the same ends, given by nature. Moreover,
each person alienates ‘some’ of their rights for sake of preserving their rights. But the
only reason each subject can trust the authorities to whom they cede some of their rights
to protect their rights is because they all share the same laws. Suppressing differing
interpretations—intrinsically biased because people are self-interested—is necessary, lest
those interpretations and interests lead to conflict, which puts property at risk. I take it
that this equivocal attitude toward public power—the need to limit it, the need to
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augment it—is an outcome of Hobbes’s logic, and by turning to his thought, we can see
the clearest theory of liberal power.
Before we turn to Hobbes’s theory, I want to make one brief note about politics.
This brief discussion has been about how government is supposed to produce a given
end: rights. If we find either means—competition or consent—compelling for
accomplishing those ends, it is because have already taken the end as given. To be sure,
this liberal view of government and its purpose is not the only view; it is a result of
human creativity. Nevertheless, it is not a view of politics that seeks to expand or
recognize human creativity. Government itself is not tasked with creation; it is tasked
with the laws that specify and coordinate rights as well as the law’s enforcement. But
individuals are not creative either; they have interests, and they consent to government
for the sake of pursuing their private interests. They neither shape the public world nor
themselves; they shape their household. Liberal theory can deny that other political
configurations are as good as liberalism, 143 or it can deny that other political views are
even distinct from liberalism since liberalism is a kind of meta-arrangement. 144 But if it
denies that people have a need—not a preference—to express their freedom, then it is
going to force that need into avenues that are ultimately destructive. Call it the return of
the repressed.

3.3

Hobbes and Authoritarianism
My reading of Hobbes in this section situates his thought at the origin of

liberalism. For Hobbes, just as with many, canonical liberal thinkers, government is
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envisioned as a power constituted by individual choices, and freedom defined in terms of
individual liberty. 145 In addition to situating Hobbes at the origin of liberalism, I will
show how he offers the basis for the constantly re-emerging threat to liberalism:
authoritarianism. I am not the first to offer such an interpretation of Hobbes. C.B.
Macpherson has convincingly argued that Locke’s and Hobbes’s notion of the individual
is the same, namely, that of a possessive appropriator. 146 Carl Schmitt begrudgingly
writes that Hobbes made possible the liberal tradition (with its anti-political impulses)
when Hobbes distinguished between the public and the private and assigned religious
belief to private life. Insofar as the immortality of the soul, the belief in the divine and
miracles, etc., is both supremely important and a matter left to the individual, public life
is devalued. It was only a matter of time, Schmitt laments, before private parties
exploited the public/private distinction and subordinated the state to their own ends. In
another vein, Quentin Skinner has recently argued that Hobbes and his notion of negative
freedom (freedom as non-interference) marked a crucial departure from the republican
tradition and the beginning of liberalism. While I am sympathetic to all three of these
projects, my own contribution focuses on how Hobbes and liberalism share a vision of
how a polity is organized.
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For emphasis, this implies that for Hobbes, as with most strains of liberalism, there is
no pre-political unity or power; public power is essentially constituted, and groupings are
necessarily an effect of constituted power.
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C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke,
(New York: Oxford University Press 2011) 2. Henceforth, “PI.” Macpherson’s thesis is
further supported by Benjamin Constant’s notion of individual relations being similar to
that of Hobbes and Locke. Constant thinks that economic competition is the replacement
for war, wherein individuals are pursuing their own interests. Constant 313.
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What many liberal theorists take as an end of communal living together, Hobbes
takes as the starting point for a nature that needs to be overcome. So where liberal
thinkers like Galston advocate for a system of rights and privacy insulated from
government power and a notion of checks and balances to enforce that limitation, Hobbes
sees the potential for conflict among individuals who are not themselves ‘checked’ by a
sovereign. We can quickly identify two relevant features of his political theory: a need to
limit individuals, on one hand, and the institution of a government for pre-given ends on
the other. The first is the inverse of what we find in liberalism, the second is completely
continuous with liberalism. The Hobbesian argument is that if we are serious about the
ends of government, we need to be able to make those ends a reality, which requires the
use of public power and the ability to insulate the commonwealth from threats emerging
from the private sphere.
For Hobbes, the state of nature—having no common authority to which one can
make appeals—is the worst kind of social evil (because it makes life nasty, brutish, and
short), and this evil is ended when an over-awing representative is created as the head of
a commonwealth. The second feature of Hobbes’s political theory is the proper end of
government. In the previously reviewed liberal theorists, we saw the notions of individual
liberties and the pursuit of individual interests. These projects are, in principle,
conditioned only by the rights and interests of others, i.e., they are reciprocally
conditioned. For Hobbes, however, the end of government is self-preservation. Not only
does the individual pursue the private end of self-preservation, but once the
commonwealth is established, the sovereign pursues the self-preservation of the whole
political body, which provides the support for individual life.
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3.3.1

The Institution of the Commonwealth

For Hobbes, the institution of an authority is essential to having a stable
commonwealth. Contra Hannah Pitkin, Hobbes is relatively clear that it is not difficult to
exit the state of nature and enter a commonwealth. The first two laws of nature (i.e., laws
of reason), among others, encourage the cessation of the state of nature. The first law of
nature is to pursue peace if it can fully be achieved (and to pursue war if peace is
impossible). The second law of nature, following from the first: “That a man he willing,
when others are so too, as farre-forth, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he shall
think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much
liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himselfe.” 147 Renouncing
one’s unlimited right to all things is the foundation of the social contract, which we enter
reciprocally with all other members of the body politic. However, the laws of nature that
encourage the mutual renouncement of rights by itself is insufficient to guarantee that
people will maintain respect for each other’s liberty. Hobbes writes, “And Covenants,
without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure man at all.” 148 And so to
fully institute a Commonwealth, not only do citizens have to reciprocally renounce their
unlimited rights, they also have to authorize some party to enforce covenants with the
threat of swords. The sovereign is the person (either individual or some other party, e.g.,
parliament) who appropriates the authority laid down by all other citizens and acts on
their behalf to maintain peace, enforce contracts, contribute to the public defense. 149
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The point about enforcing the law here is crucial. Even if we all share the same
universal laws of reason, humans are capable of acting contrary to them. 150 For humans
to stably act in accordance with laws, the law must factor into their deliberations. 151 If the
law only appeals to their desires, they will act in accordance with laws only so long as
there is not a better alternative. Thus, Hobbes takes it that the fear of punishment—and
especially of death—is what makes the enforcement of law so integral to a
commonwealth and necessitates a sovereign. Importantly, Hobbes does not endorse a
notion of legitimacy like the divine right of kings, where the authority of a leader or
official is derived from some external source. Rather, the authority of a leader (either a
person or a group) is derived from their subjects, and it is only by virtue of having a
shared leader that a commonwealth is one political body at all. Hobbes writes, “A
Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person,
Represented; so that it be done with the consent of everyone of that Multitude in
particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that
maketh the Person One.” 152 So for Hobbes, the sovereign is necessarily a representative
because the sovereign derives their authority from their subjects even without elections
(which is what separates him from our contemporary notions of liberal democracy).
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Thus, Schmitt is right to say that Hobbes need not impute evil to each individual; evil
need only be a prominent possibility. Keep in mind that for Hobbes, the state of war of all
against all is not a matter of action fighting, but only a constant possibility. A possibility,
nevertheless, that can destabilize intersubjective living together.
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For Hobbes, while there are many benefits to living in a commonwealth, there is
one final end toward which government must be directed. He writes, “The Finall Cause,
End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the
introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Commonwealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby .
. .” 153 Thus, the end of the commonwealth is founded on the end of the individual. The
survival of the commonwealth is superior to the survival of an individual, and thus
rational for the individual to enter, insofar as (a) each individual in the commonwealth
lives a secure life in virtue of their membership in the commonwealth, and (b) the
commonwealth does not have all of the vulnerability of an individual human, e.g., the
need to sleep, even when considered as one commonwealth separated from others with no
common power as a higher authority. There is no contradiction in the claim that one may
have to risk one’s life to protect the commonwealth and one joins a commonwealth for
the sake of self-preservation because of the superiority of life in a commonwealth
(although one can always defend one’s life against the sovereign). Again, a state of
natural independence is nasty, brutish, and short because of the vulnerability and
powerless of the individual (relative to other individuals).
To be clear, my interpretation of Hobbes does not suggest that we are always
already living in a commonwealth with a sovereign. There may be moments of civil war
or unmediated struggle, but I take Hobbes to be saying that it is rational to institute an
authority to whom various parties can make appeals, and even more boldly, there is an
immanent tendency for commonwealths to be established. Or in other words, in the end,
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somebody will always appropriate public power. Civil society is the norm and the state of
nature (far from being ‘natural’) is the exception. If, for example, the police force ceases
to be the enforcers of law somewhere, someone or some party will—eventually—replace
them. Moreover, even the rule by a dictator or a gang or some other despotic power is
more stable than no rule at all, i.e., having no common authority.
3.3.2

Hobbes and Authoritarianism

I take Hobbes to articulate the logic of populist-authoritarianism insofar as (a) the
authority of the sovereignty is taken to be derived from the subjects of the
commonwealth, and (b) the authority and power of the sovereign is taken to be absolute,
i.e., not legitimately subject to recall or opposition since the end—self-preservation—is
absolute. While (b) might strike us as unintuitive, it warrants some provisional
justification.
Checks and balances are a staple of liberal theorists; they prevent an abuse of
public power. However, their very articulation (by figures like Madison and Burke) often
involves the language of slowing down and even stopping the use of public power so that
the popular passions can cool, and a wise elite can make decisions with technical acumen.
Or in other words, the whole point of checks and balances and parliamentary debate is to
not accomplish the ends of citizens. But the point of the institution of the commonwealth
is to accomplish the ends of living together—basic rights, commodious living, peace,
prosperity, and stability, etc. The commonwealth is instituted against the backdrop of
individual disagreement, private values, and a lack of cooperation, and an effective
institution requires unified power (so that it cannot undermine itself).
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While liberalism has been most strongly articulated in reaction to abuses of public
power, moments of authoritarianism (including the populist variety) emerge as reactions
against a feeling of powerlessness. Where Hobbes theorizes this powerless in terms of a
state of nature, where the war of all against all prevent any kind of industry or stability,
more contemporary populisms are reacting against a perceived powerlessness in the face
of a global economy that defies common understanding, against a perceived inability of
government against a ruling elite who may be interested in votes but not peoples’
opinions, and against various socio-economic crises (opioid epidemic, perceived decline
in status or stability of one’s status, erosion of communal bonds and sense of solidarity).
This is the basic dynamic that establishes the possibility for transformations between
populism and liberalism: too little power and too much. The caveat is that the need to
limit power is secondary; the primary issue in politics (conceived socio-economically or
properly political) is the need for power.
What Hobbes gets right in my estimation is the existentialist interpretation of the
basis of government. A community, in times of crisis at least, must be able to call upon
its individual citizens to sacrifice negative freedoms for the sake of maintaining the
whole, because it is the collective that creates and maintains those freedoms in normal
circumstances. Whatever benefits living in a commonwealth might confer, those can be
suspended or reduced for sake of defending the whole. This might be risking individual
life defending the commonwealth against a foreign enemy, but it could also be making
individuals wear masks during a pandemic.
Any body politic that cannot call upon individuals to defend it is no longer a
political community. But what I am calling his existentialist insight is ambiguous: in what
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sense is the community preserving itself, and what does such self-preservation entail? If it
simply means keeping a representative in power, that would be unsatisfying because it
fixates on something particular. If it means that a people can always pursue its economic
well-being in order to maximize its chances of survival, that would be better but still
unclear. The political interpretation of self-preservation is not the mere continuation of
what is already given; it is the preservation of a capacity for creative freedom. However,
the end of creative freedom can always be overtaken by and therefore perverted by the
means of pursuing economic well-being. In summation, a community can seek its own
self-preservation simply for the sake of continuing a given existence—this would be a
socio-economic interpretation—or it can seek its self-preservation so that the community
can continue to shape its world and thereby itself.
If Hobbes’s version of sovereignty strikes us as unfulfilling, it is because it is a
kind of absolute authoritarianism. But where Hobbes may offer an over-stated
authoritarianism, this is in part due to his deployment of the mechanistic metaphor of
political unity. 154 The leviathan is an automaton, the sovereign ruler is the head, and the
citizens are the cogs that compose the body. Thinking of people as cogs—and a sovereign
as a controlling head—may not be a strict logical entailment of thinking of government in
terms of means and ends, but it is certainly encouraged by adopting this kind of
metaphor.
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If Carl Schmitt is right, Hobbes notion of mechanism does not preclude or contrast
with the organic metaphor. He traces the organic-mechanistic opposition to political
romanticism; but romanticism is only a re-birth of an old distinction. The difference
between artificial (mechanistic) organization and natural organization was well-known to
the ancient Greeks, for instance. It is clear from Hobbes’s writing that the
organic/mechanistic distinction is not observed because the organic is understood to
already be mechanistic. “For what is the Heart, but a Spring . . .?” Hobbes xxxiii.
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If we are to be on guard against authoritarianism, we should at least be suspicious
of any account of government as (a) designed for an end (whether that negative liberty,
the public interest, or fostering personal choice), and (b) constituted by the authority
given from a collective of individuals to a representative. While I take it that Hobbes has
an insight into the importance of empowered authority for the sake of maintaining the
existence of a community, he has a narrow, mechanistic-materialist notion of existence,
which entails that citizens remain largely atomistic interest-pursuers in need of being
controlled by a sovereign. It is the kind of existence Hobbes attributes to the body politic
that makes it incompatible with the organic metaphor of political unity, since it does not
allow a notion of freedom as the cooperative, creative expression of public power. His
notion of the atomistic individual, the mechanistic construction of government, and the
controlling authority of the sovereign all lend themselves to mechanistic, individualist,
competition-driven liberalism.

3.4

The Portrait of the Mechanical State
In this section, I will recapitulate my analyses of the history of liberalism through

what I take to be the theory’s guiding metaphor for government: namely, the metaphor of
a constructed machine. Then, I will discuss this metaphor in terms of constituted and
constituting power and the way in which populists are more accommodating of the latter
notion of power to their benefit.
The mechanistic metaphor encourages us to think of government in two
noteworthy ways. First, it encourages us to think of it as being built for the sake of
accomplishing some end—individual liberty, self-interest, and self-preservation—and a
government is good to the extent that it effectively and efficiently achieves that end. In
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particular, liberal government is constructed for the sake of securing individual liberties
and refereeing the pursuit of individual interests. Second, the mechanical metaphor
encourages us to think of government in terms of a procedure, where some materials,
e.g., public opinions, are inputs for the government machine that then outputs some
presumably impartial result. Since no person is deciding what is best, this second way of
thinking mechanistically allows for the claim that liberal government is a rule of law. For
populists and authoritarians, ‘the people’ rule through their representative, meaning they
differ importantly from liberal thought, since populists-authoritarians do not take
governmental machinery to be independent of human action. Lurking behind thinking of
law as a procedure or a mechanism that shapes human behavior—liberal or populistauthoritarian—is the belief that government exerts control over individuals, and whoever
wins the election is in control.
By thinking of the design of government, the mechanistic metaphor focuses our
attention on constituted power, i.e., power that is institutionalized and entrusted with a
specific task as well as set into a web of relationships with other constituted powers. Any
elected representative or appointed official is an example of constituted power, and such
power is limited both by the sphere of competency assigned to that office as well as any
checks and balances built into the proverbial system.
3.4.1

Liberal and Populist Visions of Mechanism

What follows from the liberal interpretation of mechanistic government as an
automaton, i.e., in terms of its presentation of a ‘rule of law’ and ‘proceduralism’? In this
metaphor, independent procedures take inputs from human individuals and render
impartial judgments. For Berlin, Constant, and Locke, the law is meant to prevent the
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arbitrary exercise of power over others, but the commitment to limiting power is
simultaneously a commitment to conceptualizing individuals as interest-pursuers. This
interpretation of the phrase is clearly at play in contemporary critics of populism,
especially those claiming a relationship to Claude Lefort’s work on the empty place of
power. For Lefort, the rise of democracy as a political form involved the decapitation of
the king, where power is no longer symbolized as something that an individual (person or
group) wields or controls. Instead, democratic power is an empty space that a plurality of
people only temporarily plays within. But the place of power, just like any given law, is a
product of human doing. To deny the question of constituting power implies a false
independence of government machinery; it implies that government is an automaton.
Moreover, I doubt such a denial can ever fully succeed. Even if we all agree to
‘proceduralism’ (and then whichever procedure is given) or ‘checks and balances’ (and
whichever divisions are given) or any other normative concept, those concepts must still
be specified by someone into a concrete state of affairs. Descriptively, elected
representatives do such specifying, implying that laws themselves do not rule; political
parties rule, albeit impermanently.
In its populist and authoritarian formulation, the government is machinery to be
seized by ‘the people’ and utilized for their ends. The seizure of government machinery
seems to follow naturally once one accepts that parties, and not independent laws, wield
political power. Further, one of the lures of the mechanistic metaphor is that it lends itself
to thinking in terms of control, such that if a party (or the representatives thereof) were to
receive enough votes, it could—with all legitimacy—achieve its ends through planned
action and the measured use of the very mechanisms it has appropriated. The belief in
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control of people by the government even offers the fantasy that, given the right design,
the right formal construction, institutions could make people virtuous (or at least make
devils behave). Take the example of early liberal thinker Germaine de Stael. Over the
course of her life, de Stael became increasingly committed to thinking in terms of
mechanism and control. She thought that civic virtue could be created through the
establishment of institutions and eventually replaced by the latter. The passage is worth
considering, as it presents several concepts in unselfconscious unity that I believe gets
mirrored today:
Likewise, Stael replaced her previous preoccupation with the substantively
ethical underpinnings of a republican society with a predominantly
procedural and institutional approach based on interests. As we have seen,
she now dismissed patriotic foundations. A resort to patriotism to facilitate
public virtue and political participation, she warned, is ‘a kind of foolish
self-deception’ because ‘the people do not become free on account of their
virtues.’ Rather, only a felicitous and relatively thin institutional design
produces freedom because of its capacity to envelop and appeal to the
interests of all parties. ‘We must combine the institutions,’ she affirmed,
‘in such a way that each will have an interest in maintaining them.’ The
support of a liberal society can be found not in any unitary conception of
the good but rather in legal and institutional arrangements that allow
individuals to pursue their own concepts of the good. Thus, quite diverse
individuals and groups can come to possess an interest in the regime’s
stability and durability. 155
As I have argued in the first chapter, genuine political thought cannot endorse
such a conception since human beings are not merely behavioral creatures to be
predictably shaped according to some design. It is true, humans may behave all the time,
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See Kalyvas and Kratznelson LB 141. She is by no means alone in this thought.
Liberal thinkers from before Kant to Rawls and beyond have thought that a good
constitution could make humans behave, even without the assumption that people are
‘angels.’ Moreover, even modern liberalism, e.g., Rawls and Gina Schouten, make this
same move of relegating ‘the good’ to the private sphere, while the public sphere is an
independent mechanism that allows for the satisfaction of individual interests (conceived
in whatever fashion—economic, religious, etc.).
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but humans are fundamentally capable of acting anew, even if that power is not always
publicly expressed. 156
What Trump, a populist, shares with liberalism is the belief that government is a
machine. But whereas more classically liberal thought wants to maintain the autonomous
functioning of the machine, the logic in Trump-supporter logic is that the machine is a
tool to be wielded against others. Given the repeatable and popular rhetoric about
draining the swamp, his flouting of political correctness, and the calls to lock up Hillary
Clinton, it is evident that a significant portion of Republican voters view the government
machine as a monolithic, arbitrary power wielded by interests other than their own, viz.,
the interests of foreigners, minorities, cultural elites, crooks, etc. But whether you believe
that the government machine should balance individual interests or be used to further
one’s own interest, they both buy into the narrow view that human beings, qua public
beings, are really just self-interest-pursuers. From this assumption, it is dubious at best
that people—liberal or populist-authoritarian—would agree with John Rawls that the
definition of society is a system of fair cooperation instead of a ruthless competition.
3.4.2

The Machine Manufactures Its Own Instability

Recall Constant’s claim that commerce is the replacement for war; the aim of war
is victory. The aim of market competition, coincidentally, is not equality but economic
victory, i.e., inequality. Given that market competition deeply informs the liberal
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Even without some version of Arendtian politics, Immanuel Kant makes a (roughly)
similar point in “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” in which he
insists on the importance of allowing other humans the right to exercise their judgment in
public. Education is an important task that all communities must take up, but responsible
education must respect students’ power of reason. If it takes up this responsibility, it
cannot be conceptualized as a machine that produces each student as a picture of virtue or
learning.
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tradition—or at least its libertarian strands as well as the actual institutions of liberal
democracy—we should be careful in thinking of a well-balanced machine as an attainable
idea. It is dubious that even a perfectly balanced system of competition would transcend
possessive individualism. If I entertain political matters for the sake of furthering my
interest, at the end of the day, why would I commit to an ideal of balance rather than
efficiency? Why commit to long-term rationality over short-term? Burke and Madison
seemed to hold out hope that popular interests, voiced in the public sphere (parliament)
would compete with other and ‘check’ each other, none of them winning the day. Over
time, almost as a result of magic, wiser heads would prevail and find some kind of
compromise or solution. On this account, the perfectly balanced machine is supposed to
lead to deadlock, at least for a while, which is one of the motivating factors in populists
and fascists. My worry is that critics of populism see populism on the rise, associate it
with popular sovereignty, and then seek to limit popular power by way of further
divisions of power—more checks and balances, more individualism, more opportunities
for oversight, and a more exhaustive account of a variety of interests for which people
can vote. This misunderstands the problem. Populism is, at least in some cases—e.g., the
American case—a reaction that arises because of an excess of division of power and the
feeling of powerlessness of atomized individuals and resentment against those with
monetary or social capital. In chapter four, I hope to show that the prognosis ought not be
more intricate social machinery with ever-increasing divisions, but rather a change in
ethos—or public spirit if you prefer. Institutional design is neither a replacement for an
ethos nor is it more basic; rather it is a secondary compliment to a civic ethos.
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The insight of the populist interpretation of the mechanistic metaphor is that we
can create and reform institutions deliberately. Even the government machinery itself can
be transformed by acting human beings. Even outside of a populist perspective, our
concept of ‘law-makers’ indicates the extent to which we embrace the fact that the
government is a product of our doing rather than an immutable condition for action.
Insofar as political actors are engaged in creating or transforming laws and institutions, it
does not seem so problematic to think of the government—in a limited sense—as created
with specific ends in mind. Problematically, the mechanistic metaphor does not offer
further guidance for thinking about who operates or designs the machine, and populistauthoritarians exploit this vagueness. I will contribute to the clarification of who operates
and designs the machine by analyzing the ‘constituting power,’ which cannot be
conceptualized by the mechanistic metaphor. I set my position apart from Mueller’s
insofar as he rejects the notion of the constituting power as intrinsically mystical.
Liberalism tends to fixate on particular constituted powers because it can, as a
theory, measure a constituted power by a pre-given law. Insofar as the constituted power
measures up to its law, and provided the law is sufficiently formal and thereby neutral,
such a power is “right.” The constituted power is not only governed by and accountable
to this law, it is constituted by it. In a sense, all legitimate, public power is domesticated
in liberalism. There is a genuine insight here that all power that appears as public and is
intelligible is constituted, including ‘the people’ when it votes in elections for
representatives or during plebiscites, referendums, etc. But constituted powers are not the
ultimate source of their intelligibility. They must always express the constituent power
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that created them, some specific ‘who.’ And constituent power cannot always already be
regulated in the way the actions of an office can be. 157

3.5

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have shown how populism and liberalism share a metaphor for

government mechanism and demonstrated one reason why liberalism is prone to bouts of
populism. This is because liberalism is one view about the end of government, and it
requires public power to institute itself. To be sure, representative power should, in some
way be limited, but the mechanistic metaphor limits power by way of competition. And
while competition might yield ‘good results’ when everyone has the same background
assumptions about the ends of the competition, this is no longer the case if there is no
agreement. So, if populists enter the competition with a different view of the end of
government, then we should not be surprised when the results turn out ‘bad’ from a
liberal perspective. On the one hand, if liberalism is truly neutral about views of the good,
populism would simply be liberalism continued by another name as long as the procedure
(voting) remains in place. One could contend that simply voting is the wrong procedure,
or that voting only works as a procedure given other conditions, but then one would have
to endorse a theory either (a) is not tied to our actual, liberal-democratic institutions, or
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One of Schmitt’s contentions is that the constituting power needs to be able to be
directly expressed by a representative in a timely fashion in moments of crisis. This is
essentially the definition of sovereignty; it is the impetus for his attempt to re-appropriate
a notion of dictatorship, and it is the reason why he draws more from Hobbes than
Rousseau. For Schmitt, while Rousseau has an adequate articulation of the democratic
principle, that of identification between ruler and ruled, and while the democratic form of
a modern state can involve referendums and plebiscites, there must always be a
representative insofar as someone poses the question to which ‘the people’ vote yes or
no, which is to say, some concrete person always makes the political decision. CT 240.
137

(b) is no longer a proceduralism because conditions have been stipulated that transcend
the (voting) procedure. But on the other hand, if liberalism is not neutral, then (a) it has
extensive work to show why it is the best view of the public world, and (b) it would have
to show how it is not simply recreating a mode of religious organization. It is dubious
that such accounts could be given while maintaining the familiar tenets of “liberalism” as
we recognize it today.
Populism, too, thinks that government is a mechanism designed for an end. But it
is a mechanism to be used by the people through their elected leader. Moreover, the end
is not a set of human rights. The end is simply the public interest, full stop. On this
reading, it seems that the people, even if only indirectly, are still engaged in shaping their
world. In the following chapter I will show that this is not the case. In seeking control of
the government, they destructively confuse the public and private. Populists do not give
the world new shape or creatively express their freedom; they simply plug their own idea
of their self-interest in for that of the group. But self-interest divides just as much as it
unites, and thus populism finds its own instability ‘solved’ by liberalism.
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CHAPTER 4. THE METAPHOR OF THE SELF-INTERESTED INDIVIDUAL AND
THE IDEA OF THE GENERAL WILL
In the last chapter, I examined how the mechanistic metaphor of government
shapes the populist-authoritarian interpretation of power and frames the liberal critique of
constituted power. In brief, liberalism views the excesses of populist power as a
breakdown in the division and balance of powers. As an outcome of that examination, I
argued that a liberal notion of authority, in which independent laws rule and not humans,
is unstable and tends to degenerate into populist rule. After all, the point of government is
to exercise power, not simply to limit it. To merely limit power by division is to re-create
a ‘state of nature,’ which as Hobbes shows, is the impetus to institute a sovereign power.
This chapter takes up the question of sovereignty, but with a focus on the people, qua
collective, rather than a representative. While some critics have identified populism with
a Rousseauan-democratic tradition, I will show that this is not necessarily the case.
Moreover, we should turn to this tradition to rethink the authority of representatives and
the power of the people rather than jettisoning this tradition in favor of a purer liberalism.
To be sure, the populist imagination may draw from the democratic tradition, but
not in the fashion that liberal critics think. The received view is that populists, by
insisting on a pure and immediate expression of the will of the people, are thinking of the
people as internally homogeneous. And homogeneity seems to require a simple
composition of the people that is both impossible to achieve and invites acts of
aggression in its doomed pursuit. To be sure, Rousseau explicitly invites us to think of
the people as a giant individual, and like an individual, the people must presumably
possess some kind of simplicity. For Rousseau, this homogeneous, indivisible element of
the people is its will, provided it is a genuine people with a sufficiently general will. As
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we shall see, liberal critics associate this metaphor of the individual, possessing a general
will, with an aggression against minorities. What I will show, however, is that the
metaphor of the people as an individual is not the problem. Rather, the problem lies in
how the individual is interpreted. Liberals are right to say that populists are anti-pluralists
when they insist on a homogeneous identity, but they overlook the fact that this antipluralism is deeply informed by one of liberalism’s core concepts: ‘the individual,’
conceived in a socio-economic framework.
There are different accounts of ‘the individual’ in the liberal tradition, but most
varieties offer a notion of the individual as self-sufficient in private. I do not mean
‘private’ in the sense of necessarily excluding everything public or intersubjective; what I
mean is a notion of privacy in which the individual is in control over what and who is
excluded and in which an individual can flourish in solitude. Clearly, this conception is
different from a ‘political’ notion of the individual, wherein individuals are dependent on
a plurality of others—which the individual does not create and does not even choose—for
a community.
Locke is a good exemplar in his thinking of the private individual. Individuals are
self-sufficient in a state of nature (in private), and they institute a government to secure
and stabilize that self-sufficiency. That self-sufficiency is at risk—and in need of
stabilization—because of other individuals, whose own self-interest may lead them into
conflict, for instance, over property. As we reviewed in the last chapter, later liberal
thinkers would go on to emphasize that government officials need to ‘check’ each other,
so that a government instituted to protect rights of the subjects could not be used to
infringe on them. A well-designed constitution, then, could allow private interests into
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the public sphere, but their competition—balanced by a government that is itself checked
and balanced—functions to the benefit of each. The usual benefits are familiar enough
‘final ends’ of government: life, liberty, and property. In any case, the natural, unstable
divisions in the state of nature are supposed to be checked by the ordered, rational
divisions in representative government.
If we were to analyze this liberal-democratic, private individual, whether admitted
into the public sphere or not, we would have a ready-made catalog of relevant concepts,
e.g., ‘self-interest,’ ‘rights and liberties,’ ‘(free) will,’ etc. I am interested in how this
familiar notion of the individual leads us to specify our three, framing concepts: freedom,
unity, and authority. Drawing from a socio-economic framework, populism deploys the
concept of the individual as a surrogate for the collective, and that causes it to think of (a)
‘freedom’ in terms of control, (b) unity in terms of a concrete social identity, and (c)
‘authority’ as a possession bestowed upon a single representative. If this account is right,
populism is not simply an eruption of impatience or immediate passions. It may very well
be passionate, but its passions and animosities are mediated (perhaps perversely) by
concepts established and entrenched by economic liberalism. I will show the core ways in
which populism furthers liberalism by using liberalism’s own concepts for understanding
the collective.
In the first section, I will explore the populist conception of the people. I start
with populism’s use of the metaphor of the people as an individual, and from there, I
offer an analysis of the concept of the individual on which the metaphor is based. Then, I
will detail a notion of ‘the majority,’ that accompanies both populist and liberal
interpretations of ‘the people’ in its expression of popular sovereignty. In the second
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section, I will review some argumentation for why ‘the people’ may require a
homogeneous identity, which populism proposes against liberalism. Here, I will point to
an ambiguity in senses of identification at play, one that is concrete and sociopsychological, and another notion of identification that is about the political form of a
people. In the third section, I will review some of the criticisms of basing a notion of
political unity on a homogeneous identity. The main criticism is that enforcing the
homogeneity of any political unity is ultimately self-destructive, since it must keep
purging the differences that necessarily emerge. In the fourth section, I will turn to an
interpretation of Rousseau that shows how his work expresses the ambiguity in senses of
identification discussed in the second section, but I will also show how the notion of
political identification does not run afoul of the criticisms discussed in the third section.
In the fifth and final section, I will offer an original analysis of populism that critiques it
without drawing upon the mechanistic metaphor or the concept of self-interest. In this
analysis, I will show how populism associates constituent power with an elected
representative, who has control over government machinery, but an alternative reading of
Rousseau would lead us to think of constituent power as dealing only with the basic form
the people take and not with controlling particulars.

4.1

Section One: Individualism and Conceptions of the People
Liberalism has provided a sophisticated conceptual framework for critiquing the

excesses of public power, insisting on a division of constituted powers and regular
elections. In the last chapter, we examined liberalism’s critique of authoritarianism and
discovered that liberalism itself has an authoritarian moment within it. This authoritarian
moment is not just an artificial construct of the theory, it lives within the logic of any
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representative system, in which individuals cede their authority to an individual (person
or group). That is, by insisting on the powers of a representative government over its
subjects, liberalism must seek to institute a positive authority; liberalism just happens to
limit that authority by recreating the very conditions of the state of nature that Hobbes
sought to bring to an end. And as we saw, dividing such a power tends toward deadlock,
which encourages a stronger re-emergence of authoritarian power.
But representative power need not be primarily limited by way of checks and
balances; that is simply the method of limitation we tend to grasp for when we operate
with a mechanistic metaphor for government. While the last chapter ended with an
authoritarian conception of a constituted power, we will have to begin again, with a
conception of “the people” as a kind of constituent power in the hope that a collectivist
beginning can avoid an authoritarian logic. To be sure, our interpretation of constituent
power must involve constituted powers if it is to exist at all. But constituent power exists
insofar as it creates constituted power; it is not already fully regulated by it. If the
Rousseauan-democratic tradition can avoid the fate of falling into authoritarianism, it will
have to navigate the new threat of anti-pluralism.
We start with the metaphor of the individual standing in for the people. This will
bring into focus not only the phenomenon of populism, but also the anti-pluralist worries
it occasions. From the metaphor of the people as an individual, we turn to turn to the
conception of the individual as a bearer of rights and possessor self-interest. This is the
conception often deployed in liberalism, and while it is not a false conception, it is
reductively narrow. I will review some of the criticisms against such a conception, with
the caveat that whatever is partial or myopic about this conception of the private
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individual, it will be even more problematic when it is used as the basis for a metaphor
for the entire people. I will then address the notion of ‘the majority,’ which accompanies
both conceptions of the people, qua aggregate and qua individual. This analysis will help
to clarify and direct the further study into conceptions of the collective identity of the
people.
4.1.1

Populism, the Democratic Tradition, and the Individual Writ-Large

While thinking of ‘the people’ as an aggregate is relatively easy, conceiving of it
as a collective seems to be more difficult—or at least more abstract. Nevertheless, the
democratic tradition has offered one approach to thinking of the collective, namely,
through the metaphor of a large individual. Populism is influenced by this tradition,
although it does not necessarily have the same kind of evocative imagery or achieve the
theoretical insight of Rousseau. In fact, the populist conception of the people is akin to a
corpse; it provokes neither the imagination nor the understanding. It is deployed, almost
unthinkingly, e.g., in the cries of putting America first and pursuing America’s interests
through trade wars (both with China as well as with our longstanding allies). The fact that
the metaphor is not evocative or provocative is telling; it lets us know the kind of
interpretation that crusted over the image, which at one point was a source of inspiration.
Let us turn to that image.
Rousseau explicitly envisions the body politic as a giant person. 158 In this
democratic tradition, the giant person is a novel creation, born of the social contract and
sustained by a common will. It evokes, in the first place, a sense of the way that a
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This is an echo of Hobbes’s leviathan, itself a giant, artificial man composed of
commonwealth’s subjects and itself an evocative image (even a series of images) for
thinking about the collective.
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community creates a new life and transforms the lives of those who participate in that
community. In the second place, it evokes the overwhelming strength of the collective,
such that the giant individual towers over isolated individuals and nature alike.
When populists like Trump claim to be putting their nation’s interests first, they
are drawing upon this metaphor: the collective as one individual some sense of selfinterest. Ironically, populist movements are trying to reclaim a notion of community or
group identity by making the group into the very thing the group is resisting—an isolated
individual pursuing its own good. 159 Perhaps the irony is fitting, as United States
populism is seemingly obsessed with idea of an independent, self-made man, even while
it paradoxically seeks to possess the notions of community and public service. We might
say that the irony is two-fold. On the one hand, it seeks to recapture a sense of an
American identity—set against immigrants, globalists, minorities, etc., but it is also set
against any kind of collectivism or socialism. Populists see themselves as supporting the
American collective, but they also advocate for individualism while still having its own
collectivist-conformist elements, e.g., the red MAGA hat, the rallies, the ritualistic
chanting. At least implicitly, then, populism involves a notion of a unified collective,
perhaps an incoherent one, and it is hostile to any kind of private interest that appears as
non-identical to it. This is because populism has a specific interpretation of the
individual.
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Depending on the kind of populism—Left or Right—it might frame itself as fighting
against the atomizing forces of liberalism/capitalism or the corrupt elite pursuing their
own self-interest.
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4.1.2

Liberalism and the Individual with Rights and Self-Interest

Probably the most common feature of different variations of liberalism is a
conception of an individual deserving of rights. The tradition of liberalism has surely
expanded our notion of individual freedoms while simultaneously setting such freedoms
as the goal for government. 160 Set against the abuses of public power—whether by
absolutist monarchs, despots, mobs, or fascists—liberalism has primarily framed its
notion of freedom as “negative,” consisting of an entitlement to non-interference.
Negative liberties, such as the freedom of religious practices, prevents others from
impinging on one’s projects and generally allows for the pursuit of one’s self-interest. 161
In the previous chapter, I examined a notion of rights in detail; here I am interested in a
notion of self-interest and how it is related to negative liberties. While the liberal tradition
does not offer a developed argument that demonstrates a necessary conceptual link
between self-interest and liberty, the two notions seem to be constantly conjoined.
We have been using “self-interest” in a provisional way; it warrants clearer
analysis. The main context that I am drawing from is socio-economic, and more
specifically, in ‘rational choice theory.’ “Rational choice theory uses the model of Homo
economicus. It explains human behavior in conformity with social norms as the product
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This is true for the tradition broadly speaking, including libertarianism. While
liberalism more generally has an expansive notion of individuals freedoms and seeks to
enlarge government to secure those freedoms, libertarianism focuses largely on property
right, and it takes small government to be the means of achieving its end.
161
More modern versions of ‘political liberalism’ have a similar structure, where the end
is “choice,” and the role of government is to keep private notions of ‘the good’ private.
Despite these replacements, liberalism still relies on a notion of the private individual as
well as a conception of self-interest, albeit one that is not private.
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of strategic interactions of instrumentally rational, self-interested individuals.” 162 Such a
notion of self-interest serves not only to explain human behavior, but also to predict—and
even define—it. By interpreting individuals as homo economicus, we commit not to the
idea that humans are only self-serving, but they are ultimately self-serving and
perpetually keep an eye for out their own benefit.
The notion of self-interest, especially embedded in rational choice theory, is still
prominent in both economics and sociology. Its history extends back into the early
modern era and was pivotal in the development of political economy. Albert Hirschman’s
extensive analysis of the term indicates its role as setting up an ideal to pursue that would
curb the worst excesses of the human passions. 163 If I pursue my self-interest, I will not
go out of my way to hurt others, and I will not let an ‘excess’ of anger drive me to harm
someone if I will not profit from it. As an ideal, then, self-interest sets up a quantitative
standard, encouraging one to discipline excesses and deficiencies of the passions for the
sake of equally quantitative profit. Moreover, this ideal that is set against the passions
implies that people have passions—drives—to act in ways that are not beneficial, and so
people must become self-controlled. Thus, self-interest is a term that draws together
notions of instrumentality, quantity, and control.
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Elizabeth Anderson, “Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of
Social Norms,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 29, No 2 (Spring 2000) 171.
163
Albert O. Hirschman, The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for
Capitalism before Its Triumph, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2013) esp. 312. While we might be tempted to assume that ‘self-interest’ would have originally
appeared as a something bad, Hirschman convincingly argues that self-interest was
conceived in liberalism not as an excess of greed or a constitutive feature of human
behavior, but rather, as an ideal that could tame and displace the role of the passions.
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This same, basic understanding can be seen in other commentaries. Arendt traces
the notion of interest to Aristotle, which he defined as what is useful to people. 164 Pitkin
contrasts liberal-individualistic notions of self-interest and Burkean notions of
independent-collective self-interest; both of which hold that people pursue concrete ends
but differ about the scope and origin of such ends. 165 We see this quantitativeinstrumental interpretation further reflected in public discourse when lower class
individuals vote for conservatives and therefore ‘against their own interest.’ To pursue
one’s interest is to reason about the means to achieve a given end and put those means
into action. The presumed end in this criticism is monetary; it is assumed that
conversative voters would get more money by voting for Democrats. And money is the
proper conception of self-interest and not any kind of fuzzy, vague moralism. Ends, then,
are the desirable outcome of action, wherein that outcome lies outside the action itself
and is already presupposed before the action takes place. 166 Thus, we see the notion of
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OR 12. I believe she is translating the term sumpheron, which can also be translated as
what is ‘beneficial’ or ‘profitable.’ Translation commentary aside, the concept of selfinterest is built on a notion of ‘what is good for you,’ but with a tone or a tendency that
favors quantitative and instrumental rationality.
165
Representation 191-4. Whether Pitkin is right in associating a notion of self-interest
that is particularistic and dependent on each individual with liberalism is an interesting
question, but one we need not delve into further. We need merely note that (a)
representative government is almost always understood in terms of representing interests,
(b) highly attached-particularistic and highly detached-universalistic notions of selfinterest are not very compelling, and (c) liberalism is necessarily going to adopt some
notion of self-interest. Note that Pitkin uses the term “interest” and contrasts the
aforementioned senses of it, but her interest is in understanding its relationship to
representation, not to giving the term its own conceptual analysis.
166
See Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics, (New York: Schocken Books 2005) 1934. Hannah Pitkin, in her work on representation, discusses the distinction between
Burke’s notion of interest as well as contemporary liberalism, but the difference there is
about how, where the difference is about whether interests exist outside individuals
(Burke) and prior to them or are internally determined (liberalism). In a move like
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self-interest as an end that people ought (morally) to pursue, but also which we would say
they in fact predictably pursue insofar as they act according to the standards of
calculative rationality. When political action is understood in terms of self-interest and
ends, then action becomes a matter of behavior and production, i.e., a matter of producing
predictable, pre-given outcomes. A system of rights built around individual interests
grants individuals a sphere of control, and libertarianism only seems to radicalize
liberalism when it insists on the absolute character such individual rights and control.
The notion of ‘interest’ is formally the same for everyone, and as a universal
standard, it means we can see people as ‘irrational’ when they do not pursue their selfinterest. There is a tendency to commit to economic interpretations of self-interest, but
such an interpretation is not necessary. One need only think of everyone as obliged to
pursue the ends that are the most profitable (in a broad sense) for them. Interests are not
only shared in a merely formal sense; they are sometimes shared substantially as well.
Occasionally, it is in our self-interest to cooperate and combine our labor—perhaps
because we have different specializations of labor. But just as the notion of self-interest
may align us, it also serves to differentiate and divide people. If you and I have interests
that set us at odds, for instance, because of the scarcity 167 of some concrete good, then it
is rational for us to compete for those goods, wherein the only limits are those set by

liberalism’s, Chantal Mouffe distinguishes a notion of ‘demand’ from interest insofar as
the latter remains anchored in reified social categories. The difference here is immaterial,
because all the notions under consideration take the interest (or demand) to be an end to
be produced by action. Thus, the logic of interest is the logic of instrumentality.
167
The notion of scarcity here is important, because ‘control’ is always going to be
limited. The more people there are running for office or voting or exercising political
power, the less control one has—assuming control is evenly distributed. Instituting a
representative or an office that can exercise control requires the creation of inequality
(which may nevertheless be conjoined with created modes of equality).
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government mechanisms and by our own understanding of our long-term, overall selfinterest. Government limits are only binding insofar as we can count on punishments to
be against our self-interest. The threat of punishment conditions our behavior such that
some actions ‘just aren’t worth it.’ Good government, however, establishes and respects
the limits of punishment, allowing significant liberties and curbing them only to preserve
them in a more stable system of rights.
The ideals of self-interest and liberty, presented as universally valid, rely on a
wider set of beliefs about the individual and society. C.B. Macpherson argues that the
plausibility of this view of rights and society rests on the background assumptions and
habits of an increasingly bourgeois society in which individuals engage in truck and
trade. In this kind of civil society, individuals of a certain kind—usually well-to-do
European men—spend their time interacting with others for the sake of their own interest,
usually understood as profit. They do so in civil society by selling their labor power,
understood to be a form of property within themselves and which they are free to sell for
the best price. 168 This model for interaction is then applied to all significant human
interactions. In the wake of the Reign of Terror, Benjamin Constant would express his
hope for the replacement of war with economic struggle and individual independence.
The market and sets of ‘political’ procedures, and no common authority or officer, would
mediate individual relations, all while guaranteeing that the right to life would never have
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The theory of property in the person is a pivotal notion for C.B. Macpherson as well
as Carole Pateman and Charles Mills. All three of these thinkers are all part of a tradition
that sees liberalism as playing a part in the economization of all public-political relations.
Locke, usually liberalism’s favorite contract theorist, took himself to be articulating the
right of the pursuit of one’s own interest against Robert Filmer’s theory of the divine
right of kings.
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to be compromised. This wish to replace war with economics is representative of one of
the earliest and most common threads of liberalism.
On Macpherson’s view, Locke’s theory, which is a tamer echo of Hobbes’s own,
took all human individuals to be constituted in the same way as the bourgeois
businessman—what he calls ‘the market man.’ C.B. Macpherson writes, “As with
Hobbes, Locke’s deduction starts with the individual and moves out to society and the
state, but, again as with Hobbes, the individual has already been created in the image of
the market man.” 169 The notion of ‘the market man,’ illustrated as the underlying
assumptions of various political theories, exemplifies a problematic ‘conception’ of
human subjectivity. 170 The image painted is one of a rational, self-possessed laborer, who
freely enters into contracts with other laborers. Whatever accidental relationships to
family, class, or nation a laborer might have, they are inessential in the face of such a
portrait.
4.1.3

Critiques of the Socio-Economic Individual

Earlier, I mentioned that the conception of socio-economic individual, driven by
self-interest and entitled to various liberties, is not wrong so much as it is reductively
narrow. Now that we have examined this notion in greater detail, we can turn to some of
the critiques of this conception. I will add that whatever is a potential problem in the
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PI 269.
Without detailing all seven assumptions of possessive individualism generally from
Macpherson’s text, I will note two key ones for our purposes: (iii) “The individual is
essentially the proprietor of his own person and capacities, for which he owes nothing to
society” and (vii) “Political society is a human contrivance for the protection of the
individual’s property in his person and goods, and (therefore) for the maintenance of
orderly relations of exchange between individuals regarded as proprietors themselves.”
PI 263 and 264, respectively.
170
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socio-economic concept of the individual is going to be magnified when this concept is
used as a metaphor for the collective. The first strand of critique targets liberalism’s
atomic individualism 171 that conceives of political actors as (a) bearers of rights that
insulate them from others (b) pursuers of their narrow interest. The second mode of
criticism speaks to how the general ascription of citizenship or subjectivity (or humanity,
etc.) does not capture the lived experience of marginalized groups and thus excludes the
differences that make political action possible through erasure.
The first criticism holds that liberalism thinks primarily of the rights and interests
of individuals owing to the nature of the specific experience of socio-economically
independent individuals, consistent in principle with the basic assumptions of contract
theory. I have already recounted elements of this critique, given by C.B. Macpherson.
Macpherson is critical of a dominant tradition in which we understand a political
community as arising from independent, self-interested individuals. Again exemplified in
Hobbes and Locke, contract theory holds that individuals submit to a common authority
for the sake of preserving their own life, their negative liberty, and their property. These
three things comprise fundamental interests, and the social contract is meant to procure
those, thus making it rational for individuals to leave the state of nature and enter society.
In reality, this account of the social contract was used less for the creation of new
commonwealths and more for liberating the individual from collective power and duty
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The issue of atomic individualism in liberalism is complicated by the fact that some
liberal thinkers endorse it while other do not. In contemporary terms, atomic
individualism is more associated with libertarianism. Nevertheless, the critique of
individualism I will review applies to the pivotal liberal thinkers who champion negative
freedom and seek to limit the right of public power, viz., Constant and Berlin. Echoes of
their thought are visible in the liberal critiques of populism today.
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for the sake of their economic benefit, i.e., the acquisition of property, the freedom to
enjoy that property how one pleases, and the assurance of a life long enough to enjoy the
former. 172
Carole Pateman’s seminal critique of contract theory is similar. She thinks that the
contract is a mechanism of regulation fitting for economic relations. Even while it
assumes that each person is free and equal, its very assumptions are used to justify
subordination—even domination. 173 It is not an appropriate basis for all communal
relations, which may involve non-calculative forms of rationality. Moreover, contract
theory presupposes that the individual is a laborer seeking to acquire what he desires, and
this always involves one party becoming subordinate to another (although the depth and
intimacy of such subordination may vary). For instance, when one person pays someone
a wage for labor, the laborer has become subordinate in that relationship. They must
answer to the other person, their time and energy belong to that person (for some period),
and the labor purchaser is guaranteed more legal options if he is dissatisfied. The person
who sells their labor remains in a more precarious position, more vulnerable to the other
party. This dynamic is intensified in marriage contracts as well as transactions involving
prostitution, wherein women’s bodies are subjected to a heightened vulnerability and
their legal status is significantly diminished in relation to their male counterpart. 174
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To be sure, Locke played a role in the theoretical underpinnings of the American
Revolution. However, his notion of an individual with rights was set alongside a notion
of an individual acting together with others. Moreover, his notion of a right to property
was replaced with the pursuit of happiness, which, if nothing else, does not seem to
rigidly imply the same kind of economic-business model of the individual even if it is
compatible with it.
173
See Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract, (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1988)
esp. 39-40. Henceforth, “Pateman.”
174
Pateman 189-91.
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Marx presents a critique in a similar vein. For Marx, the kinds of rights that
attached themselves to bourgeois individuals were entirely negative, which he described
as the right of a self-enclosed monad. 175 Ultimately, the concept and the ideal for the
individual aim at alienation from fellow subjects. Whether this characterization is entirely
accurate is disputable—Claude Lefort points out that some of the fundamental rights of
man, such as freedom of speech and the press, seemed to actively situate individuals in
relations with each other. 176 Even if we grant that Lefort is right, we should still be struck
by the strength and the timing of some liberal claims to the primacy of negative freedom.
Both Benjamin Constant, in the wake of the Reign of Terror, and Isaiah Berlin, in the
wake of World War II, view positive freedom and collectives with distrust. The negative
freedom for which they argue—and which we reviewed in chapter one—is meant to be
an assertion of a right of the individual against the power of collectives, whose power
they view as tending toward the destruction of individuals (at least in times of crisis).
We have just reviewed three critiques of liberalism that charge it with taking a
narrow, economic view of the individual. Those critiques indicate that pursuing one’s
own interest and having the right to be left alone to do so ought not be the sole standard
of human rationality, since negative liberties and pursuing one’s interest only capture a
calculative kind of rationality and limit our view of what is possible in cooperating with
others. The other major perspective critical of liberal homogeneity is exemplified by Iris
Marion Young, who calls liberalism ‘assimilationist.’ 177 Young’s insight is that is that
liberalism, insofar as it is individualist and proceduralist, fails to recognize significant
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“Jewish Question” 40-4.
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Young, “Together” 162-3.
176

154

groups of political actors as they recognize themselves, and how people recognize
themselves is a necessary feature of their free projects. A better ideal for a community,
she thinks, is a kind of ‘togetherness in difference’ in which actors can have solidarity in
a strong sense with those like themselves while also cooperating with those unlike
themselves. 178
The first criticism (Macpherson, Pateman, Marx) held that liberalism took a
narrow, economic view of the individual. The second criticism (Young) held that
liberalism does not account for the self-understanding of many political actors. To be
clear, I am sympathetic with both of these strands of critique, and together with Arendt
and Schmitt, I think the problem the socio-economic individual, for all its emphasis on
freedom, is that it reduces all political problems to economic ones (or rather, attempts to
solve political problems in analogous fashion to economic ones) and limits all individual
spontaneity to the private sphere. ‘Who exercises public power?’—a representative, a
constituency, etc.—is not an issue that can be resolved by reference to private individuals
any more than it can by reference to an unauthored legal mechanism. Addressing such
questions will involve developing a notion of the collective.
4.1.4

The Majority

We have reviewed the metaphor of the individual in populism, the liberal
conception of the individual, and critiques of such a conception. I now turn my attention
to a notion of ‘the majority,’ which plays a crucial role in both populism and liberalism.
In the last chapter, we saw Jan Werner-Mueller characterize the liberal majority, in which
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I will be drawing from this idea in the fourth chapter as I develop a positive metaphor
for thinking through community.
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only numbers rule, as clearly superior to the anti-pluralist collective with a mysterious
identity. 179 Or in other words, a commitment to democracy entails a commitment to
majority rule, and that a minority of votes has no right rulership no matter how much it
claims to be for the common good. 180 From the passage, one sees that the major
advantage of majority rule is that it is not derived from any particular interest. Power
does not rest in the hands of any identifiable group but rather in a pure, quantitative
mechanism. Or in other words, however elected representatives may act or explain their
actions, majority rule is unerring from the perspective of democratic practice because “in
the end only numbers count [my emphasis].” For populism, the leader claims to speak for
the entire people not because every legal citizen voted for the leader but because the
majority—the true Americans, for instance—voted for them. Crucially, quantity plays a
role here; populist leaders must have large rallies, must win elections, or—like Trump—
must be able to dismiss or discredit opposing votes. ‘The majority,’ or ‘the
silent/moral/etc. majority’ may even become a name for the collective. In liberalism,
however, ‘the majority’ is less about a group of people and more about a procedure. 181
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WIP 77-8
Note that Mueller is not making a claim about minority populations, but rather about a
minority of votes, i.e., he is making a claim about a mechanism for decision-making, he
is not trying to make a claim about social identity. Locke articulates a notion of majorityrule that seems to have been influential, although not often discussed in the context of
populism. The basic idea is that a commonwealth needs to come to a single decision; a
commonwealth will consist of a variety of conflicting opinions, ergo, each individual
needs to have submitted to majority rule so that the commonwealth can act without
tearing itself apart. This issue will be considered in greater detail in the next section.
Arendt notes a distinction between majority rule as mechanism versus majority rule in
terms of a demographic or social group seizing control of government; only the latter
represents a threat to a republic. See OR 155
181
Contra Mueller, this notion of the majority can still be a moralistic identity, especially
when non-populists feel that they must win an election against populists.
180
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There are two important points about ‘the majority’ that makes it compatible with
populism. First, majority rule, taken as an essential feature of democracy, does not
logically require elections. There could be other mechanisms in place for a people to
consent to its government or to participate in it. Given that breadth, it is unclear how
populism would violate such a broad principle of majority rule. Second, majorities can be
constructed. 182 Majorities might consist of an alliance of differentiated groups, or it might
simply involve one large group with a narrow interest. Politicians—and their campaign
strategists, advisors, and colleagues in their political party—can pursue multiple
strategies for getting a majority of votes, which may involve running attack ads, making
promises that cannot be fulfilled, or using propaganda. In fact, populist leaders are reliant
on elections to maintain their legitimacy and are often effective campaigners. They may
part with some of the ideals of liberalism, but they still use many of the same methods for
attaining political power as ordinary, non-populist politicians.
Let us assume with Mueller that in the democratic process of rulership, majorities
shift and change, and ultimately decisions get made on the basis of a quantity of votes. 183
If that is the normative foundation of democratic practice, then the source of that majority
is unimportant. A majority might emerge in an election because a higher number of
people have reasonably expressed their preferences, whether in accord with their genuine
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The familiar term for groups of voters that are constructed by such narrow interests
rather than arising from a ‘grass-roots’ movement is ‘astro-turfing,’ and majority rule, as
a basic mechanism, encourages astro-turfing.
183
From this perspective, the electoral college in the United States must be utterly
confounding, since it does not privilege simple quantities. Any system that cannot tell
when one number is larger than another and give recognition to the larger must be
irrational. I am not so convinced, although I also do not think that any voting system—
simple majority, electoral college, etc.—is insulated from abuse even in non-violent
competitions/elections.
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self-interest or religious convictions, etc. But a majority might also emerge because
people are deceived or deluded about their preferences; they might be radicalized or
mobilized by a demagogue. Moreover, the determinate rules by which a majority is
calculated, for instance, through the drawing of district lines and the establishing of legal
voting age, is itself subject to actions taken by elected representatives. 184 In short,
between the social forces mobilizing groups of voters and the changes in voting laws that
representatives can enact, the notion of ‘majority rule’ is unstable. Its very neutrality and
mathematical purity keep it from being a foil or a prevention of populism. Moreover, the
apparent neutrality of majority rule makes ‘the majority’ a possible source of identity
independent of the actual quantity of votes—one can, after all, say some votes are
illegitimate or take oneself to be in a majority before a vote is ever cast.
‘The majority’ has been a feature of both Republican and Democratic identities
over the last two elections, one which saw Trump successfully elected and another
defeated. After Trump was elected, Democrats were quick to point out that Trump lost
the popular vote while Trump declared he won it once you remove the voter fraud.
Republicans were happy to show a color-coded graphic of which states and districts
voted for which representative, clearly showing Trump had painted the country
Republican red; Democrats were quick to return with a different map with colored
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As a reference to a discussion in the last chapter, this is the concern that Kenneth
Roberts takes up. His solution to this problem is to think of liberal mechanisms as having
‘competitive equilibrium’ for an end. While voting mechanisms might only be legitimate
if they maintain competitive equilibrium would avoid the problem of enabling populism
in this way (changing the rules for counting votes), they are still unstable in the ways
discussed in the first chapter. That is, the people under the voting laws might see them as
alien or alienating and seek to change them. At this point, liberalism might conceptually
preclude populism, but practically it would encourage it.
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circles, whose size depicted the quantity of voters in the region, etc. 185 Interestingly,
identifying with the majority can take place both for the winners and losers of an election.
The procedure itself does not seem to impact how people identify.
Politicians and partisan commentators are not the only ones drawing on a vague
notion of a majority identity; it operates in academic discourses as well. For instance,
Nancy MacLean, a progressive-liberal historian, thinks of the (far) Right as creating a
kind of false voting majority through sinister campaign and misinformation campaigns,
while the real majority of people would never vote for far-Right candidates. 186 While it is
true that the (far) Right is willing to use propaganda, alternate facts, image-making, etc.
to get voters, that is the name of the proverbial game in a competition where only
numbers matter. Mueller’s insistence on mere quantity (and he is joined by various liberal
thinkers)—rather than any qualitative commitment to some substantive principle, e.g.,
some interpretation of ‘freedom,’ ‘truth,’ ‘equality,’—does not and cannot preclude the
use of propaganda. The strategy for getting votes is immaterial when quantity is the
ultimate arbiter of democratic procedure. 187
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That whole discourse on either side was entirely irrelevant, given that our presidential
elections proceed by way of an electoral college. As they say, it is a feature of our federal
system, not a bug, that states vote and not a mass of individuals called ‘the nation.’ What
this discourse did show was the extent to which the principle of majority rule can be used
to justify and critique any given mechanism of decision-making.
186
Nancy MacLean, Democracy in Chains: The Deep History of the Radical Right’s
Stealth Plan for America, (New York: Penguin Books 2017) On p. xvii, she claims that
“the single most powerful and least understood threat to democracy today: the attempt by
the billionaire-backed radical right to undo democratic governance.” In general, MacLean
often seems to express her appraisal of the Right’s manipulations and threat to the
American majority through the words and opinions of others on the Right, for instance,
on p. 176 and 208-9.
187
Of course, a liberal thinker could reject majority rule as a proper procedure, but as
with Rawls, it becomes questionable in what sense such a liberalism is democratic. It is
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To some extent, party politics is descriptively organized purely around getting
votes, and various political alignments have used propaganda, or less maliciously ‘spin,’
to further their ends. Contrary to the focus of Nancy MacLean, the far-Right, the Koch
brothers, etc., are not alone in the game. One could argue that Democrats and the Left are
not as bad as the Right, but, like the Koch bothers, they certainly have big money donors
trying to influence elections, e.g., Soros, 188 and their political candidates are perfectly
willing to engage in image-making with exaggerated or misleading stakes, e.g., Corey
Booker calling himself Spartacus during the Kavanaugh hearings. Ergo, Mueller is wrong
to paint populists and liberals as stark opposites where the former believes in a
mysterious, indeterminate majority and the latter believe in a merely quantitative
majority. Populist strategies are compatible with the formal requirements of liberalism,
even with anti-liberal rhetoric, as long as populists win elections. Any ideal, no matter
how exclusive, no matter how illiberal, could be implemented as public policy as a result
of majority rule. That is the price for a neutral, formal mechanism of decision where only
quantity matters.

hard to assume that elections are a good means for achieving liberal ideals when we
could simply adopt a liberal technocracy—a condition that has arguably become actual in
many countries in recent decades.
188
Note that Soros and the Koch brothers are essentially mirror images of an
authoritarian boogeyman for each side. Their reputations have less to do with their
political ideals and much more to do with the fantasy of sinister individuals ‘pulling all
the strings,’ which is to say, operating the levers of the government mechanism for their
own ends. When one is guided by the metaphors of mechanism and the interest-driven
individual, this is the kind of political hermeneutics one gets when one tries to understand
support for the ‘other’ side. It is all just a competition, and nothing motivates a winning
effort like the demonization of a competitor, supposing that one always has recourse to
saying that only a minority, or better, a single figure, is demonic. One might always have
to vote with members of that other group in the next election; they were just duped in this
election. Thus, you see repeatedly a focus on leader, on the representative, and not the
represented.
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The most immediate implication of this discussion of the majority’s instability is
that ‘majority rule’ should not be understood as a bedrock procedure or fundamental
commitment of a healthy democracy. It is necessarily vague and in need of other features
of communal life to stabilize it. In the democratic tradition, a notion of constituent
power—associated with ‘the people’—has done that work of stabilization.

4.2

Democracy and Homogeneity
In the last section, we reviewed notions of ‘the individual’ and of ‘the majority’ to

clarify a notion of ‘the people,’ and thereby better understand who participates in public
power. A purely quantitative notion of ‘the majority’ is not stable enough to prevent or
conceptually preclude populism; thus, it is not a preferable alternative to populism. We
turn to a characterization of the people that Mueller rejects: a homogeneous collective. 189
Our point of departure here is the theorists of populism and not populists themselves,
given that the former are self-consciously drawing from a rich tradition and the latter are
often buffoons (albeit sometimes cunning ones).
4.2.1

Social Identification and Populism

The main defenders of a notion of populism, or at least a Leftist populism, are
Mouffe and Laclau. Both on their account as well as in the analyses of liberal critics of
populism, Carl Schmitt features into a democratic tradition that informs populism. By
looking at their work, we will see a notion of the collective emerge that seems to
necessitate a kind of homogeneity of the people. While I am ultimately sympathetic to
some of the concerns that we will see here, I will show an ambiguity in the sense of
189

We only be working with the populist alternative of the people broadly speaking; we
won’t be working through his exact characterization of the populist ‘people.’
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homogeneous identity that they use—a social sense that describes a characteristic found
in many individuals and a political sense that describes a kind of shared project. The
former sense, at least, is built on and reinforces the socio-economic concept of the
individual with self-interest discussed earlier. The latter sense will be examined in the
next chapter.
The most recent defense of thinking of the people as a homogeneous collective
has been given by Mouffe and Laclau, who endorse a Left-populism while critiquing
liberalism and Right-populism. 190 Mouffe and Laclau argue that while all politics may
involve exclusions and dominance, a collective whose identity is constructed on broad
grounds may re-open closed visions of a people and allow more people to gain
recognition in the public sphere than under liberalism and allow for a resistance against
authorities whose centrism tends to co-opt or neutralize such opposition. For Laclau, the
new open identity is a collective whole, but one without multiple parts; rather a single
part stands in for the whole. 191 The part that stands in for the whole—and like Mouffe, he
understands the parts in terms of “demands” 192—is not simply a single thing to be
attained, but rather gains strength from the other demands not directly represented by that
part. 193 An example would be the yellow vests in France, wherein the demand for change
in laws about gas prices stood for a larger dissatisfaction with the economic policies of
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For instance, see Chantal Mouffe, For a Left Populism, (New York: Verso 2018) 5.
Henceforth, “Left.”
191
OPR 111.
192
OPR 74
193
OPR 96-7. Laclau likens this logic of the empty signifier—the part inflated to
represent the whole—with the process of condensation in Freud.
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the French government. 194 For Mouffe, this approach breaks with ‘politics’ as
technocracy, in which professional politicians solve economic problems and voters have
the opportunity merely to approve of those solutions. Instead, she takes politics to consist
of an agonistic debate, and she hopes for a left-oriented construction of the people, set
against the oligarchic xenophobia of right-oriented populisms. 195
Interestingly, her notion of agonistic debate, set against centrist (and neoliberal)
consensus, sets the internal/external groups apart from the limits of democracy, since the
Left and Right can appear in any particular state. Thus, her grouping seems more
indebted to a Marxist tradition that focuses on the bourgeoisie/proletariat grouping rather
than one people distinguished from others. Further, she sets the ideas of democracy and
inclusion as definitive of one group—hers—and distinguishes the other group, the other
populism, in terms of its xenophobia and oligarchical character. While I want to retain
her critique of politics as technocracy, she paints her own populism in the same way that
Right-wing populists paint theirs—in terms of the forces of good trying to conquer the
forces of evil and corruption. 196 If we are worried about the persecution or violence
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Note that within ‘populist’ movements of this type, there are at least some political
actors who think the movement should avoid any kind of representation or organized
leadership at all. This indicates that it exemplifies the kind of political identification that
we will discuss in Schmitt shortly. Thus, while the yellow vests may not be full-fledged
populists because they eschew representative leadership, they still seem to be drawing
from the same democratic logic that will extend back to Rousseau.
195
Left 6. Note that Mouffe slips into the language of construction, as though the Left
exists, and its best strategy for electoral success to create a kind of identity and use that to
win at the polls. Her language gives away her orientation in terms of control and
exclusion. This is the same language—and indeed, the same concept—given in Laclau,
who explicitly calls populism a strategy.
196
Laclau tends not to slip into this dynamic as much. His contrast between populism and
pragmatic liberalism, at least, speaks only about two styles of politics, neither of which
can fully or permanently displace the other.
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against out-groups, we should hesitate when we see narratives that set one group at its
best against another group at its worst. I am wary of starting with such a stance, as it risks
becoming more like propaganda than philosophy. 197To be sure, we can disagree with
other groups, and even think that their policies or principles are ‘bad,’ but I am
cautioning against painting the group itself as evil. 198
Neither populists nor Mouffe invented thinking of groupings in moralized terms.
In fact, some amount of moralization might be necessary for people to conceive of
themselves as members of a group. It will pay, then, to examine the source of group
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Mouffe acknowledges the polemical character of work on Left 9. She could be painted
as a propagandist because the notion of constructing identities—rather than letting them
develop organically—is a tactic taken by professional politicians for the sake of winning
elections. For all the positive work Mouffe does on Schmitt, she remains oriented within
a liberalistic framework. She is interested in what it takes to win elections, to answer
‘demands’ which is her (and Laclau’s) surrogate for interest (the difference is that she
takes the latter to be anchored in static social categories, and she refuses to rank
demands), and in her idea of a frontier set between Right- and Left- populisms, it is clear
that she is thinking in terms of the sovereignty of competition. It seems to me that liberal
centrism of the Rawlsian variety has an advantage of Mouffe on this point. At least for
internal politics, such centrism, by expecting consensus, sets a place for each part or
group to belong (however one might envision those groups being articulated). Moreover,
that kind of liberalism, while it gives a place to a variety of demands, seems willing to
work on ranking them so that they can be satisfied—the Mouffe/Laclau strategy of
allowing demands to form into a formless group demand makes it harder to do any work
on them; it is only useful for building discontent so that people will vote for whoever is
not in office. For my own part, I think politics is not just about pursuing interests or
satisfying demands; it essentially includes the creation of new realities and ways of living
together. Politics is not anti-establishment for the sake of being anti-establishment,
although it is essentially open to reconfiguring who inhabits constituted offices.
Moreover, politics does not start with an idea of shared consensus, in which the work of
politics is just allocating goods that constituted the lowest common denominator of what
people want. It is on the basis of this conception of the political that I see the
unsatisfactory nature of both Left-populism and liberalism.
198
I am drawing here not only from Nietzsche’s distinction between good/bad and
good/evil binaries, but also Hannah Arendt’s use of “absolutes.” For a good discussion of
the latter, see Richard J. Bernstein, “Are Arendt’s Reflections on Evil Still Relevant?”
The Review of Politics, Vol. 70, No. 1, Special Issue on Comparative Political Theory
(Winter 2008).
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concepts that influenced Mouffe and Laclau: Sigmund Freud. As we have seen, populists
insist on a single leader and proclaim themselves the bearer of the general will for a
people whose identity is self-evident. In Freud’s terms, this group formation is appealing
insofar as the followers in a group elevate the leader to a kind of father figure qua ego
ideal. 199 Freud writes that for the group, the leader expresses both a kind of unrestrained
libidinal freedom, taking whatever it is that the group wants, as well as some of the
common characteristics of the group members. 200 The ego ideal and the identity of the
group 201 in general is, for Freud, the key to constituting any kind of group, that is,
binding them in a kind of love and affection that allows them to work together as well as
make personal sacrifices for each other.
For Freud, the binding of individuals into a group involves a kind of conditional
love; the bonds of the group will be extended only to those members who are equally
‘inside’ the group (and equally loved by the father). The aggression that might otherwise
go toward members of the group gets diverted to out-groups, which Freud covers
describes in detail in Civilization and Its Discontents. 202 He writes, “It is always possible
to bind together a considerable number of people in love, so long as there are other
people left over to receive the manifestations of their aggressiveness.” 203 In other words,
at long as there can be an external ‘out group,’ which can be the explicit recipient of
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Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company 1989) 60-1. Henceforth, “GP.” Note that the identification with the
leader also involves a shared love object that helps constitute the ego ideal.
200
GP 79. See also OPR 56-7.
201
GP 21.
202
Thus, humanity could never constitute a psychological group, and even the doctrine of
Christian universal love excluded heathens and heretics.
203
Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, (New York: W. W. Norton &
Company 1988) 72.
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aggression, then libidinally binding people together in an ‘in group,’ is not so difficult or
unnatural. This is even easier if the out-group is nearby or easily identifiable; Freud calls
this phenomenon the ‘narcissism of small differences,’ which helps to explain intense
sports rivalries between neighboring towns. What is unnatural or difficult is a demand or
commandment to love the entire human race as oneself without having an out-group at
all.
Interestingly, Freud’s analysis not only extends to the phenomenon of populism,
but it also strongly parallels Hobbes’s analysis of the commonwealth in some respects.
Both Freud and Hobbes take a group (at least simple ones) to exist by virtue of a
representative leader. 204 They also both offer accounts of how a group arises to stand in
contradistinction to other groups—for Hobbes, for the sake of survival and stability, for
Freud, for the sake of the shared love object and ego ideal. Further, Freud’s account
involves questions about the suggestibility of group members that might help explain
how individuals can be ‘duped’ by propaganda, ideologs, and alternate facts, but those
kinds of psychological details need not concern us here.
I introduced Freud’s social psychology not only to review the roots of Mouffe’s
and Laclau’s brand of populism, but to establish a particular concept of identification in
which people view other group members as essentially homogeneous, i.e., alike one
another and engaged in a kind of collective project of whatever sort. We should note that
this is true of psychological groupings in general: it is not peculiar to populism or even
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We should note that Freud thinks that an idea, rather than a person, can take the place
of a leader in some sophisticated groups. But even in his analysis of the Christian
church—a long-lasting and stable group—the ideals of the community still have a human
face, viz. Christ. It is an open question whether any idea can sustain a prolonged group
without such a face.
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democracy. I will call this ‘social identification,’ or ‘social homogeneity.’ Let us
provisionally assume that there can be no socio-political order that does not involve
organizing people along the lines of similarity. 205 Even if we grant that all people engage
in social identification, it is not clear that democracy, even ‘radical democracy’ as an
ideal expressive of equality and freedom, consists only of social identification. This
equation between social similarity and democracy seems to be made by Mouffe and
Laclau, who prefer that the content of the democratic identity be broader than the
national/ethnic identities of Right-populism. If we want to understand how social
homogeneity could be equated with democracy, the arguments are the most explicit in
Carl Schmitt’s work.
4.2.2

Political Identification and Democracy

For Schmitt, the establishment of borders and securing internal homogeneity are
crucial for democracy. 206 Let us address Schmitt’s contentious passage about democracy
and homogeneity from The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy:
Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals
equal but unequals will not be treated equally. Democracy requires,
therefore, first homogeneity and second—if the need arises—elimination
or eradication of heterogeneity. . . . A democracy demonstrates its political
power by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something foreign and
unequal that threatens its homogeneity. 207
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I will be returning to this idea in chapter 4, but not for the sake of examining groups
competing for control, but rather for the sake of understanding the growth and
development of individuals when we orient ourselves with the metaphor of organic unity.
206
Zakin connects Freud’s work on borders and defense with Freud’s work on the ego.
On this reading, the institution of boundaries is a necessary function of the life of the
subject, whether collective or individual. See Emily Zakin, “The Image of the People,”
Telos, 157 (2011) 84-5.
207
Carl Schmitt, Crisis 9.
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On the one hand, I take Schmitt to be making a relatively simple point that every
democratic state is particular—there is no democracy of mankind—and to remain
independent, each state requires the loyalties of its citizens. 208 Through their allegiance,
citizens will be supported and protected by a military and an administration, and more
importantly, they will have a public space in which they can participate in the popular
sovereignty of that state, vote for their representatives, etc. On the other hand, he is
making a claim about how democracies can only perpetuate their existence by
maintaining—or at least striving for—an internal homogeneity in which group members
have some, similar characteristic.
Democratic homogeneity is not just a matter of being alike in an abstract or
formal sense; the common characteristic or feature of a people must be substantive,
which means that feature picks out some people and not others. Schmitt writes that there
are many possible such bases, such as religion, civic virtues, or moral characteristics, but
the predominant basis of democratic equality is membership in a nation. 209 Thus, for
Schmitt, democratic homogeneity not only indicates who one’s friends are, but also, who
one’s enemies are. For Schmitt, ‘the enemy’ is not ‘the foe;’ it is not a demon that must
be eliminated at all costs. 210 Moreover, the enemy is not an entity that one must be at war
with. 211 The defining feature of the enemy is that (lethal and legitimate) conflict is
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This point extends to all political communities, but it is especially important for
democracies since they are built on the principle of identification.
209
Crisis 9. National homogeneity holds no special place for Schmitt beyond its factual
prevalence.
210
Concept 36.
211
Concept 27, 33-4. Note that on p. 27, Schmitt indicates that the enemy can, but need
not, appear as an economic competitor. In the realm of politics, economic (or moral or
aesthetic, etc.) categories can be drawn upon to intensify friend-enemy groupings, but
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possible. 212 Moreover, (lethal) aggression with the enemy is legitimate and necessary
when the enemy threatens one’s mode of existence. 213
Some amount of internal homogeneity is necessary for any political unity; it takes
on a special significance in democracies because of the way that democracies engage in
political activity. Schmitt explains the notion of political identity in greater detail in
Constitutional Theory, a work in which he examines “constitution-making power” (i.e.,
constituent power), whose ‘value’ lies not in abiding by preset laws or procedures, but
rather simply in existence. 214 Or in other words, an entity that determines its mode of
existence, i.e., a people, has a right to preserve itself, to maintain its own existence; and
this right is not governed by anything like procedural or distributive justice. If it can be
said that politics is normative for Schmitt (and he certainly does not celebrate the

that does not mean that politics reduces to other domains. Meanwhile, for Schmitt,
economics only recognizes competitors, it has no proper concept of an enemy. When
Benjamin Constant celebrates the possibility that war will be replaced with economic
competition and domination, he is wishing for the death of politics by the hand of
economics.
212
Friends, by contrast may have legitimate conflicts, such as competitions or
disagreements, but not that extend to killing one another. The most basic law of political
friendship it seems is to not kill one another. Of course, it is possible to violate this law,
but the killing will not be recognized as legitimate. See Concept 32 and 35.
213
Concept 27. In this passage and throughout Land and Sea, Carl Schmitt’s thought
expresses a kind of existentialism. Carl Schmitt, Land and Sea, Samuel Garrett Zeitlin
(trans.), (Candor, NY: Telos Press Publishing 2015) esp. 10, 47. Henceforth, “Land.” He
remarks that England made a decision in favor of the sea. What he means by this is that a
people—and not a group of beasts—determines its characteristic ways of maintaining and
reproducing itself, and at a point in history, the English people left behind sheep farming
and turned to whale-fish hunting, piracy, and naval battles.
214
CT 75.
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‘neutralization’ of politics), its basis would be ‘autonomy’—that freedom in which a self,
the auto, maintains its freedom in a given form, the nomos. 215
In a democracy, the constitution-making power of the people operates through its
identity. Schmitt writes, “[the unity of the people] can already be factually and directly
capable of political action by virtue of a strong and conscious similarity, as a result of
firm natural boundaries, or due to some other reason. In this case, a political unity is a
genuinely present entity in its unmediated self-identity.” 216 This description is an ideal for
identification, although Schmitt does not think that the ideal can ever be achieved in a
pure, unequivocal fashion. Even the democratic principle of identity will need to be
augmented with representation (i.e., some form of mediation by a person or smaller group
of people). “At no time or place is there thorough, absolute self-identity of the then
present people as political unity. Every attempt to realize a pure or direct democracy must
respect this boundary of democratic identity. Otherwise, direct democracy would mean
nothing other than the dissolution of the political unity.” 217 For Schmitt, the democratic
principle of identity is most closely approached in referendums, now sometimes
associated with populism, “If state citizens entitled to vote do not elect a deputy, but the
matter itself is instead decided through a referendum, a so-called genuine plebiscite, and
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Schmitt is not thinking of a constitution or constituent power in terms of a written
document, but rather in a characteristic mode of existence. Thus, if one is interested in
putting Arendt and Schmitt in dialog, they would be talking past each other when one
references Arendt’s On Revolution, in which she is interested more in the document, the
object, of constitution-making power. My sympathies lie with Schmitt on this point, since
Arendt’s notion of (authoritative) constitutions and laws as independent of human power
seems to fall victim to the same instabilities or crises that characterize the liberal
‘mechanisms’ of government. I will turn to a more substantive discussion of this issue
and democratic authority in the next chapter.
216
CT 239.
217
CT 241.
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the question presented is answered ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ the principle of identity is realized to the
fullest.” 218 Nevertheless, there still needs to be someone who forms and poses the
question to the people, ergo, representation plays a role even in the fullest expression of
identity. Thus, Mueller is at least partially right that the people never appears in noninstitutionalized fashion (which is to say, all apparent power is constituted, not
necessarily all power), since citizens who show up to vote for a candidate or on a
referendum are still operating within an institution. Regardless of the type or degree of
representation, I will call this kind of identity that predominates in democracy, in which
power is actively expressed by the people (not just represented), political identification
(or political homogeneity), as it characterizes the ruling element of a political community.
For us, at least, it should still be an open question whether political identification is the
same as social identification.
If we press further into the notion of political identification, we are quickly
confronted with an ambiguity about how a political, democratic identity relates to partial,
social identities. At times, Schmitt seems to indicate that the political identity relativizes
other identities, indicating that citizens may have partial identities, but they aren’t as
strong or decisive as their political membership. 219 At other times, Schmitt seems to take
partial identities—factions—to be a threat to the political unity when they become
intensified. 220 Finally, at times, Schmitt seems to indicate that the existence of social
identities (aka private interests) led inevitably to the dissolution of political unity,
indicating that political homogeneity and social differentiation are intrinsically
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For instance, in CT 211.
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Concept 30-2
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opposed. 221 The passage here about the leviathan as a symbol of political unity is worth
reviewing given our interest in populism and metaphor:
In this fashion, party pluralism has perpetrated the destruction of the state
by using methods inherent in the liberal law state. The leviathan, in the
sense of a myth of the state as the ‘huge machine,’ collapsed when a
distinction was drawn between the state and individual freedom. That
happened when the organizations of individual freedom were used like
knives by anti-individualistic forces to cut up the leviathan and divide his
flesh among themselves. Thus did the mortal god die for a second time. 222
Schmitt blames the liberal ideal of the interested individual, insulated from sovereign
power with rights, for the destruction of the state not because human persons are a threat
to government, but because that notion of the infinite importance of the individual can be
used and manipulated by social groups to destroy the public sphere and the institutions
that express collective power. 223
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Carl Schmitt, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes: Meaning and
Failure of a Political Symbol, George Schwab and Erna Hilfstein (trans.), (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press 2008) 56. Henceforth, “LSTTH.” In the passage, which I will
not quote here, Schmitt reviews Hobbes’s interpretation on kings performing miracles
and a distinction he makes between public and private belief. The very distinction
between the two already leads, Schmitt thinks, to the primacy of the private over the
public, given the infinite importance of one’s own salvation.
222
LSTTH 74.
223
Compare with CT 202-4, in which Schmitt describes the Rechtsstaat as instituting a
legal order focusing on rights for the individual, which is in principle unlimited, and the
state, which is in principle limited. This order decays when those individual negative
freedoms become supplanted with the power to form associations and collaborate with
others in groups, which stand opposed to other groups. Which is to say, the freedom to
association is essentially what is destructive in liberalism, because it leads to a kind of
factionalism that tears the state apart. In chapter 3, I will disagree with Schmitt on this
point, and while I think the freedom of association is a threat, I think it is a necessary one.
Ultimately, I agree with James Madison that the threat of factionalism is can be
mitigated, not prevented, although I am somewhat more pessimistic about the long-term
prospects for success on that front.
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4.2.3

Identity, Unity, and Sovereignty

Against the social groups and private interests that threaten the state, Schmitt is
interested in preserving—or recognizing the necessity—of a concept of sovereignty.
Schmitt defines the sovereign as “he who decides on the exception.” 224 By this concept,
he does not have in mind a mere abstraction or a mysterious power, substance, or identity
that Mueller (among others) attributes to constituent power and ‘the people.’ The
problem of sovereignty is concrete. He writes,
What is argued about is the concrete application, and that means who
decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or
interest of the state, public safety and order, le salut public, and so on. The
exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be
characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the
state, or the like. 225
Schmitt’s idea, stemming from the right of an autonomous being to exist and maintain
that existence, is that while norms are ‘good,’ they do not make, interpret, enforce, or
protect themselves. Laws need a ‘who’ to do that work, to ‘live the law,’ as it were, and
the sovereign authority to do this work is not itself governed by any higher legal norm or
procedure. To say that sovereignty is subject to some kind of norm or procedure would be
to transform autonomy to heteronomy. Moreover, any community built solely on the
words of justice without the swords to defend it is not long for this world (to recapitulate
the Hobbesian terms). 226
Schmitt, like other commentators, associates the particular ‘who’ of the sovereign
with constituent power. For the most part, constituent power functions invisibly and in
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PT 5.
PT 6.
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Arendt notes the tendency of the power of the many to abolish the authority of laws in
OR 142.
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accordance with norms, i.e., it does not appear in a form distinct from the institutions and
laws it constituted. Schmitt’s argument about the exception points out that sovereignty
becomes visibly expressed by a particular representative in moments of crisis. We might
have an idea that ‘the people’ is the constituent power of our democracy, and in moments
of crisis, the president expresses the will of the people in a sovereign decision to resolve
the crisis. We have already seen his comments about a form of existence being under
threat—and thereby a political unity has the right to fight some out-group (whether
another political unity or not)—but a couple brief examples bear mentioning. First, in
Dictatorship, Schmitt introduces the idea of a state of siege as a kind of model or starting
point for understanding the state of exception. 227 There, he claims that there are moments
when an existential danger is present, in the form of an invading army laying siege to
one’s territory, and we need a concrete person or power to be able to respond to that
danger quickly, and the responding power has the authority of command over members
of the group. 228 Second, Schmitt is concerned throughout his oeuvre with the condition of
political deadlock and factionalism. When parties are fighting over control of the
government apparatus, the crisis is not just a matter of mechanisms being eroded or the
imbalancing of a large machine; it is an existential crisis where the existence of the
people is at stake. Sovereignty, in its concrete expression, would be able to suspend,
limit, or eliminate the factions whose fight threatens the unity of the state. In this kind of
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Carl Schmitt, Dictatorship, Michael Hoelzl & Graham Ward (trans.), (Cambridge;
Polity Pres 2014) 151.
228
His concept of dictatorship can be either commissarial, in which case the sovereign
assigns someone the power to suspend legal norms usually for a limited period of time
for a specific purpose, or the sovereign itself can act as a dictator, which Schmitt seems to
view with some distrust.
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crisis, sovereignty appears to be opposed to social groupings, entitled to expel or
eliminate them; and it is the same kind of justification populists use in their campaigns
against an elite.
Insofar as sovereignty is an issue of who concretely decides on the exception and
is responsible for preserving the existence of the people, it is an issue of control. That is,
sovereignty is a matter of who is in a position of who can give the commands to achieve a
pre-given end (in the most appealing circumstances, the end of self-preservation). 229 The
problem with factionalism is that partial interests and groups are attempting to fight for
control over the whole, not for the sake of preserving it, but for their own ends. As the
democratic whole fractures and dissolves, each social group, the party, become new
political unities competing for the control of the shared resources of all parties. The ideal
of competitive democracy is of control, not autonomy. One need not over-indulge in
cynicism to see that domestic politics in the U.S. tend toward this logic, in which
Democrats and Republicans insist on their own identities against each other more than
any shared citizenship, shared projects, or cooperative ideal. 230
If we assume that ‘the people’ is the constituent power of a democracy, then it
expresses its sovereignty in exerting control in a particular situation, reliably producing a
pre-given end. The notion of a predictable end to be achieved mirrors our discussion of
mechanistic ends set for constituted power in the first chapter, and this discussion
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Self-preservation being the genuine basis of both Hobbes’s leviathan and Schmitt’s
dictatorship.
230
In the months following November 2016, Democratic spokespeople insisted that the
important project for their constituencies would be to insist on their usual platform
agenda such as passing gun control, i.e., Democratic voters should stick ever more
thoroughly to their Democratic identity.
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suggests that constituted power is an instrument of producing the ‘goods’ that constituent
power recognizes as desirable ends. One can easily make the inference that a people can
more powerfully achieve its ends, pursue its interests, i.e., realize its freedom, the more
purely it can maintain its identity, since heterogeneity is liable to give rise to faction.
While many critics of populism who draw on Schmitt (e.g., Mueller and Abts and
Rummens) associate him with a kind of nationalism, my reading of Schmitt understands
his notion of sovereignty as ambiguously rooted in a notion of autonomy, sometimes
tending toward a notion of control and ‘the nation.’ Nevertheless, there seems to me
something worth preserving in a notion of democratic identity and the institution of
borders, if only for the sake of limiting who can participate in a given set of constituted
powers. It seems to me politically suicidal to say that anyone can participate in the U.S.
presidential (or any other) elections; just imagine if Putin was allowed to advertise for a
candidate of his choice or even to vote. If a democracy is to exist, it must have borders of
some sort, hopefully, ones not established on the basis of xenophobia and racism.
To be sure, the practice of maintaining political borders often goes awry and leads
to injustice and cruelty. I take it that detention centers at the border and dehumanizing
treatment of (both legal and illegal) immigrants presents a genuine crisis. The crisis,
though, has multiple dimensions, only one of which tends to be recognized. There is a
human crisis that every Left-leaning critic grasps easily, namely, that human beings are
being treated in a cruel, dehumanizing fashion; no human should be treated in such a
way. But there is a political crisis, too. Detained immigrants are well on their way to
becoming superfluous in the same meaning as those minority populations created under
the expanding nation-state principle. Their superfluousness is not an economic issue; it
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does not reduce to a matter of some individuals not being free to change their location or
pursue a better socio-economic life. To be superfluous entails means to have no one to
whom your opinions are significant, to have no place to belong, and to be met without
care or respect—although a superfluous person might still be met with a cold, procedural
politeness. It is a political, not an economic phenomenon.
Our question is about ‘who’ participates in sovereignty, and our analysis of
constituent power in a democratic context has led us to a notion of ‘identification’ which
seems to slip between sociological and political elements (the former being a matter of
similarity between individuals, the latter being a matter of actively doing something in a
concrete context). To better understand this slippage, I turn our attention to the
democratic tradition and Rousseau.

4.3

The Problem with Homogeneous Identity
Infamously, populist leaders constantly invoke the rhetoric of ‘the people,’ and

they claim that by electing the singular leader of the populist movement, the people will
have reclaimed its sovereignty from government elites and private interests. Critics of
populism have remained unpersuaded and have noted that ‘popular sovereignty’ for
populists usually equates to the seizure of democratic institutions by a small portion of
the population and an erosion of de-centralized governing mechanisms. 231 In this
subsection, I will address how the populist seizure of public power reflects wider thinking
about the constituency of populist leaders.
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Abts and Rummens, Roberts, Urbinati, Werner-Mueller, etc.
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I will start with a brief review of the general features that scholars identify in
populism. First, populism characterizes itself as a movement of ‘the people’ against an
elite whose positions in power have allowed them to pursue their own narrow interests at
the expense of common folk. 232 One can see this feature exemplified in calls to ‘drain the
swamp,’ by Trump. Antagonism toward an established elite gets specified in surprisingly
different ways, which has left scholars struggling to explain how a single list of features
could cover so many phenomena. Abts and Rummens, for instance, handle the generic
nature of populist antagonism by insisting that populism is a ‘thin-ideology’ that can be
coupled with radically different normative frameworks. In Left-populism, the elite is
often simply the wealthy, and the people is the set of all disenfranchised or marginalized
groups. 233 In Right-populism, the elite are both parasitical in themselves and also work
for the interest of foreigners, globalization, etc. 234 Liberal critics of populism like Abts
and Rummens and Werner-Mueller tend to care less about this distinction. They worry
more about groups struggling for political power while decreasing institutional mediation
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This characterization of populism is even true for Jacques Ranciere, who takes a
somewhat deflationary view of populism. He takes it that the real exclusion and racism
associated with Right-leaning populism takes place through subtle workplace
discrimination and state policy. The implication of his article seems to be that worry
about racism endemic to populism is taking the easy route, and we ought to be more
concerned with the everyday doing of racism and not simply the rhetoric of it. Jacques
Ranciere, “The Populism that Is Not to Be Found,” from What Is a People? (New York:
Columbia University Press 2016) 102-3.
233
This is at least true for Mouffe and Laclau who want to set all ‘demands’ for freedom
and equality (from feminism, critical race studies, etc.) alongside economic demands.
234
Trump is a good example of Right-wing populism. “Sleepy Joe Biden” is not only a
self-serving liberal, a condescending, ‘elite,’ but is also a globalist who will not put
American interests first. Moreover, Biden is seeking to help BLM terrorists take over the
country, to aid critical race theory taking over the state department, etc. Or in other
words, populists overdetermine the extent to which their electoral opponents are
‘outsiders.’ They are too partial but too global, too self-serving but too helpful to people
who do not deserve help.
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for such struggles. Whether the group is Left or Right is immaterial. Meanwhile, Leftist
critics of liberalism take the distinction more seriously, since they want to part both with
liberalism as well as Right-wing populism. For my own part, I take it that all these
positions—liberal, Left-populism, and Right-populism—share the same basic concepts
but in different while nevertheless unsatisfactory configurations. I will revisit this point at
the end of the chapter.
The second characteristic of populism is an attempt to restore popular
sovereignty, which on Abts and Rummens’s reading, means that populists think that
legitimate politics is
based on the immediate expression of the general will of the people. . .
Populist democracies can be understood as an attempt to achieve an
immediate identity of governed and governing. The immediate expression
of the will of the people consists in the people pursuing its interests,
whatever those interests may be. Even when populist leaders do not set up
referendums or plebiscites, they can still claim to restore popular
sovereignty insofar as populists claim to present and proclaim, not to
represent, the essentialist will of the people. 235
We see here a notion of mass-mobilization of the people, but also of the singularity of
leadership—one leader stands in for the people and one leader fights for said people.
Finally, populism takes the people to be a homogeneous unity. Abts and
Rummens write, “The people are united and indivisible, fully formed, self-aware and
identifiable by the majority of numbers.” 236 This transparency allows the closure of the
question of the identity of the people; it is taken to be clear who a member of the people
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“PvD” 408. I think Abts and Rummens oversimplify this point insofar as populists at
least make a claim to fostering popular sovereignty and abide by the results of elections,
even if they attack some of the institutions that make the exercise of public freedom
possible. The ‘presentation’ v ‘representation’ issue will be clarified in our discussion of
Schmitt in section 2.
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“PvD” 408.
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is and who is not. The wording of this feature of populism is somewhat varied and
includes a describing the populist people as ‘homogeneous,’ ‘anti-pluralist,’ or
‘exclusionary.’ 237 Taking the identity of the people to be self-evident and closed, is the
most important feature of populism since it demonstrates populism’s antagonism toward
plurality. Further, it is this simple, evident picture of the people that animates populism; it
is an essential part of why people become populist supporters, and my analysis later in
the chapter will contribute to understanding this drive and its potency. As Claude Lefort
points out, such a closure is partly constitutive of the logic of totalitarianism, as it
expresses who the true humans are and who the subhuman parasites to be exterminated
are.
Having reviewed the general features of populism, I will now focus on its antipluralist character. Populism is not alone in conceiving a political community in antipluralist terms, and some clarification is in order to distinguish a positive notion of the
people in need of interpretation from anti-pluralist, already ‘interpreted’ notions of the
people. I will call ‘the people’ the collective entity associated with democracy that must be
interpreted and whose meanings are varied, which I will retain as a positive phenomenon.
I will call the more determinate pictures of a people as deployed in populism, fascism, etc.,
‘the nation.’ 238 I will draw on and extend Arendt’s usage of the term, since the nation—as
an already interpreted collective—has a closure of its identity, most often in terms of a
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For instance, see Mueller WIP 3, where he calls populism ‘anti-pluralist.’
Populism, fascism, and nationalism are distinguished by way of other features, but
they nevertheless share a kind of family resemblance, and interpreting the political
community as a nation is one of their more conspicuous shared features.
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connectedness to a given territory. She addresses the term in several places, but perhaps
most clearly in her description of the nation-state:
The European Nation-state, which has received the inheritance of
absolutism, rests on the trinity of the people, territory, and the state. First
among its requirements, which are by no means self-evident, is a historically
pre-existing territory associated with a particular people. . . . The second
fundamental requirement for a Western nation-state—which is to say,
primarily and perhaps even exclusively, a nation-state in the French mold—
is that only members of the same people live on the national territory, and
that ideally all members of this nation live on this territory. 239
That connection to the territory is what is responsible for constituting the people as a
nation, or in other words, a nation is unified by virtue of its ‘natural’ connection to the
land and not by virtue of something the community freely performs. 240 While Arendt uses
‘the nation’ in a narrow sense of a people determined by its connection to a given
territory, I extend the use of the term to cover any kind of social or factical
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Hannah Arendt, “Nation State and Democracy,” from Hannah Arendt, Thinking
without a Banister: Essays in Understanding, (New York: Schocken Books 2018) 256.
Henceforth, “‘N-S.’” Arendt is engaging the notion of ‘nation,’ as a problem of
modernity and as a pre-condition for totalitarianism. The absolutist character of the
nation lies in its triumph over the state and its aspiration of control over the laws in the
name of sovereignty. We will return to that notion of control and the collective in the last
section.
240
Arendt clarifies the point further: “I dare say that we are all united on the point that
people and nation are not identical, that there are many more peoples than nations, and
that we only speak of nations when a people has a public space that belongs to it in
common, in a territory that is theirs alone. In this sense, the nation is of course older than
the nation-state; nations existed even in the age of absolutism. The nation-state comes
into being when the nation takes possession of the state and the apparatus of
government.” “N-S” 257.
Abizadeh, more or less following Ernest Renan, observes that “national identity
constitutively depends upon a selective and even distorted memory of past events.” Arash
Abizadeh, “Historical Truth, National Myths and Liberal Democracy: On the Coherence
of Liberal Nationalism,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 3, (2004) 291.
Henceforth, “‘Myth.’” I don’t take the role of myth to be replacing that of territory; in
fact, I imagine shared narratives of the past and territory often intersect. The sake of
maintaining some measure of concision in this paper, I will merely flag the element of
myth in the nation-state here without further commentary above.
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determinacy. 241 Whatever the characteristic is, be it biological, territorial, ethnic, etc., it
will primarily lie outside of individual activity, i.e. it will belong to the group first and the
individual second, and that characteristic will be self-evident.
In sum, the populist conception of ‘the people’ as a nation is a threat to plurality,
and insofar as populism takes place at the level of elections, it represents a threat to
minorities being able to vote or to have their rights recognized. The greater worry lurking
behind critiques of populism—especially the eruptions of Right-wing populism in
Europe—is that populism might become radicalized and turn into totalitarianism in the
same way that fascism became radicalized in Nazi Germany. This transformation from
populism to totalitarianism is possible, or at least threatening, because totalitarianism was
clearly built on the assumptions of the nation-state system.
Hannah Arendt’s work offers an essential articulation of just this transformation,
and we can see the parallels between how fascist and Bolshevik ideologies crystalized in
totalitarian regimes and how populism might develop. The conception of the ‘nation’ and
its foundational role in organizing states was, in Arendt’s analysis, a necessary
precondition for totalitarianism and ultimately helped energize the transformation it made
possible. The idea of the nation-state was taken as an organization principle and held that
government should be controlled by and in the interest of the nation—taken as a distinct
group with some tie to a territory and often shared ethnic characteristics. In the wake of
WWI, states were created in nationally/ethnically diverse regions according to the nation-
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Abizadeh is interested in the notion of ‘myth’ but not as a positive constituent of a
nation, but rather as a kind of lie or delusion in need of critique. He also thinks that
ultimately, all kinds of nationalism, no matter the myth, collapses into an ethnic
nationalism in practice, which is to say, all nationalism is basically racism.
182

state principle, which previously had been limited to those states with a “homogeneity of
population and rootedness in the soil.” 242 The result was not that everyone endorsed a
shared bureaucracy or government, but rather, “the nationally frustrated population was
firmly convinced—as was everybody else—that true freedom, true emancipation, and
true popular sovereignty could be attained only with full national emancipation, that
people without their own national government were deprived of human rights.” 243 In
short, while some regions may have been suited for instituting a nation-state, setting up
‘democratic’ states in nationally/ethnically diverse regions drawing on the notion of
national sovereignty led to alienated minorities who could not meaningfully engage in
acts of sovereignty or power. With this shared presumption about nationality, denationalization and other such techniques of expulsion became a major weapon in the
arsenal of totalitarian governments. Before Nazi Germany could effectively deport, place
in concentration camps, or exterminate its Jewish citizens, it had to de-nationalize them
and legally designate them as an alien population. Genocidal de-humanization occurs
through a systematic process of stripping away communal belonging before terminating
in murder.
De-humanizing large groups of people was not the explicit goal of totalitarian
movements, rather, it was the means by which totalitarian regimes made their ideologies
reality, which in turn only received their initial plausibility from the existence of
superfluous people. The spread of the nation-state system was the first step in the creation
of superfluous persons—people who did not belong anywhere or to anyone, whose
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Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Harcourt Inc. 1994) 270.
Henceforth, “OT.”
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political opinions were utterly impotent, whose freedom and interests were simply
detritus to the administration of state apparatuses. Genocide could only appear as a
solution once masses of people had been made superfluous. At this point, we should
observe Arendt’s remarks on the change of meaning of the state during the rise of
totalitarianism. She writes,
They thereby admitted—and were quickly given the opportunity to prove
it practically with the rise of stateless people—that the transformation of
the state from an instrument of the law into an instrument of the nation had
been completed; the nation had conquered the state, national interest had
priority over law long before Hitler could pronounce ‘right is what is good
for the German people.’ 244
Arendt rightly points out that totalitarianism was quick to make a weapon of accelerating
the growth of superfluous people so that they could be a burden in need of being solved;
but totalitarianism was not so creative that it invented this tactic ex nihilo. Totalitarianism
took a problem from the nation-state system, the existence of minority groups within a
system of national sovereignty and made it the mass-manufactured fuel for its genocidal
project.
The perspective of the nation-state system took the view that it was the nation’s
right to wield the state; and the national interest defined ‘right,’ which justified its action
against superfluous persons. 245 Thus, at least implicitly, both nationalism and
totalitarianism have the notion of a nation as an individual thing with an interest and the
right to pursue that interest, which is a project that is all the more secured the more other

244

OT 275
The proto-totalitarian view becomes totalitarian when all persons, regardless of group
membership, become superfluous. Genuine totalitarianism requires an ideology with a
logic that transcends human action, such as a ‘necessary movement of history” for
Stalinist totalitarianism and ‘race struggle’ for the Nazi variant.
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groups or forces do not interfere. Populism seems to be swimming in the wake of that
conception of the nation, with the chilling parallel that Right-wing populism seems to
gain strength in states with immigration crises and the existence of precarious minorities.

4.4

The Democratic Tradition and the General Will
Earlier, I distinguished between social identification—by which people may form

into a group akin to a nation—and political identification. Political identification is a
principle contrasted with and complimentary of the principle of representation, but its
meaning was unclear. Often, for Schmitt, it seemed to devolve into social identification,
which would then lead to the same kind of anti-pluralism associated with populism. The
goal in this section is to gain a preliminary sense of how political identification might
work without degenerating into ‘a nation.’ I turn to passages in Rousseau to do this work,
with the caveat that Rousseau has some of the same ambiguities as Schmitt. Nevertheless,
I hope to show two features of political identification derived from Rousseau’s notion of
the general will. First, the general will only deals with general, reciprocal relations that
are in principle non-representable because they are active throughout the body politic.
Thus, for instance, a populist leader’s concrete decisions could not be representative of
the general will. Second, if people are excluded from a democracy’s political identity, it
is based on willing, of not sharing a general, free commitment to the community. Political
exclusion does not take place on the basis of any ‘natural’ or social determinacy.
With those two goals in mind, I redirect our attention to the notion of democratic
sovereignty and its tension with populism. Margaret Canovan rightly points to populism
as a kind of exploitation of the redemptive promise of the democracy, namely, the
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promise that we are in charge in of our own fates. 246 The democratic promise is, to put it
simply, the promise of popular sovereignty, set against the sovereignty of a monarch or a
technocratic class. While democracy does not make any individual a sovereign citizen, it
does promise that the political community, qua collective, can be politically autonomous.
The democratic promise, like the people itself, is ambiguous. On one reading, to be in
charge of one’s destiny is to have a kind of absolute control over it, as though it were
Lockean property that one could use, abuse, or alienate. This is populist interpretation.
But the redemptive promise might be a kind of taking responsibility or active engagement
with one’s destiny that is not tied to producing pre-given, concrete ends. Thus, we see the
same kind of ambiguity expressed in the notion of the people/nation, in the notion of
sovereignty as control or responsibility, and in the notion of sociological/political
homogeneity. It is with this set of two-fold possibilities in mind that we look at the most
famous articulation of democracy’s promise of redemption.
4.4.1

The Individual and the Collective

For many critics of populism drawing from the liberal tradition, Rousseau plays
the part of a thinker articulating democratic thought gone wrong, since he seems to
articulate a justification for the tyranny of the collective against individuals. Or in other
words, Rousseau seems to lionize a kind of holistic anti-pluralism. We will start, then,
with the most alarming passages in Rousseau. There is perhaps no passage more illiberal
than the one about the political community forcing the individual to be free. Rousseau
writes,
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Margaret Canovan in “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy,”
Political Studies, XLVII (1999) 11. Henceforth “TtP”.
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Hence for the social compact not to be an empty formula, it tacitly
includes the following engagement which alone can give force to the rest,
that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be constrained to do so
by the entire body: which means nothing other than that he shall be forced
to be free . . .” 247
It appears that Rousseau encourages an unrestricted despotism of the collective, to which
he grants the authority to erase all personal independence and individuality to the people
as a collective. Arendt reads him this way and makes the claim the general will/interest
distinguishes itself only by virtue of its opposition to private wills/interests. 248 Still, the
seemingly aporetic phrase, “forced to be free” is by no means self-evident, and thus I will
attempt to interpret it in the ‘positive’ interpretation. First, we will need some more
context, both in terms of the negative and positive trends in Rousseau.
For Rousseau, an individual within the body politic does not just give up a portion
of their labor time; the individual puts their entire person into the general will becoming a
part of a greater whole and losing their natural independence from others. Rousseau
writes, “Each of us puts his own person and his full power in common under the supreme
direction of the general will; and in a body we receive each member as an indivisible
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He continues, “. . . for this is the condition which, by giving each Citizen to the
Fatherland, guarantees him against all personal dependence; the condition which is the
device and makes for the operation of the political machine, and alone renders legitimate
civil engagements which would otherwise be absurd, tyrannical, and liable to the most
enormous abuses.” Jean Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, from Victor
Gourevitch (ed.), The Social Contract and Other Late Political Writings, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press 1997) 53. Henceforth “SC.” It should be clear from these
latter comments that something like a majority rule or competitive equilibrium would—
on Rousseau’s view—be an absurdity. To claim that one is free in the midst of a conflict
of wills, even a mediated one, is to champion a contradiction.
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OR 66. This notion of interests should not be confused with her brief discussion of
‘inter est’ in HC 182, which refers to the worldly reality in between agents and that
therefore binds them together.
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part of the whole.” 249 From this passage, however, we should not think that Rousseau
envisions the community as a hyper-conformist mass. For one thing, he thinks that a
general will is difficult to achieve since it lacks natural strength. He writes,
According to the natural order, on the contrary, the more concentrated
these different wills are, the more active they grow. Thus the general will
is always the weakest, the corporate will occupies the second place, and
the particular will the first place of all: so that in the Government each
member is first of all himself, and then Magistrate, and then citizen. A
gradation that is the direct opposite of that required by the social order. 250
As a will becomes more general, it loses its strength. Thus, Rousseau is neither
enshrining an already given political unity nor is he encouraging the construction of a
majority; he is writing to encourage the project of cultivating unity from disparate and
competitive wills. Moreover, he clearly thinks that social life is characterized by both
centripetal and centrifugal forces, and he does not think that the spirit of individualism
should be eliminated outright—although he takes spirit of his time to suffer from an
excess of individualism.
We should further note that the general will is not already given by nature with
determinate boundaries. It arises when individuals agree to act in concert to sustain a civil
life together rather than a natural life of independence. 251 Moreover, his theory precludes
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SC 50. He seems to offer the opposite position later and notes that not every aspect of
an individual person is governed by the general will. SC 63. He claims that sovereign
power cannot exceed the limits of general conventions, and that anything left to a person
from these conventions remains their own. Perhaps the two passages can be reconciled
insofar as the first is a matter of principle and the radical transformation that arises from
entering into civil society from a state of nature, while the latter is a matter of practice
and already assumes the primacy of the first passage.
250
SC 87-8, 57.
251
Schmitt thinks that the contractual aspect is superfluous in Rousseau, and that the real
insight of the democratic logic lies in the already-found identity of a homogeneous
people (in the sense of a nation if not in terms of nationality). See Crisis 13.
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thinking of the collective as an entity that stands above its parts, justified in eliminating
individuals for the sake of the whole. Rousseau writes,
As soon as this multitude is thus united in one body, one cannot injure one
of the members without attacking the body, and still less can one injure the
body without the members being affected. Thus duty and interest alike
obligate the contracting parties to help one another, and the same men
must strive to combine in this two-fold relation all the advantages
attendant on it. 252
The first key takeaway here is that membership in a political community is not just a
modification or additional property given to an individual. It is a full-blown
transformation that creates a new, more powerful entity, like a super-organism. 253 This
transformation is not one that each person experiences auto-biographically; it marks a
change in human existence that we all now inherit. It remains conceptually available to us
normatively insofar as we come to be educated to be considerate of and cooperative with
others, rather than to cling to our own private independence. The second is that the
collective only exists with its parts, and each part belongs to the whole and expresses the
general will.
4.4.2

The General Will

On the one hand, the general will can be neither alienated nor represented. 254
Thus we see Schmitt’s rendition of democratic identity as distinguished from
representation was accurate (although setting them as polar opposites was his own
innovation). This means that the general will exists insofar as people are engaged in the
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SC 52.
As I will detail in chapter 3, I equate this transformation that arises from collective
living together a transition from acting to achieve pre-given ends to acting to realize
provisional goals arising from shared principles.
254
SC 57.
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collective work of living together. On the other hand, the general will is also general in its
content, i.e., the general will is about what is general in the collective’s relationship to
itself. Rousseau writes, “Thus, just as a particular will cannot represent the general will,
so the general will changes in nature when it has a particular object, and it cannot, being
general, pronounce judgment on a particular man or fact.” 255 For Rousseau, the general
object here is the reciprocal submission of each individual to the same conditions and
institutions, i.e., the forging of equal bonds with each other. Rousseau takes it that the
general will is inoculated from being tyrannical, (a) because no one is subjecting others to
conditions that they are not subjecting themselves to, and (b) the focus on general,
reciprocal relations prevents specific parties from being targeted. From this point, we
now have a sense of how the general will, while it involves the whole person, is not
expressed in every action or decision. Particular acts still require particular wills, which is
why the body politic needs to commission magistrates and other government roles. For
our purposes, this means that the general will is not concerned with achieved through the
production of concrete ends, i.e., it does not seem to be a matter of control.
From the preceding characterization, it may be hard to identify exactly what may
count as the general will, and in fact, Rousseau might not be fully consistent. We know
that the general will is something that everyone ought to will, and people who stray from
doing it can only realize their freedom by participating in it. We also know it deals with
the collective itself, and each individual expresses the whole and belongs to the whole
without representing it. One example of the general will might be the participation of the
body of citizenry with the electoral college in the United States. The particular
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mechanism of the electoral system is not important, and qua a coordinating mechanism,
we the people could replace it with a different institution. There are two important
features, though, namely, (1) we will the electoral college; we perform it together even
when we disagree about who should be president. It is not a mechanism that exists or
operates independently of our willing it, but it also is not something that can be controlled
or appropriated. (2) Underlying the particular mechanism of the electoral college is the
spirit of respect that each state in the union has a place and has a voice in the decision of
who is to head the executive branch of government, which is the closest branch to
embodying the kind of unity associated with ‘the nation.’ The mechanism itself, the
objective system of voting, is not responsible for unifying the people, and it could be
changed while still preserving the unity of the people of the United States. However, if
the spirit of respect and a sense of belonging of each sub-community fades away, then the
people qua constituent power has died. Although a state government may still persist, but
it would be a machine run by bureaucrats or demagogues dominating the citizenry and
not the realization of the sovereignty of the people.
In this section, I have reviewed the key passages in Rousseau that indicates how
populism might be channeling his thought, especially in terms of calls to expel or
eradicate minorities or differing voices. There are passages that lend themselves to
thinking of the general will in terms of articulating the nation as having a singular interest
that unites each member of the community in a kind of closed identity. But more
importantly, I have shown an interpretation of Rousseau, perhaps under-developed or
even in contradiction with the first sense, to attempt to think of a collective whose
‘homogeneity’ allows or even fosters a kind of internal plurality. This kind of
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homogeneity is a homogeneity of freedom; it is a taking responsibility of acting together
with others in inherited—but not immutable—modes of interaction. This free
homogeneity avoids being anti-pluralist because (a) it cannot target groups or individuals,
which would be a particular act, and (b) it is not based on any kind of social determinacy
or similarity. Political identification is willed; it is not found as an independent quality or
feature that transcends action. Admittedly, we will have to look beyond Rousseau for a
further articulation of this sense of democracy and its demos, but this line of thought
should help guide our search.

4.5

The Metaphor of the Interested Individual and the Problem of Pluralism
After having explored the liberal and democratic traditions and examining their

notions of unity, authority, and freedom, we have a better sense of how each tradition
frames its critiques as well as its goals. Liberalism rightly critiques populism’s antipluralism but obscures any notion of collective unity. Populism, sometimes rightly,
critiques the way in which representatives work on behalf of partial interests and paralyze
the collective body, but it seeks to replace multiple partial interests with a single, partial
self-interest. It encourages a merely social identification, which—while it presents the
kind of boundary-line—it obscures the kind of political freedom that can only be robustly
expressed by people who share a world but not a narrow identity. If we can set aside the
mechanistic metaphor as well as metaphor of the interested individual for the community,
we will be able to critique populism without falling back into the instabilities of
liberalism. In the next chapter, I will offer a more robust account of how the organic
metaphor lends itself to thinking of democratic unity, freedom, and authority. For now,
with a notion of political identification distinguished from social identification, we can
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sketch a critique of populism that does not fall back on a “quantity of votes” or
“competitive equilibrium.”
4.5.1

Limiting the Power of the Sovereign Representative

Often, when critiquing populism in America, people focus on Trump. They are
worried about how he will abuse his power. They are worried about how other
Republicans will do what he says to avoid his ire. They worry about how he deceives his
supporters and spread misinformation. The idea is that, as president, he has the power,
and when Biden takes office that power will be gone. This is because, implicitly perhaps,
they think that the president possesses sovereign power—he is the one who decides—and
moreover, this power expresses or manifests the constituent power of the people. To be
sure, the president of the United States has significant powers, but such power is not
constituent. It is neither unlimited nor is it sufficient to determine the behaviors of other
Republican representatives. In a significant sense, constituent power rests with the
people, a portion of whom are Trump’s supporters, on whom many Republicans depend
for their jobs, and who are quite capable of spreading conspiracy theories and fake news
among themselves without the aid of the highest executive office. Nevertheless, the
electoral victory of their leader is sufficient—more than sufficient—for populists to think
that their candidate represents the entire people and therefore can do whatever they want.
There is no conflict between the populist’s private interest and the public interest because
the leader and their constituency all share the same social identity.
While populists assume that absolute power rests with their candidate once he
becomes president, liberal critics think that significant, but non-absolute, power rests in
the office. It is something that comes into possession of whomever is elected, and abuse
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of that power is prevented by other empowered representatives. This is entailed by the
logic of representation, in which individuals alienate their authority, which then
condenses in the representative person(s). Neither view fully takes account of constituent
power, which is expressed in various mechanisms or offices, but is not captured or
exhausted by them. Constituent power, in contradistinction to constituted power, is
creative. It sets the general terms for particular actions. In the democratic tradition, this
creative power lies in the people and cannot be alienated or entrusted to a representative.
In distinction from the usual liberal critiques, the problem with the populist
leader’s claim to uncontested power is not that it violates principles of equal competition,
or that it fails to adequately divide power, or that it involves a belief in mysterious, noninstitutionalized ‘constituent power.’ Rather, the problem is twofold. First, populism
assumes that a representative, even a sovereign representative, is the bearer of constituent
power. At least in a democracy, ‘sovereign’ representatives are entrusted with power
from the constituent power—the people. 256 In so doing, the power that sets the terms of
particular actions is itself merely one particular action. On this assumption, a populist like
Trump can—and should—restructure the entire government or take whatever measures is
necessary preserve American culture. The second problem is that populism claims to
represent the general community with what is merely particular. General principles can
be expressed through particular representatives and institutions, but not insofar as they
present themselves as independent, interested individuals. To recapitulate the reasoning,
the independent, interested individual is in competition with (some) others. Their very
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Such representatives are ‘sovereign’ insofar as they are responsible for and
empowered to make concrete decisions. They determine particular circumstances. They
are not sovereign in the sense that they are the ultimate authority.
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self-sufficiency enables them to enter into such contests, which they will do whenever
resources are scarce. This economic-competitive framework can allow temporary,
voluntary associations, but it cannot offer a robust sense of an enduring, stable, and
complete community. Such a community will have finite individuals in it, and they in
turn may have partial interests, but their partiality is not what is essential and should not
be what government officials primarily express. What they should express is the topic of
the next chapter.
4.5.2

Populist Leadership

Earlier, I noted that Freud’s analysis of group psychology was broad—broader than
populism and democracy. Earlier than that, I stated that if we are to understand populist
rationality, we need to be able to see how a notion of the collective self-interest squares
with its aggression toward an elite as well as outsiders. I will now respond to that issue and
expand upon Freud’s analysis of how populist leadership works more specifically. 257 To
make this analysis, I will turn to some passages from Karl Marx’s “The Eighteenth
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.” 258
In this text, Marx gives an analysis of how a thoroughly mediocre and violent
figure, Louis Bonaparte, became the head of France. As we attempt an interpretation of a
crucial passage, we should keep in mind that Marx’s interest is not in democracy, and Louis
Bonaparte was not a populist. Nevertheless, there are some parallels, which shall become
clear.
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This analysis can also contribute to an understanding of fascist leadership insofar as
fascism sets a notion of the public interest against private interests.
258
Karl Marx, “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,” from The Marx-Engels
Reader 2nd Edition, Robert C. Tucker (ed.), (New York: W.W. Norton Company, Inc.
1978). Henceforth, “‘Brumaire.’”
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In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small
peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union
and no political organisation, they do not form a class. They are
consequently incapable of enforcing their class interest in their own name,
whether through a parliament or through a convention. They cannot
represent themselves, they must be represented. Their representative must
at the same time appear as their master, as an authority over them, as an
unlimited governmental power that protects them against the other classes
and sends them the rain and the sunshine from above. The political influence
of the small peasants, therefore, finds its final expression in the executive
power subordinating society to itself. 259
There are a number of key points here. First, the elected leader in question is not a member
of the class that elected him; that is, there is no starting identificatory structure. Second,
the elected leader does not identify with the other parts of society because the leader is
hostile to the parts of society as parts (i.e., to ‘factions’). This is the basis of the fascist
leader’s election. The leader can represent the whole by not being identical to any part.
Bonaparte gets his support because he has the same enemies as his supporters, and he was
able to play this role for several groups simultaneously. The positive, collective selfinterest of the peasants is not the basis of unity—by themselves they are unorganized—but
by taking Bonaparte as their leader, their collective interest lies in hurting the interests of
other groups. A perversion of the notion of self-interest, to be sure, but a perversion made
possible by the fact that a shared interest is not an essential feature of self-organization.
If this preliminary analysis is right, then the populist leader must represent the
whole people (not a part) and does so through hostility to the parts, often with rhetoric
about special interests or parasites that taken hold of the people. What are we to make of
identification, then, if the peasants and Bonaparte are not from the same social class or
appear to have limited similarities? Identification here is vicarious, ‘ideal’ phenomenon.
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In belonging to ‘the people’ of a populist regime, one experiences the power of an
aggressive leader over enemy groups in the same way a reader might experience the
triumphs of a fictional character in an entertaining novel or movie over ‘the bad guys.’
While this psychological/ideal identification has no roots in shared material interests
(which means for Marx, it is merely ideological and regressive/conservative), it is
nevertheless quite powerful, especially for individuals who had not experienced a
position of power (or had experienced a position of power long ago and want to return to
it). Moreover, it is made all the more powerful by its adoption of the rhetoric of selfinterest but vacated of any determinate content beyond its hostility toward apparent
competitors. Populism only increases its hold on the imagination of its supporters when
the populist leader provides isolated, short-term boons, such as when Trump gave
Christian conservatives the supreme court, repealed regulation that made truck driving
more profitable, and issued tariffs on various goods (even on goods that we get from our
allies). Populism provides a ‘sense of self’ and even self-interest, but a radically
simplified one. 260 The eagerness to belong to ‘the people,’ to belong to the winning side,
to experience power—even vicariously—is a powerful drive that transforms democratic
identity into populism, or even worse, fascism. But that is what happens when one
assumes that democracy entails a notion of control of the government, and while
liberalism may not think of the government as something that offers absolute control, it
certainly offers a notion of the individual who has some private sphere of control.
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Robert Paxton characterizes one of the passions of fascism thusly: “An enhanced
sense of identity and belonging, in which the grandeur of the group reinforces individual
self-esteem.” Robert O. Paxton, “The Five Stages of Fascism,” The Journal of Modern
History, Vol. 70, No. 1, (March 1998) 6.
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4.5.3

The Nation as an Economic Entity

To round out my discussion of populism and its use of the metaphor of the
interested individual, I want to draw attention to the inherent instability at play in populist
thinking. On the one hand, populist supporters tend to be concerned with their own
private self-interest in a way that excludes (all) others. We can assume this is logic of
Trump putting his name on the first round of COVID-19 relief stimulus checks—
assuming such an act was successful. It is the logic by which supporters that stormed the
Capitol expected pardons to be given by Trump before he left office. And it is at least
vaguely implied by frantic affirmation of ‘individualism’ against the evils of ‘socialism.’
This reaffirms the analysis of populist leadership given above: the populist leader
maintains support by giving concrete benefits at the expense of the supporter’s foes.
On the other hand, populism is rife with collectivist language. This is at least
implied in populist approval of Trump’s trade war with China. This is not to say that
Trump’s acts will be economically beneficial in the long run, or that trade is the primary
measure of success between two competing powers. In fact, the international standing of
the United States has fallen greatly under Trump, while China fared significantly better
than us, for instance, regarding the COVID-19 response. The populist logic is that what is
bad for China—the U.S. issuing tariffs—must therefore be good for the United States. On
this understanding, hurting another nation’s interest is sufficient evidence for proving that
the action is good for the populist nation. The rhetoric about ‘putting America first,’ and
measuring our renewed greatness in a trade war or in observing the GDP indicates that
there is a vague, national interest that excludes outside powers, but it has no immediate
bearing on the individual. The GDP could soar while one’s wages stagnate, but this
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would not necessarily have any bearing in the mind of the populist on whether what
Trump is doing is good for the national interest.
Given these two sides of populist self-interest, we can see the source of
instability. At one and the same time, the populist is an individualist who supporters a
leader for the sake of concrete benefits that can be enjoyed in solitude while also being a
collectivist who thinks who thinks there is a measure of “American” success that is not
anchored to their personal situation. The populist supporter, presumably, is prone to
assuming an immediate identity, in which one’s own private interest simply is the
national interest. But the populist is also prone to assuming that they have a vicarious
(and precarious) identificatory relationship to the collective. The nation may extend
beyond the populist’s private sphere, but the populist sees himself in the GDP, sees
himself victorious over the Chinese, sees himself liberated from ‘bad deals’ with Europe,
even if these representations of his success have no anchor in the concrete realm. These
two views on identity are opposed—one immediately enlarges the concrete, the other
imagines a collective interest (potentially) opposed to the concrete—and thus the populist
does not have a coherent guide for how to maximize their self-interest. My critique is not
that they should become more consistent and simply reject one side of that identification;
my point is that they conceive of themselves and the whole country simply as a selfinterested, economic being. And the economic conceptions of the individual and
community do not have a framework for how to think of a unified political body,
composed of a plurality of genuinely different identities.
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4.6

Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyzed how populism’s metaphor for the community being an

individual is rooted in liberalism’s conception of the self-interested individual. When
individuals are seen to be interest-pursuers and their freedom is seen to consist in a right
to pursue their interests, then one belongs to a democracy either because one is regulated
by the same mechanisms as others or because one’s social identity gives one a right to
control government mechanisms. These metaphors orient our thought about political
power and freedom to be a matter of accomplishing the private ends we set for ourselves.
If democracy is founded on the principle of autonomy, then the mechanistic and
individualist metaphor are not only inadequate; they are eventually self-destructive. If
one’s freedom consists in pursuing one’s interest, then a democracy can only be either a
hindrance to one’s freedom or an apparatus to keep other people from being a hindrance.
But mechanism is not the only understanding of government institutions; having a
socially identical interest is not the only understanding community, and control is not the
only understanding of freedom. From our investigations in these first two chapters, we
have developed guidelines for a successful understanding democracy and identified many
of the pitfalls that might plague any account.
First, a homogeneity that is anti-pluralist—that seeks to eliminate anything
different—is self-destructive. This kind of homogeneity is operative in various
populisms, albeit at different strengths. Second, a ‘heterogeneity’ that embraces everyone
may not be self-destructive, but it also cannot create a collective whole. This kind of
heterogeneity is expressed in liberalism, in which difference is respected only in theory
and obscured in practice. Third, if we want a notion of democracy in which ‘the people’
is internally differentiated, we need to avoid a notion of freedom as control, which tends
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to lead to the opposition of the collective against anything or anyone partial. The internal
parts, however, still need to express a general will that allows for difference in dialog,
that is, there needs to be an active unity and perhaps even similarity (at least in terms of
commitments, if not ‘natural’ features). Insofar as we are thinking of the internal parts of
a people, we are thinking of them as constituent power giving themselves their mode of
existence, not as constituted powers in need of checks and balances. The former needs to
be thought of on the basis of its cooperation, not competition. Moreover, we should
expect that the internal parts are social identities insofar as everyone must grow into
themselves and take on their identities over time with care and support from others,
which implies the need for simple groupings of similarity. Or in other words, if a
democracy can involve the difficult cooperation and harmonization of different parts on
the basis of respect, it can only do so insofar as people learn to cooperate with those like
themselves on the basis of love. In chapter one, I raised a question about the proper
constitution of authority based on the liberal objection about authoritarianism and the
Hobbesian need for authority. Across chapters one and two, I have raised the question of
freedom by looking at the liberal articulation of negative freedom and the populist notion
of control that stems from liberal interest. And now, from this chapter I hope to have
raised the question of the constitution of the people from the unsatisfactory notions of the
liberal ‘majority’ and the populist ‘nation’ and from the ambivalent notion of the general
will from Rousseau. Each of these questions—about authority, about freedom, and about
the constitution of the people—will receive a direct, if only provisional, response in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 5. THE ORGANIC METAPHOR FOR POLITICAL UNITY
The last two chapters explained how the mechanistic metaphor guides, often
unconsciously, our thinking toward an unstable conception of democracy, oscillating
between populism and liberalism. The primary concepts that are destabilized by the
mechanistic metaphor are unity, authority, and freedom. In this chapter, I will introduce
and explain the organic metaphor and how it can help us interpret the aforementioned
three concepts. To state it provisionally, the organic metaphor conceives of the
community as a ‘living being,’ and if we can unpack this concept of a living being, we
can find out something about the constitution of a healthy body politic. Moreover, I will
defend this metaphor as suitable for democracy, despite the fact that its reputation has
suffered over the last century. Notably, Claude Lefort has argued that it lends itself to a
totalitarian conception of power. 261
By developing the organic metaphor, I hope to give an account of democracy in
which we, as a people, have an active relationship to our democratic laws and in which a
common concern for community creates a place for multiple social identities. If we were
to switch from a mechanistic metaphor to an organic one, this would reorient how we
conceive of various problems—including anti-pluralism and authoritarianism—such that
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Arendt occasionally makes similar remarks about the organic metaphor and its role in
sociology. See for instance, OR 49-50. Strangely, she seems to use “life” in a positive
sense, and I will be drawing on some passages in her oeuvre to develop the organic
metaphor. For instance, in “The Crisis in Education,” 184-5 Arendt speaks of the private
sphere, insulated from others, as the condition both for growth as well as for a properly
public realm. This is an important point not only for the organic (or “living”) metaphor
but also for a conception of the private sphere that is not dominated by economic
necessity.
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populism could be more stably diagnosed as anti-democratic. For instance, rather than
focusing on balancing state machinery or adding new rules, the organic metaphor
encourages to think of critique as articulating a need to replace corrupt representatives
with non-corrupt ones, to reconstitute or eliminate institutions when a people outgrows
them, and to foster a spirit of cooperation. In what follows, I will not be offering a
systematic or complete account of democracy so much as articulating a largely forgotten
framework for thinking through democratic politics and suggesting some fruitful
directions for further theorizing. The major advantage of this normative account of
democracy is that it sets up ‘community’ as a task that a people must engage it. It cannot
be handled by representatives or procedures, and it is not established by any pre-political
nature or characteristic.
My goal is to show how the organic metaphor, properly understood, is better for
thinking about political unity, authority, and freedom than the metaphors of mechanism
and the self-interested individual. This is not to say that the metaphor is without
problems, and it is not to advocate for any particular ideology or normative political
theory. My analysis is compatible with, for instance, communitarianism, republicanism,
or even some variant of liberalism, provided their concepts are not oriented by the
metaphors of mechanism and the self-interested individual. Equally, my account should
offer an orientation to critique whatever elements of those theories are driven by the latter
metaphors.
I have organized this chapter around the three unstable concepts: unity, authority,
and freedom. While the mechanistic metaphor encourages us to think of the unity of the
people either as an aggregate or by way of the same social identity, the organic metaphor
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encourages us to think of unity in the sense of the project of belonging: creating a place
for multiple identities. Where the mechanistic metaphor often encourages us to think of
how a representative is in control of some collective functions, the organic metaphor
encourages us to think of representatives as offering faces of the law. And while the
mechanistic metaphor encourages us to think of freedom in terms of the ability to pursue
one’s self-interest—conditioned by rewards and punishments—the organic metaphor
encourages us to think of freedom as maintained through forgiveness.

5.1

The Organic Metaphor and Unity
If we do not think of the political community as an aggregate mediated by a great

machine or as a simple individual with a homogeneous, social identity, then how should
we think of it? What gives a people its unity? The cue that democratic thinking takes—or
rather, should take—from Rousseau is that a people is constituted by a common project; a
people wills itself to be a whole. Such a will cannot be represented; it either exists in the
activities of the whole people, or it does not exist at all. To be sure, representatives
(should) also express the general will, but they are not the sole vehicle through which it is
expressed. No representative can capture or possess it, and consequently, they cannot will
in the place of the people. Because the general will is associated with the whole, it must
permeate public life, i.e., it must be present in institutions and beyond. This nonrepresentable, general willing is constituent power, and as constituent power, it is the
normative basis for institutions which must live up to the spirit of its people. The key idea
from the organic metaphor—compatible with Rousseau—is that the community is
precisely a co-mmunity. It is a working together of different parts, and not a simple
identity, even a formal or structural one, shared by each member. If we can better
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understand what the general will is—through the organic metaphor—then we will be in a
better position to understand (a) the way in which populism exploits the democratic
promise and (b) what it would mean for a people to enact its freedom without merely
seizing control of the government.
5.1.1

The Organic Metaphor and the People

I claimed earlier that a people constitute a unity by way of its general will—i.e.,
the constituent power of the people is the people putting itself together as one. I want to
suggest that the organic metaphor invites us to think of this common project not simply
as a homogenous will, but as a cooperation among differentiated organs that are
dependent on that cooperation. From this schema, I want to develop the framework for a
democratic framework for thinking of the general will not as exerting control over a
concrete situation but as the activity of making others belong.
The organic metaphor, at its most basic level, indicates internal differentiation of
the body into a system of organs. While the organs may have their own ‘characteristic
activity,’ e.g., respiration in the lungs, the organs nevertheless must cooperate in a
relatively stable way in order to preserve themselves within the whole. As Aristotle
makes the point in The Metaphysics, organs do not form a heap of parts, and in fact, they
cannot perform their characteristic activity if they do not belong to a whole body. Since
our focus is on the constituent power of the people, we are thinking about groupings of
the people, and not the constituted ‘organs’ of government, which are organs only in a
secondary sense.
For our purposes, we ought not to become overly concerned with the typical
arrangement and proportion of physical organs in the ‘normal’ body, especially since
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organisms are not born with a final shape already present. Whatever the organism, its
body and the organs therein ultimately grow into themselves. The metaphor goes awry
when organs are viewed as static material with functions assigned to them. The proper
lesson to draw from the organic metaphor is that the activity of life is affirmed even as
the shape of the body changes, and life itself is co-constituted from the activities of the
changing parts working together. Thus, as Hegel notes in his famous metaphor, the
transformation of the acorn into the oak tree is an affirmation of the life of the whole
because the oak tree fulfills the promise of the acorn even as it abolishes the acorn’s
form. Politically speaking, the activity of the whole maps onto the notion of the general
will; each part is engaged in specific activities but also contributes to the overall project
of life.
While the heart pumps blood and the lungs respirate, they both contribute to life.
Unlike pumping blood and respirating, “life” is not a concrete process, at least not in the
sense of being empirically transparent. But “life” is also not a taxonomical genus of
which each organ is simply a specification. Life is expressed in the characteristic
activities of each organ, provided such organs are working together. Orienting our
thought by this cooperative notion of life, we can note that there may be multiple ways of
understanding groupings within ‘the people,’ but only interpretations in which each group
contributes to the whole is reflective of organic unity. Thus, any parsing of groups into
‘good guys’ and ‘bad guys’ should give us pause. Similarly, productive citizens and
‘parasites’ is problematic. Further, interpretations in which groupings are viewed as selfsufficient—and party politics tends to embody this interpretation as well as the good/bad
dichotomy—do not express organic unity.
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I want to suggest that the single project of “life” in the metaphor can be
understood as a project of belonging. The endeavor of making people belong requires
numerous acts by individuals but can only be accomplished by the wider community.
Such acts constitute a community; without such welcoming interactions, there is only a
set of people but no community. Arendt makes this point as a claim about “the right to
belong,” which she announces in conjunction with the right to have rights. 262 What she
means by these phrases is that the most important feature about a system of rights, often
left unarticulated, is the right to be a part of a community at all. And it is these two metarights about membership in a community—and not individualist, negative rights—that
totalitarianism destroys in order to dehumanize. Individualist, negative rights are good,
but in order for them to be real rights and not just personal preferences, they have to be
recognized and collectively willed. Thus, they do not exist in isolation, but only in a
community. What Arendt terms as a right in the ‘right to belong’ and ‘the right to have
rights’—possibly for rhetorical purposes—I am here framing as a kind of communal
spirit, channeled in local labors in which people create and sustain groups by welcoming
others. For Arendt, this activity creates a space in which individual opinions are
significant because there are people who will listen to them, and rights are real because
people will defend them together.
In conclusion, I am advocating the idea that the organic metaphor encourages us
to think of the political body as having various social groups as organs who all—at least
at times—do the labors of welcoming the other groups into the whole. This activity, a
constituent power that is expressed in various ways, consists above all in actions and in
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the welcoming of other opinions. It cannot be performed primarily by elected
representatives. Arendt offers a compelling argument:
However, while it may be true that, as a device of government, only the
two-party system has proved its viability and, at the same time, its
capacity to guarantee constitutional liberties, it is no less true that the best
it has achieved is a certain control of the rulers by those who are ruled, but
that it has by no means enabled the citizen to become a ‘participator’ in
public affairs. The most the citizen can hope for is to be ‘represented’,
whereby it is obvious that the only thing which can be represented and
delegated is interest, or the welfare of the constituents, but neither their
actions nor their opinions. 263
The point here being that no matter how much government power a representative may
have, that representative cannot personally do the work of creating a space for living
individuals to belong. Representatives may offer rhetoric about universal belonging, but
such rhetoric rings hollow when representatives talk about a general demand for
inclusiveness but do not do the work of making living individuals belong.
5.1.2

The Political Body

So far, I have outlined some general directions for interpreting the organic
metaphor as a basis for political democracy. Without committing to any particular
analysis of the body politic, I will offer some commentary on how the organic metaphor
has informed more specific accounts of social groupings. Let us look at just a few. If one
assumed that the Left/Right distinction identified complimentary sides, it would be a
candidate for organic unity. Such ‘halves’ could not exist independently, since cutting off
one side would merely create a new Left or a new Right. Moreover, for the body to
function, its halves must work together. Unfortunately, in the United States, the Left and
Right in political parties are currently vying for relative independence from each other
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and vilify the other half (rightly or wrongly). The estates system that Hegel espouses is
framed explicitly as expressing organic unity. In it, various modes of life—agrarian,
industrial/mercantile, bureaucratic, etc.—are all parts of a relatively self-sufficient whole,
even though the parts could not exist in isolation. Arguably, the globalized economy and
modern capitalist economic system have completely displaced the estates system,
although we can still look to its articulation as an exemplar of political unity (even if
Hegel views that system through rose-colored glasses). Identity politics might be a
candidate for expressing organic unity, and there is a strong case to be made that such
identities simply are the primary source for group differentiation—even more so than
membership in a particular state in the United States—so it is precisely these divisions
that we must understand as dependent on each other. To be sure, that is the goal of
collective living together and not a given. Given that there are multiple ways of parsing
social groupings within the body politic, it may be helpful to further specify the notion of
social groups. Keep in mind that any ‘identity’ or group what-ness might qualify as a
social group, but to understand the democratic potential of a group, it must involve some
active organization and therefore contain an element of the political. Such a group has a
recognized normative claim on an individual, demanding certain kinds of actions and
prohibiting others. But these claims are relativized by the stronger claims of membership
in the whole, even though this higher claim is more susceptible to disintegration or
obfuscation.
Descriptively speaking, people organize into groups based in some common
object of desire (interests) or some similar qualities, usually a similar appearance
(broadly construed). Social identity groups are fluid, they intersect, and even apparently
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large social groups may actually consist of many smaller, local identity groups.
Intersecting identities may reinforce certain normative demands, but equally they may
place competing demands on an individual, which in turn can constitute a genuine
personal crisis. The familiar candidates for ‘identity’ are based in gender, sexual
orientation, race, etc., but we are less focused on interpreting them as ‘natural,’
demographic categories and more interested in relatively organized communities
precisely because they are actively engaged in shared activities. 264 Identity grouping is
relatively easy to sustain and easy to get into in large part because the demands for being
‘in’ and the grounds for being pushed ‘out’ can be communicated fairly effectively and
generally focus on something that one can change about oneself. Children, for instance,
have an easy time grouping together based on similarity, and have an easier time caring
for others that they find familiar because they are alike. It is a simple mode of grouping
together, and it can never be eliminated because new generations of humans will need to
associate along these simple lines.
To give an explication of this notion of grouping in its ideal form, Hegel describes
the estates in roughly these terms—they are specific groupings in which a person ‘is
someone,’ an estate is where someone finds recognition and support, and everyone can
and must grow into estates, which in turn, collectively participate in the state as a whole
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Perhaps any characteristic people might share could be the basis of a social identity
group in the way I discuss, provided people engage in consciousness-raising and
instituting means of communication and interaction. As we saw earlier in Marx’s analysis
of Louis Bonaparte, a simple set of people qua isolated atoms with no class
consciousness and no internal communication may constitute a ‘class’ without thereby
having any power. This would be an example of a demographic, and such isolated
individuals, instead of belonging to a partial group, are usually highly susceptible to
organization by despots and totalitarians.
210

(in a limited sense). 265 This participation in the state is true even for the first and second
estates—farmers, tradesmen, etc.—who are not the bureaucrats, experts, and officials
whose vocation is state business. Thus, for Hegel, the universal is realized not through a
representative group, but is rather expressed through each group—each estate—as it
participates in the life and spirit of the whole community. The social identities I outlined
above and which are familiar to us now are not estates—they are more fluid and
intersectional, for one—and they may seem to fall short of the lofty vision Hegel sets of
the estates. It is worth noting, though, that Hegel is only giving the rational structure of
the estate system, any community will necessarily fall short of its ideals, just as it will
still necessarily be informed by them. I wish only to suggest that if social identities are to
be a source of political action, then they are responsible for doing the kind of positive
political work that Hegel ascribes to the estates.
While social groups do offer a place for people to belong, their concrete acts of
inclusion also entail exclusion—both by commission and omission. This is what Arendt
refers to as the ‘right to discrimination,’ which is appropriate (in the sense of necessary
and permissible) in the social realm. 266 On the one hand, it seems intuitive enough that
individuals should not have to associate with people they want to avoid in their private
lives. It seems tyrannical to legislate whom one must spend one’s time with or whom one
must be friends with. Any attempt to stamp out such social discriminations marks a
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EPR 339-351. The estates, for Hegel, belong to the legislative moment of the state and
mediate between the people and its government. Of interest is Hegel’s notion that if a
people is an unorganized mass, then cannot be called “a people” proper; it is only an
aggregate. Thus, when thinking of the people, we must think of it in terms of its distinct,
self-organizing groupings rather than anything like ‘the masses.’
266
She makes the point forcefully in Hannah Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,” from
Hannah Arendt, Responsibility and Judgment (New York: Schocken Books 2003) 203-6.
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totalitarian turn and would constitute such a turn even if it were in the name of stamping
out fascism. 267 The most familiar practical implication of this distinction is the limitation
of public power—both in terms of representatives by the people and of various
corporations and groupings by representatives—such that some matters are left to private
individuals to make their own decisions. On the other hand, discrimination poses a
problem insofar as (a) there are individuals who will not be welcomed into any social
group, and (b) there spaces that seem to ambiguously be private and public, e.g., jobs,
schools, etc. 268 Social groupings are a necessary fixture of public living, but the necessity
of discrimination makes it relatively unstable, and sometimes unjust.
No matter how people decide to discriminate in their personal and social lives—
and we should expect that there is no problem free route in navigating those decisions—
those particular groupings will play out in a context of more general cooperation. This
takes us from the organic idea of organs to the idea of the life of the whole. Group
identifications require discrimination, which helps to give content to intersubjective
norms and desires, but these must be relative in the face of belonging to a wider
community, in which issues of discrimination and social group membership are
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Carl Schmitt identifies two kinds of ‘total state,’ the quantitative and the qualitative.
The quantitative total state makes its public power responsive to all social demands from
all private parties, provided sufficient votes are given. He associates this with an
unrestricted liberalism, which he takes to be indecisive and unstable precisely because it
is the ‘procedure’ (a characteristic feature of most liberalisms) that could be used to
abolish things like the recognition of individual rights (another feature of most
liberalisms). Thus, there is a kind of totalitarianism that accompanies liberal
proceduralism—assuming the liberalism in question is about democratic procedure. See
L&L 91-3 for a clear account of the quantitative total state and its instability.
268
It is on issues like these that Arendt seems to be least helpful, although I argue her
position in the case of education is more insightful than usually credited. See Daniel
Cole, “A Defense of Arendt’s ‘Reflections on Little Rock,’” Philosophical Topics, Vol.
39, No. 2, (Fall 2011) esp. 29-30. Henceforth, “‘DRLR.’”
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presupposed and displaced by issues pertaining to a common world. I take it this is the
positive reading of Schmitt’s political concept of ‘friend,’ that is, members of the same
state with whom one must cooperate for the sake of maintaining their mode of
intersubjective existence. 269 This public spiritedness will consist of some open-ended,
democratic principles shared by the various groups, and a willingness to cooperate with
members of those groups. One should expect this attitude of meta-belonging from
citizens who have reached the age of maturity, but it is not something that can be
regulated or enforced. It is an attitude that must be cultivated within various social
groupings as well as in the family. This spirit of public belonging is, politically, more
basic than any laws or concrete institutions; I contend that it is the properly interpreted
constituent power of a democracy. In that sense, this public-spiritedness, expressed in
countless local, non-institutional acts by the citizens and hopefully further embodied in
institutions, is the main component of a good democracy. It is the power of welcoming
others, of creating a place for them to belong, that a political body is unified. It is also
demanding, and members who enact this attitude of making others belong in the public
sphere will have to return to private sphere to rest. When these conditions of publicspiritedness do not obtain, social groups may share a technical administration, which may
be economically benevolent, but that shared administration creates no space for public
freedom and has no need for public spiritedness. 270
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See Concept 32-5. Much of the work is devoted to the enemy and distinguishing it
from the foe. I am reading the notion of the friend in conjunction with his claim about the
state making other statuses relative in relation to membership in the state.
270
Compare to L&L 28-31 in which Schmitt argues that when democratic power is
divided, it necessarily gives rise to a competitive despotism. Note that while I share
Schmitt’s wariness of a merely technical administration with quantitative procedures for
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5.1.3

Populism and Organic Unity

From the foregoing discussion of belonging, it should be clear that populism runs
contrary to the organic metaphor for political unity. There are two, related reasons for
this. First, populism generally involves a kind of self-deceit about the source of
community. It generally takes political unity to be a matter of sharing some feature that
pre-exists the community, e.g., membership in a biological/natural grouping like or
ethnicity. Second, populists do not view community as a labor or activity; they view it
only in terms of self-interest either directly or by analogy.
Speaking to the first point, despite the great variety of populists, they virtually
always have some sense of a ‘pre-political’ unity, i.e., some sense of a shared identity
that subsists underneath the government. This identity can be more or less vague and
more or less coherent, and can include a race, an ethnicity, or a nationality. To be sure,
there are other bases for imagining a community, such as a religion or a socio-economic
class. Such a pre-political identity is not intrinsically populist and may not even be
problematic. However, such identities can be politicized in such a way that they seek to
eliminate the representation of any apparently heterogeneous interest. Some identities
seem better primed for becoming populist, and most of the ones that we have seen (even
outside of the United States) make reference to a race or a nation. The reason that religion
and social class are unlikely to generate populism is because they are not ‘natural.’ First,
they have requirements for their members and thus imply a kind of activity; membership

voting, I differ somewhat on the conditions for principled democratic practices, largely
because I am addressing constituent power directly. Schmitt notes the indivisibility of
constituent power—i.e., the general will in modern democracies—and from that
indivisibility, he seems to infer no further explanation is possible. My approach, as
evidenced by the earlier section, more closely follows Hegel’s.
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cannot be safely assumed. Second, there is a better articulated, distinctive identity of the
group, which in turn helps to determine the specific normative demands the group makes
of its members. Such an identity serves to distinguish their collective from other
groupings as well as assure each member of some shared similarity, and consequently,
these identities are not as likely to mistake themselves for ‘The Identity’ of ‘The People.’
As an example, I think it is easier for white supremacists to think of ‘white’ as ‘The
Master Race,’ capable of subsisting on its own, in a way that most contemporary
Christians do not assume that their particular sect of Christianity is ‘The Religion.’ We
can conclude that populism, then, relies on thinking of the collective as a natural set
rather than (a) an aggregate (liberalism) or (b) a cooperative system of differentiated parts
(organic metaphor).
Following from the idea of the people as a ‘natural’ set, populists view their
membership in the community as automatic, unquestionable, and defined by collective
self-interest. 271 Self-interest, whether for the individual or the collective, is essentially
private. It can guide action even in radical isolation. Consequently, populists virtually
always identify their own individual interest with the collective interest. The organic
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Even United States populism, for as much as it hates socialism, has a notion of
collective self-interest, even if that notion of self-interest is occasionally economic,
occasionally religious, and virtually always vague. This is evident not only in the
“America first” rhetoric, but also in the ‘refutations’ of socialism and communism. More
specifically, an oft-repeated argument against such modes of collectivism (and in favor of
‘individualism’) is simply that communism does not work, as evidenced by the USSR.
The implication is that it would be economically bad for the collective to try a different
principle of organization. It seems to me that the threat of self-destruction through
socialism plays a more prominent role in the American Right than any possible threats
posed by specific policies, e.g., ACA, Medicare for all, etc. Of course, the general threat
can be strengthened by a desire to not have any of one’s private tax dollars go to helping
another person. Conflating looking out for one’s private interest with looking out for the
collective interest is easy when the collective simply is a private interest writ-large.
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metaphor, by contrast, encourages us to think of our own belonging—even our group
belonging—as partial. And what is private or partial cannot be identical with the whole.
The organic metaphor, interpreted along the lines I have offered here, offers us a
way to critique populism’s anti-pluralism. The problem is not so much a violation of the
division of power, or of checks and balances, or even of the dignity of the individual.
Rather, the problem is that populists think that only they belong, and they need not
change or adjust to the world in order to retain their membership in the political
community. The organic metaphor, by contrast, invites us to think that community
membership requires quite a lot from us. Namely, that we can only exist by cooperating
with others who are not like us, and that this cooperation involves an ever-renewable task
of welcoming others into the collective. Such labors of belonging are not procedural or
automatic; they require listening and treating the opinions of others as significant, as
potentially world-shaping, and as having a place in the public discourse. As a
complement to this requirement of welcoming others, there is a requirement that every
group foster the same collective principles and respect for shared institutions.
Importantly, shared principles and institutions are ‘active,’ non-natural, and public,
making them dissimilar from a notion of collective self-interest.

5.2

The Organic Metaphor and Authority
I turn now to how to the organic metaphor can help us think about authority. As

we examine this notion, it will be helpful to keep in mind that we are concerned with the
legitimacy of constituted powers, and more specifically, with representatives. Where the
previous section analyzed the activity of the whole collective, here we are interested in
situating the activity of representatives within the whole. The mechanistic metaphor may
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encourage us to think of a centralized control center or a master-lever that sets the gears
in motion, the organic metaphor encourages us to think of representatives as a system that
orients the body while presenting a face to the external world. My contention is that
representative authority is not primarily a matter of controlling concrete situations
(although dealing with concrete circumstances is necessarily a part of what they do) so
much as relating a people to its laws. This is accomplished through (a) an articulation of
general principles in concrete situations, and (b) giving voice to a specific perspective on
the shared law (which implies the need for multiple representatives).
5.2.1

Representation and Mechanism

The mechanistic metaphor can direct the notion of authority in a couple of ways.
With a populist interpretation, authority is the possession of a single representative,
whose actions are unrestricted. In the more traditionally liberal interpretation, the
authority lies within the mechanism itself by virtue of some formal criteria, e.g., in a
government that is constructed according to the requirement for checks and balances.
While we may find the former interpretation abhorrent, or at least risky, it remains a
possibility—even a tendency—in a liberal democracy because institutions are created to
act, and a system of vigorous (and equal) checks tends toward inaction. Thus liberaldemocratic institutions continually lend themselves to bouts of populism under conditions
of ineffective or inefficient institutions, bureaucratic red tape, and partisan stalemate. 272
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This corresponds roughly to what Kenneth Roberts calls the various crises, which we
have referenced earlier. See “PPD,” 291-5. I will add that if people feel personally
frustrated, and they also have an instrumental, interest-based orientation toward
representatives, they may be more willing to take up a populist attitude regardless of
representatives’ performance.
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If we attempt to allow the organic metaphor to guide our thinking about
representative authority, we may still be tempted by a mechanistic interpretation. More
specifically, we might be tempted to think of representatives—or at least a sovereign
representative—as ‘the brain’ of the body politic. As we will see later, Claude Lefort
associates the organic metaphor with the populist/totalitarian-mechanistic interpretation,
wherein the representative leader seizes total control over the body politic. Such a
conflation of mechanism and organism is premised on the assumption that the body is a
system of mechanisms, and the brain sits atop it, setting all parts into motion. Instead of
situating each part within a whole, each part is instead subordinated to one, supreme part.
Clearly, then, simply adopting an image of the organism will not do our thinking
for us; we must conceptually work through the metaphor to preserve it. There are a few
reasons to resist the temptation to focus on our presumed understanding of ‘the brain.’
The first is that by subordinating each organ to a single organ, we obscure the general
project of ‘life’ that was discussed in the previous section. ‘Life’ implies that every
organ—the brain included—must perform its characteristic activity so that the others may
perform theirs, and none can perform its activity in isolation. In this way, each organ
expresses the whole. But when every organ is subordinated to one organ, each organ’s
activity becomes an expression of that highest organ’s will. Such organs do not have a
‘characteristic activity;’ they have an assigned function. They are peculiarly shaped cogs.
Second, by interpreting the brain as the ‘control center,’ we would be committing to a
notion of freedom as control discussed in the last chapter, one which absolutely exclusive
(fewer people yields more control. Such a notion would undemocratically imply that only
the representative—and not the constituency—is free.
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5.2.2

The Organic Metaphor and Representation

I suggest that the organic metaphor invites us to think less of an internal control
mechanism—the brain—and more about ‘the head,’ which orients action and gives the
whole organism a face. From this basic imagery, we should understand constituted power
in two, complementary ways. First, representatives have the authority to make the law
concrete—taking general principles and specifying them into the determinate shape of
laws, on one hand, and then enforcing the laws, on the other. Consider this a kind of
orientation for the actions of the body, rather than the sole locus of public action. Such
concrete laws do not simply control behaviors through fear of punishment, they channel
and coordinate action. Or in other words, enforcing the law is not simply a matter of
forcing people to act in a certain way or avoid a certain behavior. Rather, legislation
opens a horizon of action and enforcement preserves that opening. Second, in taking our
point of departure from ‘the head’ rather than brain, we can imagine representatives as
the faces of the law, offering points of identification in the handling of matters of public
concern. Importantly, while the laws for democracy may be singular, a healthy
democracy requires a multiplicity of representatives. This is unrelated to the rationalistic
assumptions of liberalism 273 and is neither a matter of checks and balances nor a
rationalism that is supposed to produce truth. 274 The multiplicity is for the sake of
recognizing the multiple perspectives toward the same laws and institutions; it tempers
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See Schmitt’s Crisis 39.
As indicated in the section on Hobbes and authoritarianism above, such a logic of
constituted powers checking each other leads to a kind of ‘crabs in a bucket’ scenario, in
which nothing gets done. The more important check is by the constituent power, not
simply another constituted power. What I mean by this is that the people needs to be able
to initiate its own actions and create new institutions—and at least sometimes—eliminate
or reform old institutions and laws.
274
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the impulse to over-identify with a representative and think oneself in possession of
institutions just as it helps one to relate to a set of pre-existing laws and institutions.
The first role of representative institutions, considered from the organic metaphor,
invites us to think of the overall structure of the body that turns outward to the world. A
political community is irreducible to one function, activity, or determinate end. It bears
within it a multiplicity of these things and keeps generating them anew. The organism,
then, must have a way of coordinating its different elements, and such coordination is not
simply issuing commands piecemeal to each organ. Rather, a living organism—or better,
a living person—directs its entire body outward to act. This requires a head with sensory
organs to open a field of view (and hearing, etc.), into which the other parts of the body,
e.g., the hands, may engage with the world.
Laws and institutions in a healthy democracy do not exist simply to make people
behave in a set way or to follow the commands of a despot, not even a temporary one;
they offer guidelines and illuminate shared principles in order to orient public action—
including social activities. Within this framework, representatives and officials may have
the authority to command, but that is not their primary function. Take, for example,
Martin Luther King, Jr., who was not an elected representative, but certainly acted as a
representative of the civil rights movement. His role was neither to command people nor
to assign them a function. Rather, for those with the shared principles of freedom and
equality, attuned to the racial injustice of this country, his speeches and actions clarified a
shared vision of the wider community and coordinated the collective action to make that
vision a reality.
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While less inspiring, government officials—specifically legislators—have a
similar role. Their role is not to do everything for each citizen, but to set limits to
amorphous, spontaneous activity, e.g., by setting a minimum wage or requiring
licenses/certifications in various jobs. In this case, the state government only sets a
boundary meant to preserve shared principles while enabling actions by citizens.
To be clear, political action can take place both in government institutions and
outside them. Moreover, institutions can attempt to forego (genuine) politics and simply
administrate. We could expect the latter situation to occur when a people has no drive for
collective action and seeks only a preservation of each member’s private life.
Nevertheless, in a healthy, political democracy, institutions play a necessary role.
However, this is not to say that a democracy simply is its governmental institutions.
Consequently, creating, dismantling, and reforming particular institutions does not
necessarily imply the death of a democracy or a people. However, dismantling and
reforming all institutions at once does imply a death of a democracy —or at least comes
close to it.
A democratic people, to be a people, must be self-governing, which means that
there must be some governmental organization. When the organization stops or changes
completely, then the people has been dissolved. A people cannot realize its principles and
commitments without expressing them in determinate, constituted institutions; it cannot
have a political identity if that identity is not embodied in a political form.
Coincidentally, we should be prepared to gauge the institutional damage done by
populists not simply on how many loyalists they install in government positions, but to
the extent that institutions themselves are ‘gutted’ or removed.
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5.2.3

Temporality and Arendt’s Account of Authority

As a further elaboration of representatives orienting the actions of the people, I
want to suggest that representatives also act as a kind of temporal bridge between a
people at different times. This claim sets my view in tension with Arendt’s claims in On
Revolution about authority and the preservation of a founding event while simultaneously
drawing from Arendt’s work in “What Is Authority?” Importantly, Arendt often focuses
her discussion of authority on constitutional law, rather than a law-making body. The two
loci of authority are nevertheless related: whatever representatives we have, their roles
and powers, are going to be specified by a constitution that defines and delimits
government officials. Of course, constitutions do more than that, but we need not focus
on that here.
In On Revolution, Arendt locates a notion of constitutional authority in the past.
She writes,
The seat of power to them [the American founders] was the people, but the
source of law was to become the Constitution, a written document, an
endurable objective thing, which, to be sure, one could approach from
many different angles and upon which one could impose many different
interpretations, which one could change and amend in accordance with
circumstances, but which nevertheless was never a subjective state of
mind, like the will. 275
At times in On Revolution, Arendt speaks of the founding of America as not only creating
a government but also a people (which must be an over-statement). 276 On Arendt’s
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OR 148.
Other times, her position is not so extreme. She quotes Jefferson reflecting on the
Declaration of Independence, “’Neither aiming at originality of principle or sentiment,
nor het copied from any particular and previous writing, it was intended to be an
expression of the American mind, and to give that expression the proper tone and spirit
called for by the occasion.’” Quoted in OR 121.
276
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account, it is the act of founding itself that has authority, and the people are anchored by
it just as they are capable of augmenting it. The constitution may have created the
American government, it did not give birth to the American people, who in large measure
had already developed a consciousness of themselves as an entity independent of
England. While this consciousness may have been ambiguous and indeterminate, it must
be assumed that it pre-existed institutional action to make The Declaration of
Independence intelligible. If we want to agree with Arendt that this document gave birth
to a new body politic, we must also say that such a body was already formed; it simply
had not emerged from the womb yet. In any case, both the Declaration and the
constitution were a determination and an outward actualization of what was already there
in the people. And the people were defined, in part, by their relationship to these
documents, which only applied not to humanity, but only a narrow subset of people. 277
These documents did not create ‘a one’ out of an unidentified many, but rather from an
already organized and relatively self-conscious many.
Locating an authoritative founding event in the past is an important part of
Arendt’s conception of how power is stably consolidated. As Arendt often points out,
power needs to be limited by something that is itself outside of power. In “What Is
Authority?” she writes,
The source of authority in authoritarian government is always a force
external and superior to its own power; it is always this source, this
external force which transcends the political realm, from which the
authorities derive their ‘authority,’ that is, their legitimacy, and against
which their power can be checked. 278
277

Not only did it preclude everyone who lived in Great Britain, it excluded many of the
people living in the colonies, including Native Americans, African Americans, etc.
278
Hannah Arendt, “What Is Authority?” from Between Past and Future, (New York:
Penguin Books 2006) 97, 110.
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If authority is to be effective, it must be able to check power itself, and it can do this only
if it has a separate source—this temporal gap provides the distinction between the source
of power, viz. the people, and authority, viz. the constitution. 279 Thus, she turns to a
‘founding event’ as something at the origin of political power but not reducible to it. The
founding event, then, is at least quasi-natural, i.e., it is not made by the people for whom
it is binding. Hegel makes a similar remark about constitutions in Elements of the
Philosophy of Right; the constitution cannot appear as a mutable artifact. 280 But this point
can simply be about how authority appears. Philosophically, authority can be interpreted
as an internal complication or transformation of power. More specifically, constitutional
authority is our collective agreement about some aspect of the world that we allow to
determine us so that we can change other aspects of the world together.
The great advantage of this reading of Arendt’s (and Hegel’s) ‘constitutional
authority’ would be a concept that marks what a people collectively renounces. The
foundational laws and institutions are what a people collectively agree not to exercise
power over. Philosophically—even if not recognized in practice—constitutional laws are
still rooted in the people, even if it is only in the sense that they are willing to not will
some ‘self-evident’ constitutional laws. Thus, I take it that democratic representatives are
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Compare to OR 142 in which she observes that ‘only power can arrest power,’ and
notes the vulnerable existence of mere laws when they are opposed to power. Arendt
goes on to infer that the separation of powers responds to this need to limit power by
other powers. It seems to me, given her continued discussion about the limitation of
power by law/authority, that Arendt is merely remarking on the emergence of a principle
here without endorsing it as definitive. In fact, if we understand the separation of powers
in the mechanistic terms of checks and balances, there is good reason to think such a
principle is harmful for the constitution of public power. Arendt returns to the idea that
authority needs a source that is not power, see esp. OR 175.
280
EPR 312.
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not simply carrying forward the will of the past event, as Arendt seems to indicate.
Rather, they act for the sake of the future, according to the principles of the people and
the present circumstances, but they also draw from the past—sometimes creatively—in
order to present some piece of our intersubjective world that is stable. 281 This helps to
humanize constitutional law by making it appear not as some alien, dominating
command, but rather as a sacred part of our world we actively wish to preserve.
5.2.4

The Faces of Representation

The second major role of elected representatives is to put a face to the law: to
exemplify or model some of the perspectives one can have of a shared law. The main
idea here is that a single leader cannot represent the irreducible plurality of a people,
contra populism. But contra liberalism, plurality cannot be contained and harnessed in a
well-balanced competition of interests (or some other formal, constitutive feature of ‘the
rational individual’). And finally, a democracy cannot be realized in the independence of
laws. If we give up the claim that a people can determine its laws, and consequently, that
no one (or almost no one) engages in public power, then we have renounced the defining
promise of democracy.
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Maria Pia Lara, in critiquing Right-wing populism, seems to suggest that a people is
better served and better unified if it focuses on its future goals rather than some past glory
or prosperity. Trump’s own election slogan of ‘make America great again,’ is an
exemplar of a certain kind of attitude toward the past as something to be repossessed.
From the preceding discussion, it should be clear that I think a people must have an
active relationship to both the past and the future, and we ought not just focus on one.
The crux is how a people relates to its past and future, and what makes Right-wing
populist ideology problematic is its maxim that the past is a kind of property one can get
back in hand. See, for instance, her remarks on the temporal dimension of combatconcepts in “Lara” 37.
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Representatives help to depict who the laws are for and on whose principles are
being expressed. The people can see itself in its representatives, and because of that, it
can see itself in its laws. I do not wish to say that one can immediately see one’s own
private interests in the law, but rather, one can see oneself as a member of the people in
the laws—and that entails being able to see other members in the law as well. Thus, while
each member of the people may share a political identity—we participate in some of the
same institutions, have the same laws, and we make a collective existence possible with
each other—we nevertheless have a partial perspective of our shared laws and
institutions. Representatives, the ones with whom we do not immediately identify, act as
reminders of who shares the space for freedom with us.
Representatives, by acting as the face of the country, also help to remind us of
why we are subjects to the law and not controllers of the government: because other
people depend on us as we depend on them, and those people are not just a statistic. We
do not simply obey the laws out of fear of punishment, but because we wish to continue
to live with others, others who respect the same institutions and share the same principles.
While this commitment to other people may be easier and non-representational in, e.g.,
family life, having a commitment to an entire people requires being able to engage with
those with whom we do not immediately live. The American federal system aims to be a
realization of this principle insofar as each state is necessarily represented in the
legislature of the country as a whole—each part belongs. Of course, representatives, qua
the faces of a democracy, also make a people recognizable to other political bodies. 282 Of
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This warrants further discussion, especially in light of my engagement with Schmitt,
who prefers that the executive consist of a single person. This is in part because a single
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course, if United States citizens no longer find membership in the individual states as a
meaningful identity and enabling condition of public action, then the federal system will
not be able to realize its own principles.

5.3

The Organic Metaphor and Freedom
In the earlier sections, I discussed the general will of the people and the orienting

activity of representative authority. The relationship between these two discussions is
unclear, as is the issue of whether this can be said to be an account of democracy, since
the relationship between the people and the laws has only been discussed abstractly.
What I wish to address here is a sense in which a people is responsible for its laws, even
if no one is in full control of creating or enforcing them. It is in this sense of being
responsible for the law that I locate a notion of democratic freedom. I take this
responsibility not to lie in control of their enforcement or construction but rather by
discursively establishing a sense of what is forgivable and unforgivable. 283 The organic
metaphor, if we take it to describe what a healthy body is like, encourages us to think
about avoiding an auto-immune disorder where functioning—but imperfect—organs are
attacked by the immune system. Forgiveness is a necessary feature of politics because

person is better at representing the unity of a political body to other political bodies in
addition to have the singular vigor (and therefore capacity for action) of an individual
person. Since I am not dealing with international concerns, however, I will not pursue the
question further and merely note that (a) representation is necessary for this role, and (b)
whether such outward representation is compatible with plurality is debatable.
283
This should not be confused with the concrete acts of punishment and pardoning that
constituted powers perform. I am referring rather to the nebulous sense a people have of
what constitutes a mere transgression versus a crime that is in some way beyond the pale.
Arendt takes up this question in HC, but her focus is on the acts themselves and neither
on a communal sense of the forgivable and unforgivable nor on any account of
democratic responsibility.
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individuals are born into an established, public world, but they are themselves finite and,
in a sense, premature. Thus, they always bring an element of the private with them both
in the sense of what is surprising and novel but also what is partial and immature.
5.3.1

Punishment and Behavior

Given our interest in the law, we should note that forgiveness appears as the
alternative to punishment whenever there is a transgression against the law. 284
Punishment is a sophisticated concept that has generated significant discussion, but for
our purposes, I want to indicate its role in the early social contract thinkers. In particular,
Hobbes and Locke devote sections of their major treatises to a discussion of punishments
and rewards as a way of shaping behavior. 285 The fear of punishment, for Hobbes, is
meant to enter into a person’s deliberations and thereby determine how they act. 286
Similarly, rewards incentivize various behaviors. In sum, the threat of punishment is
intended to give the law sufficient force to determine actions. Further, its efficacy to
determine behavior rests upon its regular enforcement. That is, prospective criminals
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Arendt argues in The Human Condition that we can only forgive what we can, in
principle, punish. Therefore, when totalitarians committed crimes that transcend our
ability to punish, they simultaneously committed atrocities that are unforgivable. See HC
241.
285
See Hobbes 201-8. See also Locke 89. Therein, Locke defines political power as the
power to make laws and to “annex such penalties” to them for the sake of preserving the
lives, liberties, and property of the commonwealth’s members. See also his discussion on
69, in which the power of punishing is one of the key powers that individuals cede to the
government when they enter into a commonwealth.
286
For Hobbes, the fear is primarily a fear of death. Liberalism, especially when we
consider Constant’s wish for economic competition to replace violent conflict, is more
interested in economic punishments, including fines and imprisonment.
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need to be able to anticipate that punishment is likely, and in a liberal democracy, the
people must be able to trust that punishments will be applied equally. 287
Both populism and liberalism consider laws in their relationship to punishment.
For populists, laws serve the interest of the people, and they seek to punish anyone would
pose an obstacle to pursuing their interest—especially the established elite who are
corrupt. 288 Trump supporters were fond of chanting ‘lock her up,’ over the alleged
transgressions of Hillary Clinton. Punishment still plays a role in liberalism, albeit more
abstractly. For liberal thought, as we saw in Hobbes, the fear of punishment makes it such
that transgressing the law works against one’s self-interest, and similar theories of
rewards and punishments appears in many liberal thinkers, including Locke. The threat of
punishment, then, would be sufficient to keep individuals from infringing on each other’s
rights while still preserving their liberty by not placing them in physical bondage. Both
ideologies accept this connection between punishment and the law, which sets the stakes
for competitive elections. At least over the past couple of election cycles in the United
States, the possibility of punishing members of the opposing political party has been one
of the prizes of winning the presidential election. So, while the power to punish is not a
logically necessitated goal of an election, it becomes prominent in times of partisanship.
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This is in part a matter of democracy sometimes being defined as an equality before
the law for all citizens.
288
This is evidenced in the constant rhetoric about a corrupt elite, which is an essential
characteristic of populism. Populism seems more strongly founded on the belief that
corruption is real and needs to be rooted out than on an idea of what actually constitutes
purity.
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5.3.2 Forgiveness and Freedom
Where punishment is meant to generate certain behaviors in the body politic,
forgiveness has no such aim. Forgiveness does not follow from a crime in the way that
punishment, as a ‘consequence,’ does. Forgiveness acts anew just as it allows the
criminal to act anew. 289 A proper sense of a political community retains the capacity to
punish but does so while acknowledging and embracing the possibility of forgiveness.
The importance of forgiveness for politics has been noted before. For Arendt, forgiveness
is necessary for politics as such and redeems one of politics’ intrinsic instabilities:
irreversibility. Since politics consists in a beginning from which further events follow,
humans need a way to begin again without being beholden to a past beginning. 290
Forgiveness, in a sense, releases us from a causal chain to the extent that we can initiate
new chains, themselves unpredictable and irreversible. As she understands it, forgiveness
is a political act that retains the openness and novelty of the public sphere.
There are a few ways this discursive activity of establishing the forgivable and
unforgivable plays out. First, it is expressed in trial by jury. This is a constituted and
regulated expression of the people being responsible for applying the law; I cannot
comment on whether it is a reliable method for finding the truth about alleged crimes.
Jury duty, consequently, should be seen as a duty that is at least as vital for a democracy
as voting. But secondly, it also plays out on social media and public discourse more
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I am not speaking here of (presidential) pardons that might be given in return for
political favors, for instance.
290
See Hannah Arendt, HC 241. “Forgiving, in other words, is the only reaction which
does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which
provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and
the one who is forgiven.”
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generally. Arguably, the protests in the wake of the murder of George Floyd express,
among broader concerns about the widespread harm of mass racism, the unforgivability
of a racist, brutal murder by a police officer and enabled by nearby police. The protests
and the public discourse effected the arrest of the officer, and then shortly after, helped to
ensure that the other officers were also charged, and the degree of the murder charge was
increased. But separated from the concrete legal results, the protests helped put into
words (and deeds) a collective need to address and redress violent, oppressive inequality.
An articulation of what counts as unforgivable gives shape to the community standards,
and thus its boundaries, such that (some) expressions of white supremacy are not only
immoral, but they also place their perpetrators outside the community. 291
While my discussion of forgiveness here focuses on freedom, I will briefly note it
is helpful for diagnosing both inequality and disintegration of the political community.
One recurring conversational thread in our national discourse is the way in which white
criminals, especially if they are rich, face much less severe punishments than black
criminals, even when the crimes committed by the latter are minor (or non-existent).
While I am not advocating for stricter procedures when it comes to punishing or
forgiving, I am suggesting that if we see trends in how punishments and forgiveness are
doled out unequally among different identifiable groups, then we can see clearly how
some people are being made unequal and therefore made not to belong. As for communal
disintegration, if one portion of the country sees collateral damage against storefronts
during the BLM protests as unforgivable, while another portion of the country views the
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Not necessarily in terms of banishment, punishment, or execution, but in terms of a
loss of support, of having a place in which people will listen to them or be listened to.
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assault on the Capitol Building as unforgivable—and each side is willing to exercise at
least some forgiveness for their own offenders—then we can see that these two portions
of the community have actually split and become two communities.
I will consider one final reason for the importance of forgiveness for political
freedom, and it involves the prior discussion about social identification. As we saw in
Freud, binding people together in love is possible only on the condition that aggression
collectively gets channeled outside of the group. Hopefully, aggressive impulses can be
mediated by institutions and customs, for instance, by taking place in sporting
competitions, but we cannot assume this will always be the case. Conflict within a
community is always possible, whether it be a mediated competition or a violent
confrontation. In the struggle between populism and liberalism, populists and liberals
may find themselves driven by a desire to punish the other group, which is to say an
aggression that accompanies their sense of social belonging among fellow populists or
liberals. The desire to punish is especially dangerous because an apparent justification for
punishment tends not to limit the aggression against the criminal but rather to augment it.
5.3.3

Forgiveness and the Organic Metaphor

Organically speaking, the possibility of forgiveness corresponds to the body’s
capacity to sustain a diseased part of itself or some foreign bodies without immediately
rejecting them. If the body rejected any part at the first sign of ill health, its immune
system would simply be a system of suicide. But similarly, the body would die if it were
incapable of expelling or eliminating anything within itself. Bodies can have problematic
and even fatal immune responses, and the organic metaphor offers insight not because it
tells us when to forgive and when to remain unforgiving, but because it evokes both
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possibilities as essential but whose efficacy cannot be assured. The possibility of
forgiveness is tied not only to the immune system but to healing and scar tissue. We may
be tempted to think that positive laws bind people together, but laws by themselves
merely subsume and categorize. Genuine, communal binding requires a more active
relationship, and forgiveness is at least one such relationship mediated by law (but not
mechanistically). Having endured crises together, even when responses to said crises may
have gone awry, is one element of our communal fabric, assuming that finite, flawed
responses are met with forgiveness. Such ‘scar tissue,’ our shared histories of suffering,
should be recognized as having political (and not merely psychological or sociological)
importance, and working through those events should be framed as a task worth taking
on.
For the liberal and populist conception of politics, the freedom of the people—in
the sense of participating in the public sphere—is found in elections for representatives,
and neither version of politics presents the question of what is forgivable and
unforgivable. This is because the law is already assumed in both cases. Populism thinks
that law and punishment are at the discretion of the people (or their representative); they
are simply instruments of the will of the people. Liberalism thinks either that (a) the law
and the application of punishment (and pardoning) are governed by some higher
procedure that is not in the hands of the people, (think Rawlsian proceduralism), or that
(b) ‘majority rule’ simply is the procedure. Our institutions happen to be designed around
(b), which is compatible with populism assuming populists constitute a voting
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majority. 292 Liberalism, at least in its (b) formulation, is tantamount to having no immune
system at all. If we were to agree with Mueller that ‘only numbers matter’ and we
endorse majority-decision as the basic democratic procedure—then no ideology or
policy, no matter how destructive, would be off limits in principle. 293 In a sense, it
forgives any vote, provided the formal rules were followed when the vote was cast. Any
losing vote is forgiven, but only because it is immediately forgotten; it has no direct
impact on the constituted powers of the political community. For populism, at least as
espoused by populist leaders, any disagreement with or deviation from the leader’s policy
or will is a sign of corruption and grounds for exclusion, e.g., by being socially isolated,
made politically powerless, arrested, or purged. Populism, then, forgives no impurity in
one’s public voice—although as evidenced by Trump’s regime, it is deeply forgiving of
private faults and corruption, as long as one remains a loyalist publicly. The mechanistic
metaphors that undergird liberalism and populism cannot evoke the question of the
forgivable and unforgivable, and thus liberalism and populism tend toward one of the
options automatically.
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Of course, a liberal could break with the tenet of proceduralism in order to insist on
the primacy of some other feature of liberalism, e.g., a doctrine of rights, but then it
becomes unclear in what sense liberalism is democratic.
293
L&L 45-6. There, Schmitt is doing work on the particular articles of the Weimar
constitution and its introductions of various lawmakers in different situations. Here, I am
addressing a mechanistic mode of thought endemic to liberalism. It may be the case that
liberalism could, in principle, have a more stable doctrine of rights, values, etc., but it
would have to take its doctrine seriously enough to eschew popular vote as a procedure
for politics.
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5.4

Democratic Politics and Critique
Over the last three sections, I have attempted to indicate how the organic

metaphor for political unity would orient democratic thinking about unity, authority, and
freedom. I have done this in order to restore a sense in which democratic community is
the doing of the people directly and in which a people is responsible for its laws without
seeking control of common institutions. This organic sense of democracy encourages
political form accommodating of pluralism while allowing a people to distinguish itself
as its own, distinct unity. Moreover, it situates government representatives within the
wider community. Democratic community is not a result of the actions of a few elite
representatives, and it is not automatically handled by laws, institutions, and procedures.
This approach not only refocuses on our attention on how community arises and is
sustained, but it also restores to democracy the possibility that the promise of freedom
can be fulfilled. My aim in this section is to further contrast democratic politics to both
liberalism—as we find it in the popular consciousness surrounding our actual
institutions—and populism—at least its common Right-wing variants—and to elaborate
on how this account features into political critique.
5.4.1

The People and Public Power

If we think that democracy promises that a people can be responsible for its laws,
then we should recognize that ideologies rooted in a mechanistic metaphor cannot fulfill
this promise. The most familiar liberal-democratic mechanism of participating in public
power is voting. In contrast to the catalog of negative rights, the right to vote is strangely
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positive. 294 At least for someone like Isaiah Berlin, who is worried about the excesses of
public power, one would have to imagine that this positive right to participate in politics
does not arouse suspicion because, it is assumed, one’s vote will be canceled out (or
checked or limited) by the vote of another. Consequently, as long as liberalism and
populism draw from the metaphor of mechanism, voting will tend to be seen as either
impotent or a means of controlling public decisions. Of course, versions of liberalism that
do not insist on the primacy of voting procedures have a more difficult issue insofar as
‘democracy’ becomes a superfluous component of such a liberalism.
The right to vote is perhaps the right that populist leaders seek to exploit and
pervert the most, given how voting is understood in terms of mechanism and power.
Trump’s rhetoric in the wake of his 2020 electoral defeat offers strong evidence of the
importance of voting for populism. On the one hand, he brags about how many votes he
has. But when he lost the election, he did everything in his power to discredit the
elections, dispute how the elections are called, and then put on a show of having
alternative electors (from fictional states), etc. Elections are the mechanism that no
constituted power is supposed to control; ideally, it is the mechanism by which the people
express its will directly. For this reason, it is the mechanism that populists will either seek
to control the most or to destroy if they fail.
Populist supporters usually endorse their leader’s stance regarding voting because
an electoral victory offers a vicarious sense of controlling the government. Such a strong
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Since (a) voting is a right of citizenship rather than a human right, and (b) voting is the
mechanism by which citizens generate public power, this right to vote has not been
emphasized in the tradition of liberalism, e.g., as given by Berlin and Constant. Instead,
the right to vote has been an issue of debate once liberalism has taken hold and social
groups have sought to attain such rights.
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drive to control government through a single representative requires a strong social
identification that need not be tied to any active community; like Louis Bonaparte, the
populist leader can appeal to a disorganized class. Unless populist leaders begin to
institute extensive referendums, and historically they do not, then they offer a messianic
version of politics in which one person is responsible for the whole people. The populist
leader delivers the people from its enemies. Just as the leader flourishes—or more
precisely, makes other groups suffer—so too do supporters take themselves to flourish.
While this may be an effective way for people to feel a sense of control over the public
world, it hardly offers any freedom. Moreover, anyone may find themselves suddenly at
odds with the populist movement, which they will find is cruelly unforgiving.
In the everyday functioning of liberalism, the mechanism of voting can render
experiences of impotence or the same drive to control government as populism.
Considered merely in terms of quantity—the pure, non-moralized characteristic of liberal
democracy according to Mueller—the voting individual becomes less powerful the larger
and more powerful the state is. The competitive mechanism of elections implies that
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one’s vote plays virtually no role by itself, 295 and if one’s chosen candidate loses, then
one has does not even vicariously have a sense of having influenced public policy. 296
Nevertheless, there are aspects of critique that liberalism and populism offer that I
wish to retain for this account. Liberalism offers the claim that institutions should, in
some way, be open-ended. They should not be controlled by a determinate interest group
or social identity. Populism, meanwhile, makes possible the claim that government
officials can seek their own interest over and against the community’s will—which
populists understand as an interest and that I have advanced as a project of community.
The point of the populist critique is that no ‘design’ of an institution can prevent
corruption, and that ultimately representatives (and their constituencies) must be
principled for institutions to serve as organs of freedom. Liberalism may be too narrowminded in its focus on constituted power, it nevertheless makes possible meaningful
critiques of what can empirically go wrong with institutions.
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Hegel criticizes the mechanism of voting, noting that as the quantity of votes increase,
then the results of the election appear all the more arbitrary. This is because the question
is no longer being answered by way of a principle, but by a simple magnitude. See GWF
Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Peter Hodgson (trans.) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 2011) 403, especially the claim, “If things come this final exactitude, the
decision also appears to be contingent and will be resented, especially if at the same time
inner conviction, the reflection of will, comes into play and is aware that whatever law
alone, or whatever else has been decided, contributes to the corruption of the state.”
Henceforth, “PWH.”
296
One may even feel that one’s will has been actively foiled when one’s candidate loses.
Recall the distress many Democrats felt once Trump was elected in 2016. One could
contend that one is always virtually represented, even if one’s candidate is not victorious.
But if that is true, elections are a superfluous mechanism. One’s interests can be
represented even without having cast a vote. If voting is important, it must be because it
belongs to the order of participation in the state, not because it belongs to the logic of
representation.
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While my account has emphasized constituent power, especially as it is
expressed in non-institutional acts and discourse, this has not been intended to replace
discussions about constituted power and the kinds of problems that arise therein. Rather, I
think the organic metaphor for political democracy encourages us to think primarily
about the relationship of constituent and constituted power. It encourages to ask, for
instance, how are stable institutions with set parameters and regulations an expression of
spontaneous world-creation by a people? When we focus our attention simply on
representatives and positive laws, we fall under impression that a people’s behaviors can
be controlled by a centralized force, rather than thinking that a people affects its laws. 297
Further, by reorienting our attention on everyday acts of community and belonging, I
hope to bring into focus how much the labor of community is performed by citizens,
which is surely a kind of justice. 298 The focus on representatives and constituted power
seems to me to over-estimate the extent to which particular individuals have control over
public affairs and seems to resonate with a belief in conspiracy theories. This overemphasis on representatives comes at the expense of paying attention to the people who
have a meaningful and direct impact on our projects.

297

This is the effect of my argument in “DRLR.” Changing laws about school
segregation and enforcing them may be good—or at least for a good cause—but if people
are still predominantly racist, then those changes in laws will be largely ineffectual. And
indeed, while the letter of the law held that schools could not be segregated, those who
were unpersuaded simply created new schools and laws to maintain de facto segregation.
298
I intend here not only people in professions such as teachers, firefighters, etc., but also
non-economic positions, such as church members, neighbors, as well as people who offer
support or friendship in unexpected places. It should unsurprising that many of the people
who do the work of community underappreciated either are women or find themselves in
roles historically assigned to the private sphere and associated with women’s work.
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5.4.2

The Problem of Authoritarianism

We took up the issue of authoritarianism in the second chapter. There, we
understood the term to mean that a constituted power, a representative, has unchecked
power. Let us imagine that a government official abuses their power, for instance, by
firing whistleblowers within an administration. How might we critique it? By drawing on
a notion of mechanism, liberalism encourages thinking in terms of counter-mechanism:
what lawful means are open to stopping the populist? How might an office be redesigned
to prevent abuse? The problem with this scenario is that the counter-mechanism is being
removed, thereby making the power of the representative unchecked. The action is
objectionable on formal grounds, and the immediate goal would be to re-check the
representative’s power. All of this is to say that the immediate impulses of liberalism
frame ‘critique’ in terms of a technical question. The populist critique, if it were honest,
would be concerned less with the form of representative power and more with the
content. Do the representative’s actions serve the interest of the people? But this is to say
that ‘authoritarianism’ is not a problem in populism’s understanding of politics. The only
thing that matters is that power is in the right hands, and the pre-condition of populism is
the belief that power is already in the wrong hands.
Unlike liberalism’s use of the mechanistic metaphor, the organic metaphor does
not offer any immediate practical solutions; it generates no ‘fix’ to political problems.
What it does is help to orient our thinking about what counts as a problem and a response.
The problem with an official abusing their power is not that power itself tends toward
evil and needs to be ‘checked.’ Nor is the problem that an action is being taken that might
not be in the public’s self-interest. The potential problem is that a government action is
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taking place that is not expressive of the people’s shared principles and that hinders the
publicity of office—and all things being equal, publicity is required for citizens to remain
capable of informed (if non-governmental) action. But there can be exceptions to this
general preference for publicity, such as some matters of (inter)national security, and
there may be situations in which the whistleblower is corrupt. What populism gets right
generally is that constituted power should be in the right hands, not for the purposes of
any identifiable interest, but for the sake realizing and maintaining the people’s shared
principles.
5.4.3

The Problem of Anti-Pluralism

We reviewed the problem of anti-pluralism and populism in the third chapter.
What we found is that while a democracy should be socially pluralistic—allowing
multiple identities which may have their own interests—it also requires political
homogeneity. So, for instance, a liberal democracy cannot allow monarchist groups who
seek to supplant elected government with a single, hereditary ruler. More substantially, a
democracy must require some shared fundamental principles; if ‘the people’ endorses
some material notion of equality, then it cannot allow radical individualism to have much
footing. The point here is not that each people can have only one normative concept, but
that committing to a principle (a) entails renouncing any principles that are incompatible
with it, and (b) subordinating other normative concerns to the shared principle.
Populism threatens the plurality of social identities by seeking to harm other
groups, often economically and politically if not violently. Understood organically,
aggression toward minorities or other identities is not an expedient way to pursue one
group’s self-interest, it is a path of self-destruction. It would be like cutting out one’s
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liver to make more room for one’s stomach. But even this characterization assumes stable
boundaries between groups; populism in actuality can be more directly self-destructive.
For instance, after losing the 2020 election, Trump has denounced any Republicans who
are not in denial about Biden’s victory. Now, his supporters are turning their backs on
several Republican figures and candidates. This clearly diminishes their pool of allies and
will likely yield further electoral losses. Moreover, it catches Republican populists in a
cycle of constantly seeking to punish Republicans for their lack of purity instead of
forgiving their differences in order to focus on realizing whatever goals they still share.
The fact that the Republican party has not entirely collapsed is a testament to how much
many Americans distrust their ruling elite.
5.4.4

Lefort’s Criticism of the Organic Metaphor

Democratic power, Claude Lefort argued, is best represented by an ‘empty place
of power.’ 299 This conception encourages thinking of democratic institutions as contested
spaces in which a voting group only seizes power temporarily and without thereby
eliminating other groups. By contrast, Lefort thinks that the organic conception
encourages thinking of institutions as a means of subordinating every part of the body
politic to the whole. Or in other words, every individual is just a function to be arranged
and put to work by a centralized agency. Such a metaphor is adopted by totalitarianism,
which conceives of the body as controlled by a head and conceives of a people as
controlled by a supreme leader. 300
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The former, democratic representation of power acknowledges society as
something that cannot be controlled, at least not in any enduring sense. The latter,
totalitarian representation entails thinking of the leader either as a kind of social engineer,
planning and controlling the body, or as a mechanistic ‘organ’ whose functions simply
have a higher place of importance. Lefort acknowledges the extent to which the organic
metaphor has been colonized and transformed by a mechanistic metaphor. But Lefort
does not further question this transformation. Is such a transformation necessary? What
drove this transformation?
My contention is first, that the functionalization of the individual is only possible
on a mechanistic conception of the state. That is, it is only when we think of the body as a
giant machine, whose parts are devoted to realizing given ends and whose operations are
entirely transparent and controllable that we make the jump to a totalitarian conception of
power. Totalitarianism needs mechanism in a way that it does not need organism.
Second, I contend that the blending of the organic and mechanistic metaphors is not
necessary, and properly understood, it is a corrective to the mechanistic metaphor. 301 As I
have been arguing throughout this chapter, the organic metaphor can offer its own
guiding concepts for unity, authority, and freedom. My focus for the rest of this section is
showing the drive toward mechanism and how it corrupts the organic metaphor.
The impetus for conceiving of the body—political or personal—in mechanistic
terms stems from a fantasy of being entirely self-possessed, i.e., fully one’s own and free
of impurity, internally homogeneous. Any sign of impurity should be excreted
immediately. On Lefort’s account, the people is defined by its purity and need to eject
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whatever is other—some malevolent, parasitic group. 302 Categorizing ‘the other,’ has
played a role in totalitarian, fascist, and populist rhetoric. Interestingly, the notion of
‘parasite’ is not simply an out-group. First, it is an out-group that has found its way to the
inside. Second, it is a group defined by receiving benefits from an entity to whom it does
not contribute; it is a ‘free-rider’ on body of the commonwealth. ‘The other,’ whether it
be liberals, foreigners, or globalists, does not belong, and yet it is taking up valuable
space in the body politic. Thus, the populist (and totalitarian) project of eliminating the
parasite is not simply maintaining boundaries to distinguish inside from outside; it aims
to purify the inside. Moreover, if I am right in my diagnosis of how a social identity
comes to take the place of a political identity, then we can readily recognize this ‘antiparasite’ stance as an anti-difference stance, full stop. True enough, a people must be able
exclude principles that are not compatible with its own. A democracy cannot allow a selfstyled king; America cannot invite every Russian to cast a vote in American elections,
etc. Just as with an organism, who cannot consume its own excrement or allow itself to
become one with its predator, a political body must be able to exclude. But if we take the
organic metaphor seriously, the organic metaphor indicates that a political body must
allow internal differentiation.
We must be on guard if we are to take up the organic metaphor for political unity
in a non-mechanistic sense. It is neither, for instance, an invitation to think of a people as
merely carrying out a minimal, organic functioning. Nor is it an invitation to think that a
people have an immutable form that persists through the changing generations. While the
organic metaphor may encourage us to think of internal balance, it is not the kind at play
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in competition; it is the kind evoked when differentiated organs must cooperate for the
sake of the life of the whole organism without dominating the others. I take it that
developing a normative picture of the political community by drawing on the organic
metaphor encourages us to do two things. First, it encourages us to think of the
community as performing actions involving growth, cultivation, and change, whereas the
mechanistic interpretation encourages us to think in terms of instrumentality, force, and
prediction. Second, the metaphor requires us to think of the parts and wholes of the
community in a co-constitutive relationship.

5.5

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have offered an account of the organic metaphor as offering a

better orientation for democratic thought than the mechanistic metaphor. I interpreted the
unity of the people as a commitment to the project of community and the labors of
belonging in which individuals support each other within a richer communal context. I
interpreted representative authority not as right to control government, but as a
stewardship of shared principles, an orientation for growth and action, and giving faces to
the law. I then discussed public freedom as a discursive, general conversation about what
is forgivable and unforgivable. Finally, I addressed how the organic metaphor orients our
thinking about critiquing problems in constituted powers.
I have offered this account with the hope of redirecting critiques of current waves
of populism to be more open to a people’s capacity to act in unexpected, unregulated
ways. While I think Trump is a corrupt politician, I worry that critiques from within a
liberal framework will make matters worse (both strategically as well as well as in terms
of the health of the political community). There is a tendency to identify all Trump
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voters as die-hard, homogeneous Trump supporters, and from that identification, all
manner of criticisms and associations are made about a large, heterogeneous portion of
the population. These people are treated as though they are transparent, misbehaving
children, and the more ‘enlightened’ liberals think that they need to be controlled,
corrected, and if that fails, simply beaten in elections. 303 When ‘solutions’ are framed in
this way, such critics are voluntarily becoming the very thing that conservative
Americans think they are: elitists intent on humiliating and controlling them. This is not
to say that one needs to embrace populists’ beliefs, or that disagreement should be
forbidden, or even that being more open and vulnerable will restore an original unity of
the community. I think that once you no longer view someone’s opinion or commitments
as respectable, then the community has already withered, and public action is at least
temporarily impossible. 304 In such a scenario, the mechanistic ‘moves’ that we are
familiar with may seemingly offer us a means to combat populism in the short term, but
such victories are at the expense of a healthy democracy. Perhaps Hegel is right, and the
constitution of modern states is no longer compatible with democracy; 305 but it seems to
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This attitude permeates various discourses about populism. We have seen it explicitly
in Roberts’s “PPD,” esp. 152-3.
304
One of Arendt’s compelling, but unhappy, contributions to political philosophy is the
diagnosis of a widespread erosion of the public sphere. I not only think that she is right
about that point but also that politics is always possible. And while infinitely unlikely,
public spaces can emerge anywhere people are speaking and possibly acting. It is the
threat of totalitarianism—not populism—that seeks to make the possibility of politics
impossible.
305
PWH 400-4. Hegel’s theory of the state is composite. It involves democratic as well as
aristocratic elements. But the sovereign power, the fulfilment of the idea of the state, is a
monarch, and that monarchy is not an electoral one. I am certainly amenable to the idea
of a composite state, but I take it that the general commitments of our time are such that
the democratic element must be sovereign, and that requires a substantive, shared spirit.
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me at least prima facie more likely that democracy is possible, but devoted antidemocratic people should not participate in democracy.
The organic metaphor offers two routes for critique without demonizing or
infantilizing the people or groups thereof, largely because it encourages thinking about
what we can undertake without compromising the constitution. Either we can treat
populists as fellow citizens to be persuaded and whose opinions matter (and hopefully
thereby ease some of the partisan tension), or, we can say they do not share our principles
or commitments to our actual institutions. They advocate for a government and can only
see their freedom that is not our own. In which case, they should not participate in our
elections. They are an ‘enemy,’ if not a foe, and while this does not necessitate violence,
we cannot pretend to share our space of public freedom while seeking to defeat that
freedom at every turn (and vice versa).
One possible objection to my view is that liberalism or populism could adopt an
organic metaphor and thereby avoid any of the criticisms I have offered. My main
response is that adopting an organic, rather than mechanistic metaphor would entail reordering the importance of our guiding concepts. Once we no longer diagnose public
problems as a violation of, e.g., competitive equilibrium, checks and balances, or
“popular sovereignty” as control of the government, we no longer see the same kinds of
‘solutions’ to those problems. While populist and liberal ideologies do not logically
exclude the organic metaphor, it should be clear that the way their concepts work to
orient action can only be evoked by a mechanistic schema. Populism thinks of
communities in terms of what it controls and how it will create prosperity, stability,
rights, etc. while it presents the people under one name. For Right-wing populism, the
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name is usually an ethnicity or nation, while Left-wing populism promotes a socioeconomic class. 306 Laws are an instrument to achieve this end, and they can be used to
punish the foes of the people. Liberalism thinks of communities as aggregates of
individuals whose interests sometimes cause conflict. The hope of classical liberalism,
articulated by Benjamin Constant, is that economics will replace war. The hope of
Rawlsian liberalism is that we will, at best, somehow build our elections on top of an
ideal procedure that replaces living citizens with mathematically constructed legislators.
We might add that for liberalism, elections have replaced domestic strife. In both cases—
war and domestic strife—all antagonism has been transformed into competition,
mediated by independent laws. Liberalism, too, promotes thinking in terms of
instrumentality—e.g., how to pursue one’s interest and how to get others to behave—but
with the caveat that all public power should be limited, regardless of its end. The
implication, perhaps unconscious, is that a people is less responsible for its laws than the
general mechanisms of civil society, and it is in reacting against this implication that
populists can be said to be democratic at all. Nevertheless, I think my account preserves
the best features of liberalism and populism, even as it resituates them in a more
comprehensive theory.
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For Mouffe and Laclau, the “yellow vest” protestors in France would be a good
exemplar of populism. However, they do not fit perfectly with the definition offered
earlier because they did give rise to a representative and participate in government. Much
like the Left-oriented “the 99%,” in the U.S., there was a demand for widespread
institutional change from large groups, but no lasting institutional change in government.
Thus, while there are populist elements to those movements, the fact that they were not
headed by a leader makes them fall short of populism. To further clarify, it seems to me
that Bernie Sanders is not an example of a populist leader in large part because (a) he
seems largely uninterested in a singular name of the people that differentiates us from
other groups, and (b) he does not suggest that he is the only person who can represent the
people (as Hugo Chavez did and as Trump evidently does).
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION
My two primary goals in this dissertation were to show populism’s essential
continuity with liberalism and to show how the organic metaphor for political unity
would offer a more stable conception of democracy. Animated by the same mechanistic
metaphor and coupled with the idea of a self-interested individual as a metaphor,
populism adopts many of the same concepts of liberalism, weaponizes them, and assaults
the vital plurality of the body politic. While liberalism may seek to protect plurality by
way of limiting power, its resources for recognizing the spontaneity of individuals and
the need for collective action and belonging are impoverished. To be sure, there are
liberal thinkers willing to concede this point. 307 My secondary point is that this
impoverishment eliminates the ‘properly political’ in such a way that is bound to lead to
disaster. When spontaneity and the urge to participate in politics is utterly suppressed, it
returns in the guise of private, socio-economic concepts that are destructive to the public.
Populism can exploit liberal concepts because the mechanistic metaphor that they
share offers a socio-economic framework for conceiving individuals and communities.
Liberalism, at least in many of its formulations where it is critiquing power, 308 conceives
of individuals as independent, capable of pursuing their self-interest in isolation, and
deserving of negative liberties. The independent individual is an instrumental reasoner,
formulating means to accomplish relatively set ends and establishing calcified patterns of
behavior. Populism, when it takes the individual as a metaphor for the community,
ascribes these attributes to the community and encourages the immediate identification of
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E.g., Galston, whose relevant passage was cited in chapter two.
For instance, Constant and Berlin, as well as the contemporaries Galston, Abts and
Rummens, Mueller, and Roberts, to name a few.
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the members with the whole. For a populist, then, any apparent difference in self-interest,
or potentially any difference in social identity, is grounds for expulsion from the
community. Such ‘others’ are parasites, foreigners, outsiders, globalists, etc., and
properly speaking, not members of the nation. And a populist leader should be able to
pursue the self-interest of their constituency free from any obstacles or resistance. A
healthy vision of democracy, I proposed, involves conceiving of the individual as capable
of acting together with others in unexpected ways, and ‘the people’ of a democracy
demarcates a group to which one belongs and in which one can continually begin anew.
Liberalism seeks to protect plurality by way of protecting individuals in a system
of rights, i.e., negative liberties that limit the exercise of public power against them. John
Stuart Mill offers one of the more influential arguments that neither the government nor
the majority (or some other ‘social,’ i.e., non-governmental association) should be able to
compel individuals into conformity unless that person is causing harm to other
individuals. 309 Rights, and therefore the individual, can be most reliably protected when
government power is limited by way of checks and balances: as long as relatively equal
factions (or powers or branches, etc.) can limit each other, then no one part will become
so powerful that it can trample over individuals. This vision of a checked and balanced
government is a kind of mechanism, and that mechanism can be assumed to be effective
for as long as its form holds up sufficiently well to push and pull, limit and check, and
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John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1978) 9.
“The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and
control, whether the means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties or the
moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind
are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any
of their number is self-protection.”
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impact the calculations of subjects, effectively. However, in addition to its formal
composition, a government is instituted for the sake of power, or in other words,
government is instituted for the sake of establishing power, not dividing it. And the
questions of what kind of power is instituted, who ‘wields’ it and for whom, are political
questions that are not answered by simply insisting on division. Populism seeks to answer
these questions, but its resources are again bound up with the independent, private
individual.
If we attempt to answer the ‘who’ questions just mentioned in a democratic
fashion, we might be rightfully inclined to answer “the people” wields government
power. But ‘the people’ can be conceived in different ways, and both liberalism and
populism take for granted some notion of ‘the majority’ as a mechanism for the operation
of power. Moreover, populism attempts to further the ‘who’ question by offering some
concrete social identity, like a nation or a race, as grounds for membership in the people.
Any healthy political body, contra purity-seeking populism, must be open to multiple
social identities (not necessarily all). No community can exist without internal
differentiation. Moreover, that internal differentiation has to be self-articulated and
(relatively) spontaneous; it cannot simply be functional, as it is with the specialization of
labor. The democratic tradition, especially in one interpretation of Rousseau’s thinking,
offers a view for thinking of how different individuals can create a political community
by way of their own activity. Rousseau calls this ‘the general will,’ which is a concept
that currently finds itself maligned by liberal critics of populism (and liberal critics of
fascism half a century earlier). I have sought to disentangle such a productive reading of
Rousseau from the socio-economic readings that he certainly encourages at times.
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While populism may be unconsciously guided by the democratic tradition, and
especially Rousseau’s ‘general will’ and his use of the individual as a metaphor for the
community, I have made it clear that it is not Rousseau that is the problem with populism.
Rather, it is how Rousseau and ‘the individual’ are understood. Community should not,
contra populism, be understood as a naturally given identity or even a shared interest that
automatically unfolds in practical life. Community is the laboring of making community,
and such labors entail thinking about the general relationships that the specific
community will have.
By drawing from the organic metaphor, I have shown how Rousseau’s general
will can be understood as this shared project of community, and I have further interpreted
it as a project of belonging. This project is the basis of democratic community and is not
fully captured, contained, or relegated to government. It is this project, carried out in a
multitude of particular acts, that gives the community its unity, a unity that is a
togetherness of different parts. Such a unity requires a shared will, which is a kind of
homogeneity, but in principle it can be (and must be) forgiving for at least some
imperfections. This community in difference is compatible with ‘social change,’ i.e.,
redressing inequality, but it encourages us to think not of abstract demands for equality,
but of the demand and the need for different groups to belong. Of course, a community
cannot be infinitely permissible; it must be able to expel or protect against (a) those who
do not share a commitment to the basic political form of the community, 310 and (b) those
who are staunchly opposed to the general principles of the community. So, while I think
communities must be generally forgiving, I do not think that the United States should
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You cannot have a monarchist party in a democracy, for instance.
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have any tolerance for—to give one example—white supremacist groups, since they
violate not only our general view of human rights but also the federal principles of our
specific republic. 311
Freedom, then, in contrast to a set of negative liberties or rights, consists in
participating in public power, and more specifically, in being responsible for the law. I
have attempted to situate such a notion of democratic freedom in terms of establishing the
forgivable and unforgivable through, for instance, jury duty rather than in voting. If a
people, qua collective, can be responsible for its laws, it is not going to be in the mode of
creating or controlling those laws. But interpreting how those laws apply to and maintain
the community is a possible venue for shaping the public world, i.e., the interpretation of
the law is a locus for political power even when creating and shaping the letter of the law
is not an option. Engaging in acts of forgiveness, and seeking independence from those
who perform the unforgivable, is not only an expression of collective freedom; it
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While my focus is on populism, I will offer a brief elaboration here on forgiveness. It
seems revealing to me that a large portion of conservatives in this country want to hold
the BLM protests accountable for their worst excesses, rather than their principles, but
then have an attitude toward the police based on police principles rather than their worst
excesses. It seems to me that a kind of community is emergent in this difference in
attitude, and even if it is not as explicitly or fundamentally white-supremacist as, for
instance, the Proud Boys—who are beyond redemption—it clearly shows an eagerness to
expel black people from the wider ‘commonwealth.’ If proverbial push comes to shove,
and it turns out that such conservatives are devoted to such race-thinking, then they too
should be barred from participating in public power. They should not have their human
rights—as the healthy community envisions them—violated, but politically speaking,
they do not belong. Prior to the ‘push comes to shove’ moment, openness and forgiveness
is preferred, and to paraphrase Nietzsche’s claim The Genealogy of Morals, the measure
of the strength of our community is by how much it can forgive, not how much it can
punish. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, (New York:
Vintage Books 1989) 72.
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maintains the possibility of freedom for future acts, liberating a people from the chain of
cause-and-effect.
Finally, I have offered an organically motivated notion of representative
government as an orienting organ of the body politic, not a control center. This notion of
orientation views elected office not as offering ‘control’ over the whole, but as
completing and articulating what is already inchoately in the whole. Moreover, as a plural
body of representatives, democratic officials model and express the different
perspectives, stemming from different social groups, that people may have on the shared
principles and laws.
From the considerations here, I wish to draw the conclusion that ‘the problem’ of
populists, at least of the Trump variety, is not that they are criminals or sinners or
‘deplorables.’ They might be those things, but that is not something peculiar to populism.
The tradition of liberalism, which has established much of our conceptual framework for
‘politics,’ has given us the familiar category of the criminal as one who violates the law,
but when liberal theorists frame populists primarily as criminals, they are misrecognizing
populists. Populists seek to create a new political form under ‘principles’ that are not
shared. This makes them ‘enemies.’ The liberal critics Abts and Rummens are right to
recognize this category as appropriately applied to populists, but that is only because
Schmitt and Rousseau—and the democratic tradition more generally—open a robust
political thinking that Abts and Rummens otherwise seek to deny by insisting on an
impoverished representative liberalism. 312
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